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AFIT/GEE/ENV/03-08 
Abstract 
The goal of this research is to bring a new, dynamic modeling perspective to 
organizational information technology (IT) implementation systems (using the Air Force 
GeoBase initiative as a real-world example) without compromising principles from the 
research literature.  Undesired behavior patterns, from historically poor IT 
implementation performance, versus desired behavior patterns are incorporated into the 
model structure.   
Using a system dynamics approach, multiple simulation runs under various initial 
conditions and organizational contexts are performed and compared over a short-term 
versus a long-term period of time.  Based on these simulation runs, various mixes of 
management interventions, under varying conditions, are recommended to improve IT 
implementation performance based on manager and organizational goals. 
Generally, for better long-term system performance, learning management, with a 
focus on team learning, is the best single IT implementation tool.  With a low level of 
organizational buy-in at the beginning of the IT implementation effort, change process 
management should be the initial focus of management effort.  Reward system 
management provides a short-term spark, but its implementation effects are not carried 
over for long-term sustainment as readily as learning management or change process 
management.  Continuity management, though beneficial, does not provide as much 
“bang for the buck” as the other management interventions. 
 
 
 1
A SYSTEM DYNAMICS APPROACH FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINMENT 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
When significant technological innovations are introduced into organizations, 
organizational personnel must traverse a typically unpleasant mountain of change.  
Individual routines are disrupted, self-efficacy issues arise, organizational resistance 
reigns, and managers are left to pick up the broken pieces of the status quo and try to join 
them back together into a better way of doing business.  Oftentimes, managers do not 
know exactly how to put the pieces back together to create a better way of operating.  
They may do something, which may result in a strangely configured organizational 
mosaic that only someone like Picasso could appreciate or they may do nothing, which 
would allow the shattered pieces of the status quo to gently merge back together on their 
own.   At other times, however, talented managers, well versed in change management 
and organizational dynamics, are able to beautifully guide their compatriots on a path of 
enlightenment that amazingly improves performance, using the innovation that started the 
whole change process in the first place. 
Air Force organizations are attempting to implement significant information 
technology (IT) innovations, which introduce significant change into an organization’s 
dynamics.  History has shown that Air Force organizations have had limited success with 
IT implementation and sustainment.  This is a major problem because significant IT 
innovations require a large upfront investment of money and manpower, which dissolves 
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if the IT implementation effort is unsuccessful.  Top-level leaders usually envision, either 
implicitly or explicitly, the concept of a payback period when considering an IT 
investment – if I invest these resources in this IT innovation, what type of organizational 
performance enhancements can I expect and when will I see them?  This concept can be 
called a performance payback period – when will I recoup my initial investment in the 
form of performance enhancement?  
The following quote sums up the historical problem with IT implementation 
efforts:  “Post mortems of failed IT investments clearly diagnose an overemphasis on 
short-term technology issues and insufficient attention to sustainment concerns [people 
issues] as the cause of their early death” (Department of the Air Force, 2002b:I).  The 
short-term technology focus, though necessary, does not address the long-term, people-
driven factors that make IT sustainment possible.  This research hopes to assist 
organizational IT managers recognize and address these long-term sustainment issues 
before their IT investment suffers an early death. 
The words implementation and sustainment have a dynamic flavor.  A manager 
has to do something over time to implement and sustain an IT innovation, yet there has 
not been any published research that holistically considers the dynamic aspects of IT 
implementation and sustainment.  This research takes a dynamic view of the IT 
implementation process and presents a fresh, new, innovative way of looking at it.  
Relevant research literature presents a multitude of different methods managers can use 
to implement IT, but how do these management interventions affect organizational 
performance in the short-term as opposed to the long-term?  Are there tradeoffs and, if 
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so, how can a manager balance them in such a way as to maximize system performance 
in either the short-term or long-term, based on organizational goals?  
This research presents a generalized view of an IT implementation and 
sustainment system, using the Air Force GeoBase initiative as a specific case study, and 
proposes various combinations of management interventions that address performance in 
either the short-term or long-term.  Even though the IT focus of this research is the 
GeoBase initiative, this approach can be used generally for any type of IT innovation 
implementation effort. 
GeoBase Management 
The Air Force is embarking on a significant change journey as a result of an IT 
innovation called GeoBase.  GeoBase is an Air Force initiative aimed at transforming 
both how personnel deal with information and IT on Air Force installations.  GeoBase 
changes the way people think about and use database information – spatially enabling 
databases and sharing information across installation functional units (Cullis, 2002).  
GeoBase also allows a wide range of personnel to access spatial data using a geographic 
information system (GIS).  A GIS is an “automated system for the capture, storage, 
retrieval, analysis, and display of spatial data” (Clarke, 2001:3).  Much like IT 
implementation in general, the Air Force has historically not done very well with GIS 
implementation efforts of the past.  Lieutenant General Zettler, AF/IL, stated, “When it 
comes to management/fielding of new IT capabilities, ‘we do extremely poorly’” 
(Department of the Air Force, 2002a).   
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It is understandable that managers would have a difficult time managing and 
fielding new IT capabilities.  Organizations are made up of people.  Managers must 
function in these human systems.  Humans display highly dynamic and often confusing 
behavior – there are motivations hinging on personal as well as organizational goals, 
perceptions of reality that may or may not be accurate, dynamic social interaction, and a 
plethora of other influences that make understanding social behavior and organizational 
dynamics difficult (Kim, 1993; Rogers, 1995; Cullis, 2000; Agarwal & Prasad, 2000).  
In organizations, managers are tasked to focus human effort to achieve 
organizational goals and objectives.  In complex, dynamic organizations, managers are 
often not aware of how their programs and policies will affect organizational 
performance and how significant time delays can be.  Is there a tool that can help the 
manager better understand these complex human systems so he or she can more 
effectively guide the organization where it should go?  This research hopes to help with 
this question, and yes, there is a tool that can help – namely, system dynamics.  System 
dynamics can be instrumental in helping the manager understand how his organizational 
system interacts and how his management interventions affect the organizational system. 
System Dynamics Approach 
System dynamics provides an analysis methodology that captures a system’s 
dynamic behavior by simulating the interaction of variables over time (Sterman, 2000).  
System dynamics allows the researcher to simulate simultaneous continuous-time 
processes rather than discrete event processes.  As such, the researcher can explore time 
lags, nonlinear dynamic complexity, and other dynamic behavior (Sterman, 2000).   
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Dynamic system behavior is modeled by the interaction of variables locked into 
causal loop structures.  Causal loops are feedback processes (A affects B, which, in turn, 
affects A) that define how a system responds to system inputs.  The natural behavior of a 
system is derived from its endogenous structure (system variables that affect one 
another).  A portion of this research aims to identify the aggregated, substantial variables 
present within the IT organizational implementation system.  Organizing these aggregate 
variables into structures that give rise to hypothesized or historical behavior patterns over 
time allows the modeler to analyze different combinations of management intervention 
strategies that dynamically affect the system in different ways.  The organizational-level 
manager will then better understand how to affect change within the system and explore 
how his actions affect the system using simulation and experimentation. 
GIS and GeoBase 
Referring back to the definition of a GIS, an “automated system for the capture, 
storage, retrieval, analysis, and display of spatial data” (Clarke, 2001:3), the word 
“spatial data” stands out.  The term “spatial data” refers to a collection of geographic 
features and their attributes. Three features can be modeled in a GIS – points, lines, and 
polygons.  For example, a point could be used to locate a wellhead, a line could designate 
an underground water pipeline, and a polygon could distinguish a building footprint, or 
any object with a large area.  A GIS also attaches attribute information to each of these 
geographic features.  For example, tabular information about a building (building 
number, number of floors, etc.) could be attached to a polygon feature in the GIS. 
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The power of GIS is derived from its ability to sort geographic features onto map 
layers.  Any Air Force base has many geographic features dispersed throughout its 
physical area – buildings, underground pipelines, roads, water bodies, etc.  On one layer, 
all of a base’s roads, with associated attributes, could be depicted.  On another layer, all 
of the underground water pipelines could be shown.  The GIS user can choose to 
simultaneously display as many of these layers as desired, each stacked one on top of the 
other.  A digital map, included as a separate layer, could also be inserted to provide 
location context for the objects.  Layering allows the user to perform geographic and/or 
attribute queries (i.e., show me all of the points that lie within 100 feet of this building 
footprint), construct digital maps, analyze geographic patterns, observe (i.e., has a land 
feature appreciably changed over time?), or plan (i.e., will digging a hole impact 
underground lines, endangered species habitat, etc?).  Dramatic advancements in 
computer, database, satellite imagery, and global positioning system (GPS) technology 
over the past few decades have fueled the usefulness and power of GIS and enabled its 
diffusion throughout the marketplace (Clarke, 2000; Cullis, 2000:6-7).  Figure 1 presents 
a screen shot from a functioning GIS.  In this figure, a map with overlaid attributes is 
pictured.  Each attribute has attached database information and a digital picture.  The 
combination of the map, attributes, database, and the personnel manipulating these items 
makes up the GIS.   
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Figure 1: Example of a GIS (with Geographic Features and Attributes Shown) 
(Cullis, 2002) 
 
Beginning in the late 1980s, innovative Air Force personnel recognized the 
usefulness of GIS and began integrating GIS systems into applicable work functions 
(Cullis, 2000:4).  This adoption occurred as autonomous AF organizations collected 
spatial data, digital maps, and computer hardware and software to use in their own units 
(Cullis, 2000:5).  Often, organizations spent unnecessary money and time populating 
redundant databases and multi-ordering base aerial photographs (Cullis, 2002; Geo 
InSight, 1999).  Uncoordinated collection efforts led to inconsistencies between 
databases, inducing data standardization, data maintenance, and data accuracy problems 
across the installation (Cullis, 2000:5-6; Geo InSight, 1999).  Installation commanders 
were unable to get a complete and accurate view of base assets – an especially daunting 
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problem during emergency situations where data and map accuracy are mandatory to 
quickly make informed decisions.  There was no sustained effort to provide 
knowledgeable GIS personnel, recurring monetary resources, or implementation 
management guidance, so many of the early GIS investments were “dead, dying, or 
increasingly irrelevant” (Cullis, 2000:3).  In this context, one can see why GIS use and 
adoption were not initially successful within the Air Force. 
To help alleviate this GIS management ailment, the Air Force created the 
Headquarters Air Force Geo Integration Office (HAF GIO).  HAF GIO provides 
GeoBase policy, programming, and database architectural guidance for the Air Force as a 
whole (Department of the Air Force, 2002b:4-11).  GeoBase is HAF GIO’s response to 
GIS implementation problems.  The technological goal of GeoBase is to rid bases of data 
standardization, data maintenance, and data accuracy problems by creating a common 
installation picture (CIP) for each base (Department of the Air Force, 2002c:5).  The 
long-term impact of GIS in the Air Force (through GeoBase) will be greatly improved if 
everyone can access the same data, have confidence in its accuracy, and not waste time 
and money gathering and maintaining redundant information.   
The vision of GeoBase is “one installation…one map” (Department of the Air 
Force, 2002c:5).  The mission of GeoBase is to “attain, maintain, and sustain one 
geospatial infostructure to address installation requirements” (Department of the Air 
Force, 2002c:5).  The purpose of GeoBase is to improve, even significantly improve, Air 
Force business processes (more effective and efficient) and improve command and 
control decision-making.  The Air Force can only realize the GeoBase vision by 
sustaining the GeoBase system long-term (Department of the Air Force, 2002b:9). 
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Research Problem and Questions 
The general research problem is as follows: 
How can significant technological innovations be effectively integrated into 
organizations for long-term sustainment? 
 
To provide a more specific context of study for this general problem, the 
researcher asks the question: 
How can GeoBase, a significant Air Force IT innovation, be effectively 
integrated into an organization for long-term sustainment? 
 
Based on this more specific research question, the researcher poses these three 
research questions: 
1.  Can the important organizational components affecting IT   
     implementation be identified? 
 
2.  Can dynamic simulation over time assist understanding? 
 
3.  Can the researcher distinguish management approaches that address   
     short-term versus long-term performance? 
Thesis Overview 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into the following four chapters: literature 
review, methodology, results and analysis, and discussion.  Chapter 2 presents an 
aggregated model of relevant information focused on the research question.  The majority 
of the literature discussed in Chapter 2 is drawn from research in the fields of innovation 
and information technology adoption, diffusion of innovations, organizational change, 
and organizational learning.  Chapter 3 outlines the system dynamics approach 
methodology and how this research fits into this approach.  Chapter 4 contains the results 
of the research and analysis, in line with the system dynamics approach methodology 
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outlined in Chapter 3.  Chapter 5 provides a summary, outlines recommendations for 
managers, identifies the limitations of this work, and describes areas for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Aggregation of Literature Concepts 
This research was started by gaining background in the relevant literature 
associated with the research problem.  To avoid as much bias as possible, the instinct to 
form early, definitive mental models on how an IT implementation system would 
function and behave was depressed.  However, after fruitful meetings with the client 
(AMC GeoBase Management Team) and useful insight from the 2002 Computer-Aided 
Drafting and Design/Geographical Information System (CADD/GIS) Symposium, held in 
San Antonio, Texas in August 2002, a mental model, focusing on how the system in 
question would behave over time and what would significantly contribute to this 
behavior, was formed.  Throughout the research process, a general trend in the literature 
was observed; researchers often focus on similar issues and problems in their 
investigations and studies, but call relevant concepts, which are usually very similar in 
nature, by different names.  For example, consider the information shown in Figure 2.  
Armenakis and Bedeian sifted through the major contributions in the field of 
organizational change in the 1990s and were able to boil down the significant concepts 
from a multitude of journal articles into two general categories: 1) phases within which 
change agents act and 2) stages through which change targets progress.  The intricacies of 
Figure 2 will not be discussed at this time, but the concept of aggregating concepts from 
the literature into more general categories is a powerful tool in the system dynamics 
approach.  Modelers cannot hope to capture all of the complexity of the real system in a 
model, so they have to aggregate much of this complexity in order to intelligently discuss 
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how best to intervene in the system to push it in a desired direction (discussed more fully 
in Chapter 4). 
The general organizational system model for IT implementation, derived from 
this research, is presented in Figure 3.  This model aggregates concepts from the research 
literature and provides a relatively simple view of how the IT implementation system 
might function in a relatively small organization.  Based on the research question, the 
system boundary must be constrained to those portions of the system the manager can 
control.  Basically, the portions of the system falling within the system boundary circle in 
Figure 3 (operating capability, adoption, integration, management interventions, and 
organizational inertia) are endogenous to the system, which means the system manager 
can control them.  The portions of the system falling outside of the system boundary 
circle (funding, organizational culture, top level support, and the innovation meeting 
needs) are exogenous to the system, meaning the manager cannot control them.  The 
exogenous variables provide the context within which the manager operates and 
intervenes in the system.  The Air Force GeoBase initiative provides an excellent real-
world example to study this general pattern in a squadron-size organization.  The 
literature review for this research will be organized around the model shown in Figure 3 
for clarity.   
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Figure 2: Change Agent Phases and Change Target Stages (Armenakis & Bedeian, 
1999:305) 
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Figure 3: General IT Implementation Model 
 
Before each of the endogenous, aggregate portions of the IT implementation 
model are explored, the reader should have some background on the history and vision 
for the GeoBase initiative from the Air Staff perspective and understand how this 
research approaches the research problem from a system dynamics perspective. 
GeoBase Capabilities 
The USAF GeoBase Initiative began in the fall of 1998 as an extension of a 1995 
scientific research paper prepared by Brian Cullis examining the factors affecting 
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successful use of geospatial information technologies by military organizations on US 
defense installations (Department of the Air Force, 2002b).  Results from this research 
concluded that the current methods for geospatial information system integration on 
defense installations were “resulting in high development costs with dubious long-term 
sustainability at best and all too frequent abandonment and fiscal waste at worst” 
(Department of the Air Force, 2002b).  Appendix A contains information on the history 
of GIS to provide a historical context of its development. 
The Headquarters Air Force Geo Integration Office (HAF GIO) was established 
in July 2001 by the Air Force to operationalize GeoBase capabilities across USAF 
interests and serve as the focal point for installation geospatial information and services.  
HAF GIO recognizes that “post mortems of failed IT investments clearly diagnose an 
overemphasis on short-term technology issues and insufficient attention to sustainment 
concerns as the cause of their early death” (Department of the Air Force, 2002b:I).  As 
such, HAF GIO desires to pair technology sustainment abilities with technology 
advancements as GeoBase is integrated into AF processes.  Technology issues such as 
system and data architectures will be mixed with crucial crosscutting issues such as 
planning, education, and training (Department of the Air Force, 2002b:I). 
In the early stages of AF GIS implementation, autonomous AF organizations 
began developing GIS applications and databases with a bottom-up perspective.  A 
bottom-up perspective focuses development on the needs of a smaller unit, without 
regard for compatibility with other units in the larger organization.  Hence the smaller 
units, using a bottom-up development approach, were not concerned with installation-
consistent software, database architecture, or formatting, so these efforts resulted in 
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stove-piped applications (mutually exclusive unit applications) and differing installation 
viewpoints for each organizational unit.  The GeoBase initiative aims to take a top-down 
perspective on GIS development, where inter-organizational compatibility is one of the 
primary development concerns.  Figure 4 contrasts the concepts of bottom-up 
development and top-down development.  The GeoBase initiative aims to overcome the 
stovepipe application problem that currently exists by a taking a top-down approach.   
In the GIS stovepipe application context, command and control decision-making 
capacity was diminished because installation commanders did not have a consistent 
installation view from a GIS perspective.  This problem was especially daunting when 
emergency situations arose that required critical, time-sensitive decisions.  GeoBase aims 
to collect the relevant portions of each of these stove-piped applications and transform 
them into one common installation picture (CIP), allowing everyone on each installation 
the ability to manipulate and view the same information at all times.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Bottom-up Development versus Top-down Development Paradigm 
(Hopper, 2002) 
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HAF GIO has three strategic goals with subordinate objectives that will guide 
how they manage the GeoBase creation process (Department of the Air Force, 2002b:II): 
Goal 1: Develop Core GeoBase Capabilities 
• Establish a Baseline Assessment of Existing GeoBase Investments 
• Establish a Common Definition and Understanding of GeoBase 
• Build Operational Architecture Based on Functional Requirements 
• Define and Document GeoBase System Architecture 
• Define and Document GeoBase Technical Architecture 
• Establish a GeoBase Imagery Architecture 
• Develop a Standards-Based GeoBase Data Architecture 
• Create an Application Framework to Access GeoBase Services 
Goal 2: Infuse the Mission with GeoBase Capabilities 
• Establish a Detailed View of the GeoBase System Interfaces 
• Consolidate Mapping Processes Through the GeoBase Service 
• Enhance Key Mission Systems Through the GeoBase Service 
• Identify Opportunities to Improve Air Force Mission Processes 
Goal 3: Sustain the GeoBase Program 
• Develop Strategic and Implementation Planning Guidance 
• Establish a GeoBase Education and Training Plan 
• Promote the GeoBase Program 
• Partner with Other Organizations for Mutual Benefit 
• Establish Policy and Guidance 
• Establish a Viable Program Management Process 
• Establish a Sound Programming Strategy. 
 
The GeoBase initiative is more than just creating a CIP for decision support for 
each installation.  In order for the investment of time and money into an AF-wide GIS 
tool to be sustainable, it must significantly improve the efficiency of Air Force business 
processes, provide an excellent management tool for emergency situations, and improve 
the effectiveness of personnel using the system.  The first goal, “Develop Core GeoBase 
Capabilities,” is focused on moving the technology and support functions to an initial 
operating capability (IOC).  GeoBase will have various levels of management and user 
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responsibility.  It will be partitioned into segments for users, doers, and viewers.  Where 
increased capacity for geospatial investigation is necessary, users will have increased 
power when working with the CIP.  The doers are the data maintainers.  The database is 
typically the most costly and difficult technical portion of the GIS to manage since 
installation dynamics force constant updates to the database, not to mention the heavy 
expense of simply populating a database with new information (Geo InSight, 1999).  If 
the database is not properly maintained, it will not accurately reflect base assets and its 
credibility will disappear.  The data maintainers have a very important job – GeoBase 
will not be sustainable if the database is not maintained properly.  The viewers are those 
who have a requirement to view the CIP, but do not require extensive analysis tools when 
dealing with spatial data.  They will have access to the CIP, but in a “stripped-down” 
form (Department of the Air Force, 2002d).  When all of the GIS software, data 
architecture, and GIS technical support personnel are in place and functioning, GeoBase 
will have reached IOC.   
The second goal, “Infuse the Mission with GeoBase Capabilities,” moves the 
system to a point where the investment begins to pay-off.  Without a clear 
financial/manpower benefit to GeoBase, it is likely that its continued funding will dry up.  
To provide this financial/manpower benefit and allow funding to continue, integrating 
GeoBase into the business processes of the organization to dramatically improve mission 
performance will be the hallmark of GeoBase success.  If personnel can accomplish their 
jobs more effectively and efficiently, they will continue to integrate GeoBase into more 
and more processes.  Information sharing will take the place of information hoarding.  
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Cross-functional communication will replace no communication.  As a result, great 
performance dividends will be realized.   
The third goal, “Sustain the GeoBase Program,” is probably the most important of 
the three for the overall health of the GeoBase program.  GeoBase must meet the needs of 
the organization and its personnel to realize its full potential.  Excellent system 
management is a key factor in assisting personnel in finding how GeoBase applies to 
them.  Often, the thought, “build it and they will come,” permeates IT investment at the 
unit level.  It takes a lot more than availability to get personnel to use a new system they 
are unfamiliar with (Department of the Air Force, 2002b).  Social network diffusion 
processes play a great role in getting people talking about GeoBase (Rogers, 1995).  
Personnel must be trained and educated to be able to have some level of competence 
when dealing with the system (Geo InSight, 1999).  As people begin using the system 
and seeing what it can do, they will be the champions to carry it forward into their 
business processes.  It will not be a mandate from above that will get GeoBase integrated 
sustainably into AF business processes; it will be personnel, trained and educated, that 
will carry the program forward, but only if it meets their needs (Department of the Air 
Force, 2002c).   
 GeoBase has lofty goals – it is not merely an IT investment – it also, and more 
importantly, represents a change in the way people use and share information.  
Responsibilities for database maintenance will be required not only for individual units, 
but for a wide swath of units throughout an installation.  If one of the units does not 
maintain their data, the whole installation suffers because that portion of the database is 
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unreliable.  This research focuses on IT implementation in only one organizational unit 
(squadron-size organization).  Though the scope of this research is trimmed-down to this 
level, the dynamics within one organization make the GeoBase implementation system 
difficult to understand.  Whenever people are involved in a system, there are many 
variables that complicate it.  To effectively deal with this complication, a tool that 
aggregates these variables and welcomes dynamic interactions over time becomes 
necessary.  System dynamics is one such tool and following its methodology can help the 
researcher and system manager uncover much of this dynamic complexity. 
System Dynamics Approach Methodology 
The reader must understand that system dynamics is a method of dealing with 
questions about the dynamic tendencies of complex systems, which is to say, the 
behavior patterns they generate over time.  System dynamicists are generally not 
concerned with precise numerical values of system variables in certain years.  This lack 
of precision is acceptable in the system dynamics approach and makes it possible for the 
modeler to explore systems where a great deal of quantified data is absent.  Modelers 
from other modeling schools of thought may question the validity of the system dynamics 
approach (Meadows, 1980) since it is not reliant on empirically quantified data.  
However, Meadows (1980) outlined these differences of opinion and found that different 
modeling schools of thought, such as system dynamics and econometrics, can co-exist 
and provide meaningful analysis to the scientific community.  The key element for 
deciding which method to use lies in the type of problem requiring analysis.  Some 
problems are good system dynamics problems and some problems are not.  Some 
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problems are more effectively analyzed by other statistically based modeling methods 
like econometrics (where exogenously driven open-system problems with ample amounts 
of data are the focus).  This research uses a system dynamics approach to analyze this 
system, since this problem can be well addressed using a system dynamics view.  There 
are portions of this system that follow predictable patterns of behavior, there is an 
endogenous explanation for these behavior patterns, and there is a lack of empirical data 
from the system.  System dynamics provides a unique, effective methodology to study IT 
implementation. 
System dynamics offers a methodological, iterative approach to analyze a system 
(Sterman, 2000:86).  The first step is to articulate the problem clearly and specify the 
client (system manager) for whom the work is being accomplished (Sterman, 2000:86).  
Modeling can never capture all of the complexity of a system, so a specific problem must 
be identified so the appropriate structural boundary can be explored (Liberatore et. al., 
2000:186; Sterman, 2000:89).   Modeling a specific problem allows the researcher to 
identify and better frame the problem being studied by providing information that leads 
to exploration of certain areas and exclusion of others (Liberatore et. al., 2000:186).  
Modeling gives decision-makers insight into the causal structure of the system and helps 
them understand how actions in one area may have formerly unforeseen impacts in 
another (Sterman, 2000:85).  Once the problem is identified, the client specified, and the 
proper background in the problem gained (through interviews, literature research, client 
conversations, expected problem time horizon, etc.), hypotheses about the system can be 
proposed. 
 
 
 22
In concert with the client, the researcher proposes a set of graphs that show how 
important metrics from the system are expected to behave over time.  These graphs 
embody the reference mode of the system (since the researcher refers back to them when 
formalizing the structure of the system).  Using the reference mode graphs as a guide, the 
researcher outlines the causal structure of the system (Sterman, 2000:102).  The 
researcher must focus only on the important, aggregated influences surrounding the 
problem and resist being pulled into the “dark forest” of all influences present within the 
system.  The causal diagram is a useful tool for outlining the feedback structures present 
within the system by showing the causal links among variables using arrows running 
from a cause to an effect (Sterman, 2000:102).  Once the reference mode and causal 
diagram are completed and agreed upon, the researcher can take this dynamic system 
hypothesis and move to the next step in the process, namely formulation. 
Formulating and simulating the dynamic hypothesis is done in the virtual world.  
Simulation in the virtual world allows the modeler to test various management strategies 
quickly and efficiently without having to endure longitudinal studies composed of 
empirical data.  The goal of system dynamics simulation is not precise prediction of 
numerical metrics -- the behavior pattern over time and magnitude of difference between 
simulations elucidate how the system should respond given specified initial conditions 
and management interventions.  To assure the model functions properly, the researcher 
must test it. 
Testing begins when the first formalized variable is entered into the computer.  
Each variable must correspond to something meaningful in the real world (Sterman, 
2000:103).  To be meaningful, variables must have a certain degree of aggregation, but 
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not so much that they lose explanatory power in the framework of the model.  Usually in 
social system experimentation, most of the variables are “soft.”  That is, a precise 
measurable number cannot be associated with the variable.  Even though precise, 
measured numbers are not included in a model, the goal of system dynamics is not 
obscured by this complication.  Simulation does not produce precise, predictive output 
(only behavior patterns and level of magnitude differences); hence, exact 
parameterization of the model is not necessary.   
Validation from these tests differs from statistical validation.  System dynamics 
validation assists the client in gaining confidence in the model.  Strictly speaking, the 
model is validated to the extent the client uses it to make decisions influencing the 
system.  In more quantitatively precise modeling efforts, some degree of confluence of 
simulation data and empirically observed data is useful, but in social system modeling 
efforts (since there are usually no applicable metrics in the real world) there is no need 
for precise numerical agreement between empirical and simulation numbers.  The 
important validation comes from aligning the simulation behavior pattern with either 
historical or hypothesized behavior patterns from the real world, which allows the 
manager to use the model in a meaningful way. 
Literature Associated with GeoBase Implementation System 
The desire to understand the natural system requires the researcher to gather 
relevant, aggregated concepts from many different fields of study.  System dynamics 
allows the researcher to combine these concepts into aggregate variables in the system.  
Applicable areas of study for this research effort include: diffusion of innovations, IT and 
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innovation adoption, and organizational change, among others, which all include 
different approaches managers can take to intervene in these portions of the system.  The 
remainder of his literature discussion will focus on the aggregate concepts of operating 
capability, adoption, integration, and organizational inertia.  The literature discussion will 
include some commentary on how each of these concepts pertains to the IT 
implementation model. 
Operating Capability. 
Operating Capability represents the technology and technological system 
management portion of GeoBase.  One of the initial milestones for GeoBase is arrival at 
initial operating capability (IOC).  GeoBase assists and is managed for three discrete 
customers: users, doers, and viewers.  The users are those who require access to the 
common installation picture (CIP) and need a full GIS to manipulate it.  Doers are the 
data maintainers.  Each organization using GeoBase will be responsible for maintaining 
some piece of the data.  A dedicated GeoBase management team will maintain the data in 
the CE squadron.  Viewers are those who require infrequent access to the CIP and do not 
require substantial GIS manipulation tools.  They would operate mainly from a web-
based viewer.  Arrival at IOC will occur when all of the hardware, software, and 
management elements are in place to satisfy all of these GeoBase customers.      
Getting the hardware, software, and management teams in place will take time 
and will require consistent funding.  GeoBase management personnel will continue 
improving the system over time, so arriving at IOC will not end the investment in 
technology and operating capability.  The database, the most important technical 
component of a GIS (personnel being the most important), will always need continual 
 
 
 25
updating, not to mention its expensive genesis.  The long-term investment in this portion 
of GeoBase will always require strict management control – advocating funding and 
managing the database and technical.  As the initial hurdles are passed, the manager’s 
level of time and effort in this portion of the GeoBase system will diminish, but he will 
still need to continually work at keeping this element in place and functioning properly. 
GeoBase Technical Issues in the Organization Environment. 
GeoBase is an enterprise-wide GIS.  An enterprise-wide GIS is “a single, 
organization-wide data resource” (Geo InSight, 1999).  The role of a GIS in an 
organization is more than simply automating a few tasks for the sake of efficiency.  The 
introduction and adoption of GIS by an organization is an opportunity to introduce 
fundamental change in business operations.  Organizational GIS adoption forces 
organizations to reorganize how they collect, maintain, and use data and information.  
These changes should lead to improved operational effectiveness and efficiency (Geo 
InSight, 1999).   
An enterprise GIS database allows users to have immediate and easy access to up-
to-date information and assures that database construction is done in the most efficient 
manner possible.  The enterprise GIS database eliminates redundant collection and 
storage of information.  An enterprise GIS integrates GIS data for all units of the 
organization participating in the GIS program (Geo InSight, 1999). 
For an enterprise GIS database to function properly, all users must cooperate, both 
for the collection and entry of data, and in application development in a shared data 
context.  Generally, this causes some individual applications to work less efficiently, but 
the overall benefit to the organization outweighs this distraction.  For the overall 
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organization to benefit, more emphasis must be placed on excellent data maintenance and 
user services to offset perceived individual loss of control that accompanies data sharing 
initiatives (Geo InSight, 1999). 
The GIS database is the most important technical portion of the GIS.  The GIS 
database “can account for up to 60% to 80% of the GIS development costs” (Geo InSight, 
1999).  Not only are initial database development costs high, but continuing costs for 
operation and maintenance are also dominated by the data.  In addition to understanding 
that database development takes substantial time and money, users and managers must 
appreciate that GIS is a new technology and its adoption usually involves some level of 
uncertainty that can cause time delays, on-going change in the development program, and 
the need to resolve unforeseen problems (Geo InSight, 1999). 
For a database to remain relevant over a long period of time, database information 
must include metadata (data about data).  Metadata describe the “content, quality, 
condition, and other characteristics of data” (Geo InSight, 1999).  Since data, once 
created, can travel almost instantaneously through a network and be used for a multitude 
of tasks, metadata allow different users to decipher what a piece of data means.  With 
rotating personnel, this becomes even more important, so incoming people can 
understand what has been collected in the past and not have to “recreate the wheel”, so to 
speak.  For long-term GIS sustainment, metadata can provide a degree of continuity that 
otherwise would not exist. 
Written plans, if followed, provide an effective management tool for a GIS 
development program.  A GIS Implementation Plan can resolve some of the uncertainty 
associated with GIS development.  An Implementation Plan describes the “organizational 
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GIS scope and objectives, management framework, task descriptions, schedule, budget, 
and administration” (Geo InSight, 1999).  The Implementation Plan also provides a 
framework for all GIS hardware, software, network, and data considerations.  The 
database design specified in the Implementation Plan governs the main database and all 
“children” databases and applications that are based on individual business process 
requirements.  A Training Plan should also be developed that provides “a formalized, 
long-term strategy that outlines who should be trained, the subjects and topics covered, 
sources of education and training, forums, when training is appropriate in the 
implementation process, and training intervals and length” (Geo InSight, 1999).  Changes 
to the training plan can be added as new requirements surface (Geo InSight, 1999). 
GIS is an innovation that, when integrated into organizational processes, forces 
major changes in organizational behavior.  Since the development period for an 
enterprise GIS can be lengthy, managers must be patient and take an active role in the 
development process.  Personnel must be trained and educated on how to use GIS and 
managers must manage the change process to allow organizational adoption to occur.  If 
personnel learn how to effectively share and utilize data differently than they have done 
in the past, a GIS can bring major improvements in organizational effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
 Adoption. 
Adoption is the most human portion of the GeoBase innovation system.  There are 
many issues involved in adoption, including many inputs from the field of organizational 
change, IT innovation perceptions, and management intervention recommendations.  The 
first section, change process management, will focus the adoption discussion that follows. 
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Change Process Management. 
A number of researchers have proposed change process management 
interventions for organizational managers.  In the change literature, process issues focus 
on management actions taken to implement changes within an organization and how 
employees respond to such efforts (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999:295).  Kotter recognizes 
that a successful change progresses through various stages that can take a considerable 
amount of time to complete (Kotter, 1995:59).  Skipping steps in the process only 
provides an illusion of successful change implementation and never produces desired 
long-term performance results (Kotter, 1995:59).  Substantial mistakes in any of the 
process stages can have a devastating impact, slowing momentum and negating past 
efforts (Kotter, 1995:60).   
Kotter (1995:61) identifies eight stages that must be sequentially completed and 
sustained by change agents for any substantial change effort to be successful:  
1) Establish a sense of urgency (identify and discuss crises, potential crises, or   
      major opportunities),  
2) Form a powerful guiding coalition (assemble a group with enough power to  
      lead the change effort and have them work as a team),  
3) Create a vision (where is the organization now and where does it want to be in  
      the future),  
4) Communicate the vision (using every communication vehicle available and  
      through guiding coalition example, promote the change effort),  
5) Empower others to act on the vision (remove obstacles, change inhospitable  
      organizational structures, promote good, nontraditional ideas, etc.),  
6) Plan for and create short-term wins (visible performance improvements as a  
      result of the change),  
7) Consolidate improvements and produce more change (get rid of policies and  
      structures inconsistent with the change vision), and  
8) Institutionalize new approaches (articulate connection between new behaviors  
      and organizational success). 
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For GIS-specific change programs, there are a number of policy issues that must 
be addressed early in the GIS planning process.  GIS is still an evolving technology, so 
personnel involved with the implementation process (managers, users, and GIS staff) 
may have varying expectations of what GIS can accomplish.  GIS development is a long-
term process, hence pay-offs from the technology usually take a long time to materialize.  
Geo InSight Inc., a leader in GIS implementation management, identifies several factors 
associated with successful GIS implementation (Geo InSight, 2001): 
- Emphasize advantages of GIS to individual users and entire organization 
- Require high level of competency by all participants 
- Ensure high level of management commitment from all management levels in 
the organization 
- Require participation in team building and team participation within and 
between departments 
- Ensure minimum data quality and access for all users 
- Require development team to set realistic expectations 
- Minimize time between user needs assessment and availability of useful 
products 
- Develop positive attitude toward change within organization 
- Ensure level of technology is appropriate for intended users 
- Conduct highly visible pilot project that is successful  
 
How Perceptions of Change Progress through a Process. 
For general change, Isabella proposes a four-stage model of how change targets 
perceive change.  Isabella proposes the first step in a change is anticipation.  Anticipation 
occurs when individuals assemble rumors and pieces of information into a perceived 
reality (how they view the change and the state of the organization based on rumors).  
Confirmation occurs when events are standardized into a conventional frame of reference 
used to establish logical associations reflecting understandings that have worked in the 
past.  Culmination results from a comparison of conditions before and after the change 
where the frame of reference created in the confirmation stage is adjusted based on how 
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the change actually unfolded.  The final stage, aftermath, occurs when change targets 
review and evaluate the consequences of a change (Isabella, 1990). 
Jaffe et al. propose a four-stage model focused on how change targets react to 
change.  The first step is denial, which occurs as employees refuse to believe that a 
change is necessary or that it will be implemented.  Resistance follows when individuals 
withhold participation, attempt to postpone implementation, or try to convince decision 
makers that the proposed change is inappropriate.  Exploration occurs when employees 
experiment with new behaviors and test their effectiveness in achieving promised results.  
If exploration produces a positive view of the change, commitment to the change takes 
place as change targets embrace the proposed change (Jaffe et. al., 1994). 
Kotter’s change implementation model parallels the general effects of the change 
models of Isabella and Jaffe et al.  Isabella describes the stages through which an 
individual progresses as change unfolds and Jaffe et al. provide a title for each stage.  
Hence, during anticipation, employees are likely to experience denial.  At confirmation, 
employees may resist the change.  Armenakis et al. propose that individuals will 
experience denial and resistance throughout the change process if they are not adequately 
prepared for the introduction of change at the outset of the change effort (Armenakis et. 
al., 2000).  During culmination, when organizational members compare past and present 
conditions as a result of the change, they are exploring.  Aftermath occurs when change 
targets decide the extent to which they will commit to the change (Armenakis & Bedeian, 
1999).  These models give the change agent an idea of what change targets experience 
during a change effort and outline some practical strategies and tactics to ease the 
transition through each step of the process. 
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Adoption and Diffusion of Innovations. 
Since this research recognizes the importance of change induced by an IT 
innovation, the relevant points from the research literature that focuses on innovation 
adoption and diffusion, which is highly correlated with change process management, will 
be discussed.  An innovation is “an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers, 1995:11).  GeoBase is a new concept for 
many people in Air Force organizations, since the program is in its infancy, so it would 
currently qualify as an innovation.  Successful introduction of an innovation into an 
organization requires two main processes.  First, the individual user must adopt the 
innovation.  Rogers defines adoption as a “decision to make full use of an innovation as 
the best course of action available” (Rogers, 1995:21).  Second, the organization must 
adopt the innovation through a diffusion process.  Rogers defines diffusion as “the 
process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time 
among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 1995:5).  
Rogers describes the stages through which an individual progresses as he 
evaluates an innovation for adoption or rejection (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Stages in the Innovation-Decision Process (Rogers, 1995:163) 
In the model shown in Figure 5, the potential adopter first gathers information 
about an innovation, which generates knowledge.  The potential adopter’s mental model 
(or paradigm), which is typically formed as a result of both personal and organizational 
culture, frames the way he views an innovation.  Factors involved with the potential 
adopter’s mental model include previous practice, needs and problems, level of 
innovativeness, social norms, socio-economic characteristics, personality, and 
communication behavior.  Positive or negative persuasion occurs as the potential adopter 
either forms positive or negative perceptions about the innovation based on its perceived 
characteristics (relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, triability, and 
observability).  Relative advantage is “the degree to which the innovation is perceived as 
being better than its precursor” (Moore & Benbasat, 1991:195).  Compatibility is “the 
degree to which an innovation is perceived as being consistent with existing values, 
needs, and past experiences of potential adopters” (Moore & Benbasat, 1991:195).  
Complexity is “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being difficult to use 
(Moore & Benbasat, 1991:195).  Triability is “the degree to which an innovation can be 
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experimented with before adoption” (Moore & Benbasat, 1991:195).  Observability is 
“the degree to which the results of an innovation are observable to others” (Moore & 
Benbasat, 1991:195).  If the potential adopter forms a positive perception of the 
innovation based on these characteristics, he will probably make the initial decision to 
adopt.  If the potential adopter perceives the innovation lacking overall in these 
characteristics, then the initial decision will be to reject.  Initial adoption leads to 
implementation, where the adopter actually begins using the innovation.  Initial rejection 
forces the potential adopter to reevaluate the innovation as more knowledge is gained.  
Over time, confirmation will either reinforce the initial decision (continued adoption) or 
degrade the initial decision to adopt (discontinuance) if the innovation does not perform 
as desired.  Discontinuance can be separated into two categories: replacement 
discontinuance (rejection in order to adopt a better idea that superceded it) or 
disenchantment discontinuance (rejection as a result of dissatisfaction with innovation 
performance).  If the potential adopter initially rejected the innovation, later confirmation 
of the innovation may induce the potential adopter to adopt or, if the innovation continues 
to not meet the potential adopter’s needs, he will continue to reject the innovation 
(Rogers, 1995). 
In Cullis’ research, the innovation-decision process is adjusted to show how GIS 
is implemented at the individual level (Figure 6).  The environment, information system, 
and development process combine to determine the extent of GIS use for an individual.  
Based on the individual experiences with the GIS, the GIS user is either satisfied or 
dissatisfied.  If the user is satisfied, the user will continue to adopt GIS.  On the other 
hand, if the user is dissatisfied, he will discontinue use of the GIS.  The user progresses 
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through three phases in this model: the decision phase, the implementation phase, and the 
confirmation phase.   
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Figure 6: The GIS Implementation Research Model (Cullis, 2000:9) 
During the process of adoption and implementation, users may re-invent the 
innovation to better suit their needs.  Re-invention is defined as “the degree to which an 
innovation is changed or modified by a user in the process of its adoption and 
implementation” (Rogers, 1995:174).  In previous research, investigators treated re-
invention as “noise” in the adoption process.  Researchers erroneously perceived adopters 
as passive acceptors of an innovation instead of active modifiers and adapters of new 
ideas.  Later, researchers found that re-invention often occurs at the implementation stage 
-- providing impetus to measure adoption at the implementation stage rather than trying 
to measure the intention to act on the innovation (Rogers, 1995). 
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Re-invention causes innovations to change over time and across different 
adopters.  Researchers and diffusion agencies typically frown on re-invention because it 
is difficult to measure performance and it distorts the original technology.  Adopters, on 
the other hand, generally think favorably about re-invention.  Re-invention provides a 
wider body of alternatives besides adoption or rejection; modification or selective 
rejection of innovation modules may also be appropriate.  Implementation problems by 
individuals or organizations are unpredictable, so changes in innovations that make them 
more compatible with the individual or organization can be desirable.  Re-invention also 
decreases discontinuance since re-invented innovations better fit the conditions of the 
individual or organization; innovations and organizations may engage in a kind of 
mutually influencing interaction, as the innovation and organization move closer to one 
another (Rogers, 1995). 
Innovation Diffusion. 
Individual adoption eventually can lead to organizational adoption if the 
innovation is effectively diffused throughout the organization.  For diffusion of an 
innovation to occur, it must be spread throughout an organization beginning from a 
source and carried through a channel.  A source is “the individual or institution that 
originates a message” (Rogers, 1995:194).  A channel is “the means by which a message 
gets from the source to the receiver” (Rogers, 1995:194).  Researchers categorize 
communication channels as either (1) interpersonal or mass media in nature, or (2) 
originating from either local or cosmopolite sources (Rogers, 1995).   
Mass media channels are a means of transmitting messages (radio, television, 
newspapers, etc.) to reach a large audience rapidly, create knowledge and spread 
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information, and lead to changes in weakly held attitudes.  Interpersonal channels involve 
face-to-face exchange between two individuals and can be effective at changing strongly 
held attitudes and providing a two-way exchange of information.  Mass media channels 
are relatively more important at the knowledge stage and interpersonal channels are more 
important at the persuasion stage in the innovation-decision process (Rogers, 1995).  
Cosmopolite communication channels “are those from outside the social system 
of study” (Rogers, 1995:196).  Interpersonal channels can be either local or cosmopolite, 
whereas mass media channels are almost always cosmopolite.  Cosmopolite channels are 
relatively more important at the knowledge stage and local channels are more important 
at the persuasion stage in the innovation-decision process (Rogers, 1995). 
The innovation decision period is the “length of time required for an individual or 
organization to pass through the innovation-decision process” (Rogers, 1995:197-198).  
The time elapsing from awareness to knowledge of an innovation decision for an 
individual is measured in days, months, or years.  This is the gestation period during 
which the new idea ferments in an individual’s mind.  Rogers describes the rate of 
awareness knowledge, rate of adoption, and length of the innovation decision period for 
Iowa farmers adopting a weed spray by year (Figures 7 & 8) (Rogers, 1995).  Rogers 
suggests that the decision to adopt is not instantaneous, but may take a long period of 
time to develop, especially for the laggard portion of the potential adopter pool.   
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Figure 7:  Rate of Awareness Knowledge, Rate of Adoption, And Length of the 
Innovation Decision Period for Iowa Farmers Adopting a Weed Spray by Year 
(Rogers, 1995:200) 
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Figure 8:  Innovators Have Shorter Innovation-Decision Periods than Laggards in 
Adopting 2,4-D Weed Spray (Rogers, 1995:201) 
 
 As mentioned earlier, diffusion is “the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system” (Rogers, 1995:5).  The four main elements of this definition include: innovation, 
communication channels, time, and the social system.  Rogers describes the diffusion 
process by graphing the percentage of adopters versus time in Figure 9.  Rogers suggests 
that an innovation diffusing throughout an organization follows an s-shaped curve as a 
result of differences between the innovative behaviors of personnel within the 
organization.  Innovative personnel would tend to adopt an innovation earlier than non-
innovative personnel.  Innovative personnel would tend to fall into the early adopters 
group and non-innovative personnel would tend to fall into the laggard or late adopters 
group.  Different innovations would also follow different s-shape behavior pathways, 
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based on the perceptions of the innovation by potential adopters.  Better perceptions 
would lead to faster diffusion and lower perceptions would lead to slower diffusion. 
 
Figure 9:  Innovation Diffusion (Percent of Adopters versus Time) (Rogers, 
1995:11) 
 
A social system is defined as “a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint 
problem-solving to accomplish a common goal” (Rogers, 1995:23).  The scope of the 
social system can encompass individuals, informal groups, organizations, and/or 
subsystems.  Each element in the social system must be distinguishable from other units, 
but all elements cooperate to the extent of solving a common problem to reach a common 
goal.  This sharing of common objectives binds the system together (Rogers, 1995). 
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There are a number of factors that affect diffusion within a social system.  The 
system structure, system norms, opinion leader and change agent roles, types of 
innovation-decisions, and consequences of the innovation all contribute to how 
effectively an innovation diffuses.   
System structure is defined as the “patterned arrangements of the units in a 
system” (Rogers, 1995: 24).  Structure lends regularity and stability to human behavior in 
the system and allows researchers and managers to predict group behavior with some 
accuracy – thereby reducing uncertainty.  The social structure within a typical 
government organization system would consist of hierarchical positions, giving 
individuals in higher-ranked positions the right to issue orders to lower-ranked 
individuals.   
In addition to this formal social structure, an informal structure of interpersonal 
networks also links a system’s members.  Rogers defines these as communication 
structures, defined as “the differentiated elements that can be recognized in the patterned 
communication flows in a system” (Rogers, 1995:24).  Communication structures are 
often tied together through cliques of homophilous individuals.  Homophily is defined as 
“the degree to which two or more individuals in a system talk with others who are similar 
to themselves” (Rogers, 1995:24).  A complete lack of a communication structure in a 
system would consist of system members having the same probability of communicating 
equally with each member of the system.  The structure of a social system can facilitate 
or impede innovation diffusion in a system (Rogers, 1995). 
System norms also affect innovation diffusion.  Norms are defined as “the 
established behavior patterns of the members of a social system” (Rogers, 1995:26).  
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They define the tolerable range of behavior and serve as a behavioral guide for members 
in a social system.  Norms can operate on a national, religious, organizational, or local 
level and must be considered when undertaking any diffusion action (Rogers, 1995). 
Opinion leaders are also important members of a social system during diffusion 
processes.  Opinion leadership is defined as “the degree to which an individual is able to 
influence other individuals’ attitudes or overt behavior informally in a desired way with 
relative frequency” (Rogers, 1995:27).  Opinion leadership is earned and maintained by 
an individual’s technical competence, social accessibility, and conformity to the system’s 
norms; not by their ranked authority (though they typically have somewhat higher social 
status than their peers).  When a system is accepting of change, opinion leaders can be 
quite innovative, but when the system’s norms are opposed to change, the behavior of the 
opinion leaders also opposes change (Rogers, 1995).   
Opinion leaders are always at the center of interpersonal communication 
networks, consisting of “interconnected individuals who are linked by patterned flows of 
information” (Rogers, 1995:27).  The opinion leader can serve as a social model whose 
innovative behavior can be imitated by other members of the system.  However, if 
opinion leaders deviate too far from system norms, they can lose credibility and become 
an obsolete influence (Rogers, 1995). 
A change agent differs from an opinion leader in that they are usually 
heterophilous from their clients.  A change agent “is an individual who influences clients’ 
innovation-decisions in a direction deemed desirable by the change agency” (Rogers, 
1995:27).  The change agent typically seeks to gain the adoption of new ideas, but may 
also try to quell diffusion and prevent adoption of undesirable new ideas.  Since change 
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agents are usually heterophilous from their clients, they have problems effectively 
communicating the innovations they are promoting.  Hence, change agents should 
attempt to enlist opinion leaders to spread the innovation message.   
Figure 10 is an example of a diffusion network of school superintendents in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.  The innovator superintendent (I) was the first to adopt 
a modern math innovation, but since he was not linked through the interpersonal network 
to any of the other superintendents, he had no influence on any of the other 
superintendents’ adoption trends.  The innovator was a social isolate, among other 
superintendents, who mainly interacted with cosmopolite friends and was disdained by 
his superintendent peers due to his innovative behavior.  The gray-shaded area represents 
a clique of superintendents who interact more with each other than any of the outsiders.  
Within this group resided three opinion leaders (OL).  After they adopted the modern 
math teaching techniques, others began quickly adopting to follow their examples.  This 
diagram shows the powerful effect of opinion leaders in the communication network and 
how they can speed adoption (Rogers, 1995). 
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Figure 10: Opinion Leadership Patterns in the Diffusion of Modern Math 
Among School Superintendents in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Rogers, 
1995:283) 
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There are three types of innovation decisions that can have a huge impact on the 
diffusion process.  First, optional innovation-decisions “are choices to adopt or reject an 
innovation that are made by the individual independent of the decisions of the other 
members of the system” (Rogers, 1995:28).  Even in this case, system norms and 
interpersonal networks can greatly influence this individual decision.  Second, collective 
innovation-decisions “are choices to adopt or reject an innovation that are made by 
consensus among the members of a system” (Rogers, 1995:28).  Once this decision is 
made, all members of the organization must conform to the system’s decision.  Third, 
authority innovation decisions “are choices to adopt or reject an innovation that are made 
by a relatively few individuals in a system who possess power, status, or technical 
expertise” (Rogers, 1995:29).  The individual system member has little influence on these 
decisions – he or she must simply implement the decision.  Ram and Jung have found 
that authority innovation decisions resulting in “forced” adoption are a poor way to 
manage innovative change.  Their results suggest that even innovative individuals resist 
the innovation in the context of forced adoption.  In these types of decisions, 
organizational members deal with forced adoption through the use of coping mechanisms 
such as complaining and seeking peer help (Rogers, 1995; Ram & Jung, 1991). 
Consequences of an innovation provide the defining factor for long-term 
innovation sustainment.  Consequences are “the changes that occur to an individual or to 
a social system as a result of the adoption or rejection of an innovation” (Rogers, 
1995:30).  Rogers identifies three types of consequences: desirable versus undesirable 
(functional or dysfunctional effects in the social system); direct versus indirect (changes 
occur in immediate response to an innovation or as a second-order result of the direct 
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consequences); and anticipated versus unanticipated (depending on whether changes are 
recognized and intended by members of the social system or not).  Change agents usually 
introduce innovations into a system where the results will be desirable, direct, and 
anticipated.  However, innovations often have undesirable and indirect consequences for 
a system’s members (Rogers, 1995). 
Information Technology Adoption. 
The literature focused on adoption of information technologies (IT) by individuals 
and organizations provides a solid background on how perceptions of IT innovations 
influence adoption.  Research in this area has been a major topic of research over the past 
36 years (Moore & Benbasat, 1991:193).  Understanding how to effectively implement 
IT successfully has proven difficult, with efforts producing mixed and inconclusive 
results (Moore & Benbasat, 1991:193).  Recent research has focused on how potential IT 
users perceive the information technology and how those perceptions influence its 
adoption and ultimate diffusion (Davis et. al., 1989:983; Moore & Benbasat, 1991:193; 
Cullis, 2000:2; Agarwal & Prasad, 2000:295; Fisher et. al., 2000:284).   
In the study conducted by Agarwal and Prasad concerning the adoption of the C 
programming language by COBOL programmers, multiple factors were uncovered that 
were correlated with successful software adoption.  They used three beliefs, found to be 
the most important in innovation adoption-implementation studies (Tornatzky & Klein, 
1982) that influence employee attitudes for technology acceptance: perceived usefulness 
(relative advantage), perceived ease of use, and perceptions of compatibility.  Relative 
advantage “captures the extent to which a potential adopter views the innovation as 
offering an advantage over previous ways of performing the same task” (Agarwal & 
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Prasad, 2000:298).  Ease of use “encapsulates the degree to which a potential adopter 
views usage of the target innovation to be relatively free of effort” (Agarwal & Prasad, 
2000:298).  Compatibility is “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being 
consistent with the existing values, needs, and past experiences of potential adopters” 
(Agarwal & Prasad, 2000:298).  These factors shape employee attitude, which accounts 
for 72% of the variance in usage intentions.   
In the case of the COBOL programmers, those having greater prior technical 
knowledge and less organizational tenure had more positive perceptions of C than those 
with more perceived job security.  The group with greater prior technical knowledge and 
less tenure found it easier to make the transition to the new C language development 
environment, thus improving their perceptions of C (Agarwal & Prasad, 2000). 
Though organizational tenure and prior technical knowledge are not factors that 
can be directly affected in the short term, training is a management intervention that can 
help produce desired adoption results.  In this organization, many managers expected 
employees to take the responsibility of reskilling themselves through non-structured 
training.  However, the results of the study found that unstructured training experiences 
did not have a significant effect on any of the beliefs relevant to attitude, whereas formal, 
structured training was more fruitful in this regard (Agarwal & Prasad, 2000). 
People with perceived job insecurity exhibited strong negative relationships with 
beliefs about the innovation.  The researchers found it is very important for management 
to create and foster an organizational climate where the threat of layoffs and 
powerlessness in the workplace is not imminent.  Perceived job insecurity leads to 
feelings of uncertainty, which is detrimental to innovation adoption and may result in 
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other undesirable effects such as reduction of effort and diminishing productivity 
(Agarwal & Prasad, 2000).  The effects of A-76 studies on Air Force organizations are 
not specifically explored in this model, but it seems reasonable to conclude that 
organizations undergoing A-76 actions would develop an innovation-unfriendly culture. 
The researchers also found that managers should devote attention to motivating 
their personnel by positively highlighting the relative advantage and compatibility aspects 
of new technologies as opposed to only focusing on programs that are easy to learn and 
use (through design and educational programs).  For long-term routinization of the 
technological innovation, adjustments to work processes may be necessary so that mutual 
adoption can occur within the organization (Agarwal & Prasad, 2000).  Short term 
success in technology adoption can be had through forced adoption by management 
mandate, however, negative long-term effects of this method have been well documented 
(Ram & Jung, 1991).  Figure 11 presents a synopsized view of the relevant factors 
leading to the intent to use the C language.  Voluntariness acted as a control variable in 
the research. 
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Figure 11: Research Model for C Adoption by Information System 
Professionals (Agarwal & Prasad, 2000:297) 
 
Technology Acceptance Model. 
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) also posits useful information to 
better predict, explain, and increase user acceptance of computer technology.  Davis et al. 
address the ability to “predict peoples’ computer acceptance from a measure of their 
intentions, and the ability to explain their intentions in terms of their attitudes, subjective 
norms, perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and related variables” (Davis et al., 
1989:982).  TAM, shown in Figure 12, postulates that computer usage is determined by 
the behavioral intention to use (BI), which is determined by the person’s attitude toward 
using the system (A) and perceived usefulness (U) according to the relationship BI = A + 
U (Davis et al., 1989). 
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Figure 12: Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis et al., 1989:985) 
 
The A-BI relationship implies that people form intentions to perform behaviors 
toward which they have positive affect.  The U-BI relationship is based on the idea that, 
in organizations, people form intentions toward behaviors they perceive will increase job 
performance, beyond whatever positive or negative feelings they have for the behavior.  
The desire to improve performance is a result of the ability to achieve extrinsic rewards, 
such as pay and promotions, based on enhanced performance (Davis et al., 1989). 
Davis et al. also found that people’s computer use can be predicted reasonably 
well from their use intentions.  Perceived usefulness strongly influenced people’s use 
intentions, while perceived ease of use had a small but significant impact on use 
intentions, although the effect from perceived ease of use subsided over time.  Attitudes 
only partially mediated the effects of these beliefs on use intentions (Davis et al., 1989). 
GIS Adoption on DoD Installations. 
Cullis specifies the common factors influencing GIS adoption based on the GIS 
use influences shown in Figure 6.  Based on Cullis’ research findings, Figure 13 
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illustrates how 52 variables influencing GIS adoption were collapsed into twelve groups 
under three GIS use influences.  The three GIS use influences include: environment, 
process, and GIS subsystem.  There are six groups in the environment use influence, 
including: external environment, organizational environment, and four user groups (user 
benefits, GPS and remote sensing knowledge, relative advantage of GIS, and the extent 
of GIS training).  There are two groups under the process use influence, including: GIS 
use access and the analog-to-digital conversion.  There are four groups under the GIS 
subsystem use influence, including: utility of GIS hardware, confidence in database 
quality, ease of applying GIS, and GIS linkages.  The dependent variables in this model 
include GIS user satisfaction and extent of GIS Use.   
Based on the results of Cullis’ research, he proposed four recommendations for 
GIS adoption (Cullis, 2000:17-20): 
1) Develop a strategic plan for achieving GIS success on defense installations. 
2) Seek out resistance to GIS initiatives and treat it as a signal needing response. 
3) Focus on the GIS end user and not solely on GIS technologies 
4) Assemble a “toolkit” to share the “way ahead.”  
Cullis’ first recommendation focuses on change management, operational and job 
redesign, development of a long-term perspective with clear goals and objectives, and the 
use of an integrated GIS management approach.  His second recommendation specifies 
user coordination and stakeholder involvement are vital to successful GIS development 
initiatives.  His third recommendation focuses on developing realistic expectations of 
what the technology can do and what to expect during the implementation process.  The 
key is to prepare users and leaders for change and follow the change process throughout 
the effort.  His fourth recommendation recognizes the investment already made in GIS 
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across DoD installations and how all can utilize these investments.  Providing a DoD GIS 
clearinghouse would help others at any point along the GIS implementation pathway 
(Cullis, 2000). 
 
 
 Environment
*Dependent Variables
GIS Subsystem
User Benefits 
Increased productivity 
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GIS software utility
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Quality of technical support 
Availability of documentation 
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GIS links to existing digital databases 
GIS links with AM/FM/CADD databases 
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GIS User Satisfaction* 
Extent of GIS Use* 
GIS Use Access 
Access to the GIS
Time available to use the GIS 
Product requests from others 
Top management support 
Ability to retain GIS manpower
GIS integration into SOPs
Supervisory appreciation of GIS
Perceived GIS cost effectiveness
Ability to purchase data 
Attitude of GIS staff
Size of GIS staff 
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GIS implementation structure 
Organizational 
User
Knowledge of other DOD GIS efforts 
Previous ADPE efforts 
External 
Factor Labels in Bold  
Knowledge of Other GIS Adoptions
Organizational Support 
GPS & 
Remote Sensing Knowledge 
Relative advantage to GIS 
Extent of GIS training 
Confidence in Database Quality
Ease of Applying GIS 
GIS Linkages 
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Figure 13: Common Factors Influencing GIS Adoption Responses (Cullis, 2000:9) 
 
Modeler’s View of Adoption in GeoBase Implementation System. 
For this research effort, the members of the organization who are capable of using 
the GeoBase innovation in their work functions comprise the pool of potential adopters.  
Adoption (moving from the potential adopter pool to the adopter pool) requires buy-in 
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from potential adopters on three levels.  First, the potential adopter must adopt the GIS 
technology that drives GeoBase.  Second, the potential adopter must agree to work within 
the new data framework for the organization, meaning the intercommunication, database 
control, and data sharing protocols that are required.  Third, the potential adopter must 
choose to become a force for integrated business process change.  The potential adopter 
must research his business processes and find ways for GeoBase to fit-in and improve the 
process performance.  These individuals define the pool of potential adopters in this 
system.   
Based on Rogers (1995) research, adoption is expected to follow an s-shaped 
behavior pattern over time as a result of innovative and laggard characteristics of 
potential adopters.  Innovative personnel will tend to adopt earlier and laggards will tend 
to adopt later.  Both organizational personnel and managers will go through the stages of 
change discussed by Isabella (1990) and Jaffe et al. (1994) during this s-shaped adoption 
growth period.   
There are two main processes at work in organizations to move this diffusion 
process forward: direct management action using change process techniques and 
interpersonal communication channels.  Direct management influence using the change 
process techniques discussed by Kotter (1995) and others (Geo InSight, 2001; Armenakis 
et al., 2000) focus on moving personnel from the potential adopter pool to the adopter 
pool by direct management action.  Change process techniques are necessary at the 
beginning of a change implementation effort until the adopter pool builds to a point 
where passive, interpersonal communication channel processes (Rogers, 1995) can take 
over.  Managers can have some influence on these interpersonal communication channels 
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by gaining buy-in from opinion leaders (thereby strengthening the diffusion by 
interpersonal communication channels power of the IT innovation) and organizing 
communication forums.   
There are also overarching IT innovation perception characteristics that will 
control the rate of adoption, based on potential adopter perceptions and organizational 
culture.  These perceptions will generally be higher in organizations more accepting of IT 
innovations (positive IT organizational culture) and lower in organizations less accepting 
of IT innovations (poor IT organizational culture).  These perceptions include the 
concepts of relative advantage, ease of use, and compatibility as discussed earlier 
(Tornatzky & Klein, 1982).   
Figure 14 provides an overall view of all of these concepts as they relate to the 
adoption portion of the IT implementation model.  Chapter 4 includes more information 
on how these influences interact in the adoption portion of this model. 
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Figure 14: Modeler’s View of Adoption Process 
 
Integration. 
The word integration is defined as combining technical hardware, technical 
software, and social system components into the business processes of the system.   
GeoBase is more than simply an information technology (IT) integration effort 
(though this is a required element); it also aims to transform information behavior.  
Personnel must learn to share and spatially enable information.  This level of change is 
categorized as second-order change.  Second-order change requires more than mere 
incremental change – it requires personnel to move outside of existing parameters and 
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frameworks and redefine how business is accomplished in their organizations 
(Cunningham, 1999:32).  People often do not know what type of information is available 
in an organizational setting – instead of spending extra time trying collect new 
information, it would be much easier to have a general database of metadata for personal 
reference to check if required information already exists.  When personnel share 
information, as uncomfortable and risky as this may be, for the good of the whole 
organization, it enables everyone involved in organizational business processes to 
accomplish their jobs much more efficiently. 
Organizational business process efficiency can be dramatically improved with the 
addition of meaningful IT capability.  As GeoBase adoption continues to grow, adopters 
will begin to think inductively about technology.  Instead of deductively saying, “I have a 
problem.  What IT innovation is out there that can help me solve it,” people can now 
inductively say, “Here is this IT innovation.  What can I use it for to help me improve my 
business processes?”   
Over time, GeoBase will arrive at initial operating capability (IOC).  However, 
this is not the end of the GeoBase implementation process.  Personnel must be initially 
trained on how to use the innovation and make the commitment to adopt, then they can 
begin finding innovative uses for it.  Integrating technology into business processes is 
done much more effectively by the personnel operating within the process than by 
outsiders looking in.  Cosmopolitan teams of insiders and outsiders are usually the most 
effective at reengineering business processes with new IT innovations (Hammer & 
Champy, 2001).  Integration, in this context, is more than introducing a new technology 
into an organization and expecting people to use it.  Managers must assist personnel 
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through a process of personal discovery.  If managers can help their personnel progress 
through this adoption process by alleviating roadblocks and other distractions, then 
subordinates will begin to buy-in to the GeoBase initiative and find ways to integrate it 
into their business processes.  GeoBase integration, in this model, is a very aggregated 
term.  GeoBase integration is more than merely increasing the technological capabilities 
of IT or focusing solely on individual or group adoption of technology; it is about 
changing how the organization deals with information sharing and IT capability and 
using these enhancements to make the business processes of the organization 
dramatically more efficient.  This type of second-order change takes time, but with 
proper management, personnel will adjust and all will benefit. 
For the GeoBase initiative to maximize its potential in the organization, managers 
and adopters must find ways to integrate it into their business processes.  There are a 
number of ways to do this.  If organizations already understand their business processes 
and only require business process enhancements to moderately improve performance, 
they may find ways to integrate GeoBase technology without having to rethink the way 
business is done in general.  This approach is akin to continuous improvement (kaizen).  
However, this research proposes that for significant gains in organizational effectiveness 
to occur, many of the fragmented processes alive in the Air Force organizations today 
must be reengineered.   
A typical civil engineer (CE) squadron (or any organization in the Air Force) 
provides an illustrative example of a reengineering opportunity.  Most Air Force 
organizations are structured around fragmented functionality.  Most CE Squadrons are 
composed of an engineering flight, environmental flight, maintenance engineering flight, 
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etc.  However, most of the products that organizations produce for a customer are the 
result of a process.  A new building construction process for a customer has elements of 
engineering, environmental, maintenance engineering, and other CE-internal and CE-
external inputs that run across existing functional units.   Obstacles to communication 
often reside between functional units, which produce time delays, quality problems, and 
missed information.  Under the current system, a new building may not be adequately 
designed with customer requirements in mind, project delays can multiply due to 
coordination delays, and certain environmental considerations may not be taken into 
account, resulting in environmental compliance problems.  Moving from a functional 
organizational model to a process-oriented model would bring more value (less 
expensive, faster, better quality) to the products the customer is interested in.  Instead of 
the organization being solely comprised of functional units, the creation of a new 
building process team, with membership in the process team based on product value-
added input, could revolutionize the way business is done for great gains in time, cost, 
and quality.  IT innovations, such as GeoBase, can become process enablers and allow 
these value enhancements to realistically materialize. 
  Often, reengineering is thought to be synonymous with organizational 
downsizing.  It is true, oftentimes, that fewer personnel are a result of reengineering, but 
the goals of reengineering are not based on this factor alone.  Some basic concepts from 
the business process reengineering literature will be discussed to hopefully clear up some 
of this confusion and show how the GeoBase initiative can have a dramatic impact on 
organizational performance in the form of efficiency, effectiveness, and lower costs, 
resulting in a better product for the customer. 
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Business Process Reengineering. 
One of the major aspects of integration, as defined in this research, is the concept 
of business process reengineering.  Reengineering is defined as “the fundamental 
rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements 
in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, or 
speed” (Hammer & Champy, 2001:35).   
The definition for reengineering contains four key words: fundamental, radical, 
dramatic, and processes.  The word fundamental is emphasized because it forces 
organizational personnel to ask basic questions about how they operate.  Asking 
fundamental questions forces personnel to look at the basic way they do business – why 
do we do things the way we do?  Often, underlying assumptions that dictate how business 
gets done are based on erroneous, obsolete, or inappropriate rules.  At the heart of 
reengineering is the premise that old rules can be destroyed and new rules can be created 
that replace the what is with what should be (Hammer & Champy, 2001:35-36). 
The word radical refers to the concept of getting to the root of the problem and 
avoiding merely superficial changes.  With reengineering, personnel can cast off the old 
and bring in a completely new way of doing things.  Reengineering is about business 
reinvention – not business improvement, enhancement, or modification (Hammer & 
Champy, 2001:36). 
The word dramatic refers to the concept of making quantum leaps in performance 
rather than marginal or incremental improvements.  A need to improve process 
performance by 10% does not provide the impetus for reengineering – other methods 
such as incremental quality programs or exhorting personnel can dig an organization out 
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of a 10% hole.  Reengineering should be used when magnitudes of enhanced 
performance are needed (Hammer & Champy, 2001:36-37). 
The last word, processes, is the most important in the definition of reengineering.  
Most managers do not think in terms of processes.  Instead, they tend to think in terms of 
tasks, jobs, people, and structures.  A business process is defined as a “collection of 
activities that takes one or more kinds of input and creates an output that is of value to the 
customer” (Hammer & Champy, 2001:38).  The fragmentation of processes in 
organizations can be traced back to Adam Smith and his seminal work, Wealth of 
Nations, written in 1776 (Hammer & Champy, 2001:13).  Smith determined that for 
organizations to be their most productive, work must be broken into its most simple tasks 
and each task assigned to a specialist – this division of labor was a very effective way to 
operate under the old rules of business efficiency where mass production was the key 
factor in success.  In fact, management bureaucracy is the glue that holds together the 
fragmented business processes that division of labor created.  In today’s world however, 
customers, competition, and change itself have gone through such a metamorphosis that 
the old rules of division of labor do not usually work well.  In today’s world, customers 
want products that suit their individual needs, not those meant for the general population.  
With the number of competitors in the marketplace today, organizational survival is 
predicated on who will satisfy the new demands of customers.  Technology growth has 
taken change from the every-so-often event to the norm – organizations must adapt to this 
level of change to be successful in today’s world.   
A major focus of business process reengineering is to put the fragmented pieces 
of processes back together to allow organizations to function productively in today’s 
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context (Hammer & Champy, 2001).  The business process reengineering concept may 
have been derived from research in non-government companies, but the lessons learned 
apply as much to them as to government organizations, such as the Air Force. 
Information technology plays a crucial role in business process reengineering, but 
one that is commonly misunderstood.  Information technology is an essential enabler for 
reengineering, but merely throwing computers and technology at a problem does not 
cause it to be reengineered.  Most managers are good at thinking deductively, which is to 
say they are good at defining a problem and seeking solutions to it.  However, successful 
application of information technology to reengineering requires inductive thinking.  
Inductive thinking is the ability to first recognize a powerful solution and then seek the 
problems it might solve, possibly problems the organization does not know it even has 
(Hammer & Champy, 2001).   
Even when thinking inductively about information technology, managers often 
make the mistake of viewing information technology through the lens of their existing 
processes.  Instead of looking for ways that information technology can merely improve 
the way things are currently done, managers should look for ways that information 
technology can allow them to do things they are not already doing.  Reengineering 
spawns innovative thinking – it exploits the latest capabilities of technology to achieve 
entirely new goals (Hammer & Champy, 2001).  This research proposes this is the key to 
integration – allowing the information technology innovation to enter and change the 
business processes of the organization to achieve dramatic improvements in system 
performance. 
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It is difficult for managers and organizational personnel to continually think 
inductively about technology and implementing changes that offer more uncertainty – 
people get comfortable with their level of competence and tend to stop learning. A few 
issues related to individual and organizational learning will be discussed to lay the 
foundation for the rest of the integration discussion. 
A System’s View of Mental Models and Learning. 
In order to adopt an innovation and act as a force for innovation integration, the 
potential adopter must go through a learning process.  System dynamics can help us 
understand how this process progresses as a feedback loop.  “We make decisions that 
alter the real world; we gather information feedback about the real world, and using the 
new information we revise our understanding of the world and the decisions we make to 
bring our perception of the state of the system closer to our goals” (Sterman, 2000:14).  
In addition to the process described above, decisions are also a result of a decision rule or 
policy, which come from institutional structures, organizational strategies, and cultural 
norms (Sterman, 2000: 16).  These are all affected by our mental models, which are 
“deeply held images of how the world works” (Kim, 1993:39).  Figure 15 is an 
illustrative example of this feedback loop conditioned by our mental model. 
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Figure 15: Single-loop Learning (Sterman, 2000:15) 
 
The type of learning process pictured in Figure 15, commonly referred to as 
single-loop learning, helps an individual change a particular decision he or she might 
make, but to actually change how they think about a given problem requires double-loop 
learning (associated with second-order change).   
Figure 16 illustrates the difference between these two types of learning processes 
for an individual.  Single-loop learning, though information from the environment is still 
obtained and taken into account in the decision process, relies on the same mental model 
of the real world.  When substantial change or a significant paradigm shift is introduced 
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into a system, the mental model of the individual must change to accommodate this 
adjustment; hence double-loop learning is required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Double-loop Learning (Sterman, 2000:19) 
 
Mental models differ from the commonly held belief of how static memory 
operates because mental models filter what an individual sees and does (Kim, 1993:39).  
Mental models are similar to the source code for a computer’s operating system, acting as 
the manager and arbiter of gathering, storing, using, and deleting new information.  
However, they are also a step higher, since they are also like the source code programmer 
– they can rewrite the source code and choose between different sets of code (Kim, 
1993:39). 
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Kim (1993) breaks learning into two types: operational (required steps to 
complete a task) and conceptual (why things are done the way they are in the first place).  
Mental models are an important part of how an individual learns.  To illustrate the link 
between mental models and learning, consider the following analogy.  Imagine the task 
of driving a vehicle home from work.  Usually, each person has a favorite return route.  
This belief system is our framework that guides our choice between a route with the least 
stoplights and the one with the most scenic views.  Once we have decided on a route, we 
execute this routine whenever we want to return home – as if on autopilot.  If there is 
road construction or something that blocks this route, we have to rethink our criteria of 
what represents the best route home and select a new one.  This is the model of individual 
learning – a cycle of conceptual and operational learning that informs and is informed by 
mental models (Kim, 1993). 
Cunningham introduces some important concepts from the writings of Peter 
Drucker to give further understanding of individual and organizational learning.  Drucker 
wrote about his experiences in Japan and compared their learning paradigm to the 
western learning paradigm.   
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Some of the specific references to the Japanese emphasis on learning include 
(Cunningham, 1999:47):  
● the idea of ‘continuous learning’; 
● every employee (including managers) attended training sessions; 
● learning was seen as part of regular, scheduled work; 
● training sessions were not, as a rule, run by trainers but by the employees; 
● experts (for example, industrial engineers) would assist in learning sessions    
   but not take the lead or dominate; 
● learning did not focus on just one skill at a time – people learned about all the   
   work in the unit: they did not focus on one person or one job but on the whole   
               unit or the whole plant; 
● training sessions were oriented to developing new, creative ways of doing  
               things. 
 
Japanese culture fostered a Zen-based learning tradition where learning was seen 
as a perpetual process of self-improvement (Cunningham, 1999:48).  Japanese workers 
understood the concept of a learning curve to mean unending learning – ever expanding 
knowledge and abilities (Cunningham, 1999:48).  On the other hand, the western view of 
a learning curve is an approach to steady state behavior pattern (Cunningham, 1999:48).  
Figure 17 could represent the Japanese view of learning as opposed to Figure 18, which 
represents the western view of learning. 
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Figure 17: Possible Japanese Model of Learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Western Model of Learning (Cunningham, 1999:48) 
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In the Western model, learning is a temporary nuisance that is cured by the 
individual leveling-out into competent performance (and, by implication, ceasing 
significant learning until the next promotion requires increased learning).  The economic 
and production success of the Japanese following WWII (specifically in the 1970s) is 
partially attributable to this learning paradigm.  Japanese companies that have moved into 
North America and Europe have shown that the indigenous workforce can learn in 
similar ways to the Japanese, hence this type of paradigm shift is possible and useful for 
studying how western organizations can increase their learning capacity and make 
marked improvements in productivity and knowledge creation (Cunningham, 1999:47-
48). 
Cunningham also notes that both societies had troubles making the transition to 
double-loop learning.  The Japanese were very efficient within their existing way of 
thinking, but had problems dealing with second-order change (Cunningham, 1999:48).  It 
is uncomfortable moving away from existing mental models (which is essentially 
change), hence the difficulties inherent in double-loop learning.  Often in change 
initiatives, there is a substantial amount of individual and organizational resistance to 
change (Isabella, 1990:34; Armenakis et. al., 2000:327).  This research proposes that 
resistance to continued learning is one of the major compensating influences on IT 
integration.  From the discussion of individual learning and the complexities of changing 
mental models of the real world (double-loop learning), one can see why it is difficult to 
undergo IT-induced second-order change.   If it is difficult for individuals to undergo 
double-loop learning and second-order change, how much more difficult is it for 
organizations composed of multiple individuals to do the same?  Since this research 
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focuses on achieving GeoBase integration within an organizational setting, as opposed to 
a lone individual, it is necessary to examine how individual learning and knowledge is 
transferred from individuals to the organization for its continued improvement. 
Learning Organizations. 
There is a large body of research that focuses on identifying how to create a 
“learning organization” (Garvin, 2000; Kim, 1993; Cunningham, 1999; Beer & Eisenstat, 
1996; Romme & Dillen, 1997).  A learning organization can be defined as “an 
organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and at modifying 
its behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights” (Garvin, 2000:80).  Romme and 
Dillen point out that “the gap between individual and organizational learning is perhaps 
the biggest barrier in moving toward learning organizations” (Romme & Dillen, 
1997:77).  System dynamics modeling can be especially useful in understanding and 
alleviating this gap between individual and organizational learning since it offers “a 
number of resources for reducing fragmented learning, involving situations in which 
individuals learn but the organization as a whole does not” (Romme & Dillen, 1997:77).  
The work of Kim clarifies how individual and collective mental models interact and 
operate as a transfer mechanism between individual and organizational learning (Kim, 
1993:44). 
Specifying the transfer mechanism between individual and organizational learning 
uncovers the process through which individual learning embeds itself into an 
organization’s memory and structure (Kim, 1993:37).  An organization’s memory is 
composed of manuals, procedures, symbols, rituals, myths, physical office layout, and all 
of the current individual memories of its employees (Romme & Dillen, 1997:73).  All 
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organizations are made-up of individuals; organizations can learn independent of any one 
individual, but not independent of all individuals (Kim, 1993:37).   
Organizational learning is more complex and dynamic than a mere amalgamation 
of individual learning (Kim, 1993:40).  As individuals have their own mental models, 
organizations have what Kim calls shared mental models – “shared assumptions that 
protect the status quo” (Kim, 1993:41).  Organizational culture is defined much the same 
way as shared mental models.  Organizational memory is composed of everything that is 
retrievable, but a static definition is not very useful when trying to understand how 
organizations learn (Kim, 1993:43).  Only the parts of an organization’s memory that are 
relevant for organizational learning are those that make-up active memory (portions that 
outline what an organization gives heed to, how it acts, and what experiences it chooses 
to remember) (Kim, 1993:44).  These active memory portions explicitly or implicitly 
define both individual and shared mental models (Kim, 1993:44). When the shared 
mental model precludes people from easily exchanging information, little learning is 
possible.  One of the methods Kim recommends for overcoming shared mental model 
complications, leading to organizational learning, is to make them explicit (Kim, 
1993:46).  Making mental models explicit is one of the learning management methods 
discussed in the next section. 
Individual and Organizational Learning Management Interventions. 
Kim identifies that the “mental models in individuals’ heads are where a vast 
majority of an organization’s knowledge (both know-how and know-why) lies” (Kim, 
1993:44).  Since mental models are composed not of reality, but perceptions of reality, 
then fundamental to learning is a shared mental model (Kim, 1993:46).  If one could 
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accurately and easily articulate what composes his or the organization’s mental model, 
then most learning problems could be overcome.  However, organizational learning 
problems stem from the fact that mental models are a mix of both what is learned 
explicitly and absorbed implicitly – hence communicating them is difficult (Kim, 
1993:46).  Mental models are usually highly dynamic and nonlinear phenomena, so tools 
such as system dynamics become effective to help elucidate much of this complexity 
through causal loop diagrams and computer modeling and simulation (Kim, 1993:46).  
As mental models are made explicit and actively shared, a base of shared meaning in the 
organization widens and the organization’s capacity for effective coordinated action 
increases (Kim, 1993:48).  Making mental models explicit is one way to close the gap 
between individual and organizational learning and fosters an environment where a 
learning organization can flourish.   
The process of making mental models explicit also aids how individuals 
communicate within an organization.  Garvin recognizes the first step in creating a 
learning organization is fostering an environment that is conducive to learning (Garvin, 
2000:91).  Managers must give employees the opportunity to learn – if they are rushed or 
overwhelmed with pressing tasks, the possibility of organizational learning is depressed 
(Garvin, 2000:91).  It follows from this analysis that employees must take advantage of 
the learning time given to them or nothing constructive will occur.   
Garvin also identifies the need to open up boundaries and stimulate the exchange 
of ideas between functional units within and without the organization (Garvin, 2000:91).  
Autonomous groups within organizations have a tendency to isolate themselves and view 
the function of the organization only from their perspective (Romme & Dillen, 1997:75).  
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Their mental model perceptions are framed in such a way that they are unable to view 
events from the perspective of other elements within the organization.  The “not invented 
here” syndrome must be replaced by “enthusiastic borrowing” when innovative and 
positive ways of doing business are discovered outside one’s own group (Garvin, 
2000:86).     
When knowledge and skills are linked to specific people or groups within an 
organization and not shared and distributed to others, the danger of deterioration creeps 
in.  Deterioration is the “breakdown of the organization’s capacity to learn” and reverses 
any organizational gains from learning (Romme & Dillen, 1997:69).  As people 
possessing unshared knowledge transfer out or leave the organization, deterioration 
increases (Romme & Dillen, 1997:75).  Garvin argues for the creation of “learning 
forums” where information can be freely exchanged among members of differing groups 
in a supportive and open environment (Garvin, 2000:91).  Hoarding information and 
unhealthy inter-group competition is reduced in these pro-learning environments 
(Cunningham, 1999:50).  These types of forums foster double-loop learning, especially 
when forum activities require employees to wrestle with new knowledge and consider its 
implications (Garvin, 2000:91).  In terms of GeoBase integration, since the Air Force is 
at the initial stage of development, there are many business processes that remain 
unaffected by GeoBase improvements.  However, one of the GeoBase objectives is to 
significantly improve mission processes (Department of the Air Force, 2000b:7).  For 
significant improvements, business process reengineering is a proven commodity; for 
minor improvements, continual improvement programs are applicable.  Business process 
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integration can be aided through a cross-functional information exchange forum where 
double-loop learning can be exercised. 
Cunningham proposes a practical approach to both individual and organizational 
learning that increases inter-group communication, fosters the proper organizational 
learning environment and culture, and allows individuals to “own” their learning process 
(Cunningham, 1999).  This approach, called self managed learning (SML), aims at 
achieving long-term results and emphasizes the need for organizational buy-in with the 
support of top management (Cunningham, 1999:xi-xii).  Garvin identifies that education 
and training programs are powerful tools for transferring knowledge, but for them to add 
value to the organization, they must be linked explicitly with implementation (Garvin, 
2000:88).  Cunningham seems to recognize this important element since his approach is 
devoid of standardized training or instruction modules, since these are typically too 
generalized and ineffective at motivating people to learn about their own behavior and 
thinking (Romme & Dillen, 1997:76).   
Instead of solely using training sessions (though these may be a part of the 
approach), Cunningham has employees participate in training or self-educational 
activities based on individual learning contracts, in which a number of goals have been 
agreed upon by the employee and manager over, for example, the next four to nine 
months (Cunningham, 1999:177-180).  These learning contracts are established in a 
learning set, composed of a group of preferably five individuals (including a set manager) 
from different backgrounds and positions within the organization (Cunningham, 
1999:182-194).  Knowledge and skills acquired in these learning sets are spread 
throughout the organization by merit of the eclectic group of individuals present within 
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the set (Cunningham, 1999:182-194).  Learning contracts allow the individual to “own” 
his learning and knowledge creation process and learning sets disperse space and 
facilities to learn collectively, building a learning culture throughout the organization 
over time (Cunningham, 1999:182-194).  Integration of set learning with daily tasks is 
also stimulated by this approach since individuals can discuss pertinent individual issues 
during the set meeting and get different perspectives on these issues (Cunningham, 
1999:182-194).  Knowledge retention is increased when paired with operational exercise 
(Romme & Dillen, 1997:76).  An approach, such a Cunningham proposes, that, to some 
degree, unshrouds individual and shared mental models and increases inter-group 
communication is of most benefit for the learning organization to reduce learning 
fragmentation (link between individual and shared mental models is poorly maintained 
(Kim, 1993:46)) and deterioration. 
Organizational Resistance to Change. 
When people become comfortable in their surroundings and feel competent in 
their jobs, they tend to resist a lot of increased learning (Cunningham, 1999).  People also 
resist change – it creates uncertainty and forces them to adjust their ways of operating.  In 
the aggregate integration concept resides the concept of organizational resistance.  This 
research views organizational resistance in the integration context as both resistance to 
continued learning and resistance to change. 
Second-order change forces individuals to change their mental models through 
double-loop learning processes (Sterman, 2000; Kim, 1993).  This is uncomfortable, as 
was discussed in a previous section, so individuals tend to resist changes that force 
double-loop learning.  If managers are able to effectively intervene and assist individuals 
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change their learning paradigms, then much of this resistance disappears (Kim, 1993).  
The focus of change process management is to communicate to personnel why the 
change is necessary and assist them in reducing their own uncertainty, thus decreasing 
their change resistance. 
This research proposes that the limits to the level of IT integration in an 
organization are naturally caused by the level of organizational resistance present in the 
organization.  Integration is probably the most aggregated concept in this model because 
it takes many different concepts, such as business process improvement and 
reengineering, learning, and organizational resistance, and brings them under one 
heading.  However, the summarizing concept in this research, which brings together all of 
the concepts discussed to this point is that of organizational inertia. 
Organizational Inertia. 
Organizational inertia, in this model, is an overarching concept that “encompasses 
personal commitments, financial investments and institutional mechanisms supporting 
the current way of doing things” (Huff et al., 1992:55).  The three main aggregate 
variables discussed in the model to this point (operating capability, adoption, and 
integration) capture the concepts embedded in the definition of organizational inertia by 
Huff et al.  Personal commitment is at the heart of adoption, financial investments are 
associated with operating capability, and institutional mechanisms could also be 
described as the business processes of the organization.  When most people in the 
organization accept the innovation (and probably stop referring to it as an innovation) as 
the way certain things get done, this indicates it has probably been effectively integrated 
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into some of the business processes of the organization.  This acceptance as status quo 
also indicates a level of positive organizational inertia has been developed.   
Organizational inertia is linked with the concept of organizational memory.  
Organizational memory is composed of everything in the organization that is retrievable; 
this includes all of the written documentation in the organization, the experiences and 
knowledge of personnel, manuals, procedures, symbols, rituals, and myths (Kim, 
1993:37; Romme & Dillen, 1997:69).  As an organization lavishes time and resources 
upon an innovation and as adopters buy-in to the innovation and seek to integrate it into 
the organizational business processes, organizational memory increases, thereby 
increasing organizational inertia. 
It is important to understand that organizational inertia can be either positive or 
negative.  Positive organizational inertia would tend to support further integration, 
support adoption, and continue increasing operating capability.  Negative organizational 
inertia, on the other hand, would tend to decrease integration, decrease adoption, and 
decrease operating capability.  
Positive organizational inertia stores the positive continuance practices of the 
organization as they relate to the innovation.  For long-term innovation sustainment, the 
organizational memory must accumulate positive experiences and pass them on to others 
in the organization.  In contrast, negative organizational inertia stores the negative 
continuance practices of the organization and leads to long-term innovation rejection.  
Organizational inertia is also, to a large degree, determined by the context within 
which the organization functions.  Referring back to Figure 3, there were four main items 
that were exogenous in the GeoBase system and defined the context of the system: 
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funding, top level support, organizational culture, and innovation meeting needs.  HAF 
GIO provides a portion of the context for the squadron-size GeoBase system through Air 
Force-wide GeoBase leadership and funding.  In this model, HAF GIO helps define the 
organizational context the GeoBase system manager functions in.  This influence, in this 
model, is derived mostly from top leadership support and funding.  The organizational 
culture is also very important.  If an organization is innovative, perceptions of 
innovations will be better and adoption will tend to increase more quickly.  If an 
organization is rigid, or unkind to innovation and change, it will tend to prevent or reduce 
adoption.  Another important concept in the organizational context is whether the 
innovation is meeting both personal and organizational needs or not.  If both the 
individual user and organization’s needs are being met as a result of innovation use, 
innovation integration will be supported over the long-term.  If not, organization inertia 
will not support continued integration.      
The upcoming discussion focuses on literature examples, some using the system 
dynamics approach, which help to provide a better understanding of organizational 
inertia.  The reader should not expect to see all of the factors discussed in this section to 
be included in the formalized model, since the literature research is guided by wholly 
different questions. 
Contextual Issues in Organizational Inertia. 
Contextual issues in organizational change play a major role in organizational 
inertia.  Contextual factors focus on forces or conditions existing in an organization’s 
internal or external environments.  External conditions could include things such as 
governmental regulations and technology advances, whereas internal conditions could 
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include the degree of specialization or work specificity required by existing technology 
and experiences with previous changes (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999:295).   
Fox-Wolfgramm et al. analyzed the effects of the Community Re-Investment Act 
(CRA) on two Texas banks and how the banks reacted to these regulatory changes in 
their environments.  One bank was labeled a defender bank and the other a prospector 
bank, given their previous methods of operating.  Changes as a result of CRA on these 
two banks required the defender bank to go through second-order change, whereas the 
prospector bank went through first-order change.  The second-order change required of 
the defender bank was inconsistent with its envisioned identity and image, so the change 
was ultimately rejected.  On the other hand, the changes required of the prospector bank 
were sustained because they were consistent with its envisioned identity and image.  As a 
result of this work, Fox-Wolfgramm et al. proposed that to be sustainable, change must 
be consistent with an organization’s current identity or envisioned identity and 
envisioned image (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998:118).  Likewise, for GeoBase to be 
sustainable, it must fit in with the organizational identity and image, which are 
determined by the organizational culture.   
Huff et al. developed and simulated a characterization of how organizations move 
between state sustaining strategic renewal and the more radical changes that significantly 
alter organization activity over time.  Their argument juxtaposes inertia (commitment to 
current strategy) and stress (dissatisfactions that signal the need for renewal).  Huff et al. 
model differing evolutionary processes that simulate differing renewal paths and the 
interaction of cumulative stress and inertia that naturally develops in organizations over 
time (Huff et al., 1992).   
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Organizational inertia will grow over time as basic business task demands are 
met.  Successfully meeting demands leads to more detailed and routinized policies and 
procedures to increase reliability.  As managers find the organization’s new strategy 
satisfactorily meets current conditions, and as they make decisions following its 
prescription, the new strategy is further supported.  As the new strategy is more strongly 
implemented, even individuals who are not completely convinced of its benefits are 
motivated by self-interest to find ways to mark their stake in the status quo.  This 
escalating commitment to current strategy, at the organizational level, can be thought of 
as organizational innovation adoption (Huff et al., 1992).   
Resistance to further frame changing renewal in the organization arises due to the 
difficulties associated with reconfiguring increasingly complex organizational activities 
surrounding the current strategy.  Major strategy renewal efforts would resubject the 
organization to the inefficiencies and uncertainties of new innovation.  Managers are 
more motivated to work with what they have inherited, since commitments become less 
easy to change and administrative mechanisms make it easier to predict satisfactory 
results (Huff et al., 1992).   
In the period immediately following adoption of a new strategy, organizational 
inertia is low; but as time goes on, inertia and the associated resistance to changing a 
satisfactory strategy will tend to follow the classic ‘s-shaped’ adoption curve (shown in 
Figure 19).  Despite the prediction that inertia will increase, escalating commitment is not 
always inevitable.  New personnel, transferring champions, and eliminated institutional 
repositories of organizational memory can cause dampened or stepped reduction in 
inertia over time (Huff et al., 1992).   
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Figure 19: Cumulative Inertia Surrounding Current Strategy (Huff et al., 1992:57) 
 
Even though the forces of inertia generally gain strength over time, the grounds 
for significant strategic renewal are always present as well.  Poor performance, 
technological advances, internal reorganizations, and new leadership can make past 
strategic positions less appropriate.  “Organization stress” is a “summarizing concept that 
expresses ways in which current strategy is not satisfactory; it reflects the dissatisfactions 
of individual actors and imperfections in the fit between the organization and its 
environment” (Huff et al., 1992:58).   
Stress is always present because no strategy is perfect – it will increase if strategy 
implementation falls short of expectations.  Stress also increases because the environment 
in which the organization functions is dynamic.  As opportunities develop and new 
technologies and ideas become available, the inadequacies of current strategy are 
compounded.  Stress accumulating over time is likely to lead more and more people in 
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the organization to perceive the benefits of major strategic renewal, in contrast to the 
processes that increase commitment to current strategy. 
Stress tends to dissipate over time as attention to and memory of specific stressful 
events fade (Figure 20).  These stress adjustment processes are all aspects of an important 
form of organizational renewal called homeostatis, defined as “the tendency of a system 
to maintain internal stability owing to the coordinated response of its parts to any 
situation tending to disturb its normal condition or function” (Huff et al., 1992:58).  
However, not all problems can be satisfactorily resolved within one strategic framework.  
It is unlikely that homeostatic efforts can completely counteract dissatisfaction over time 
when large stressors enter the system.  Cumulative stress, which makes major strategic 
change more likely to be sought and accepted, is usually associated with specific stressful 
events (Huff et al., 1992).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Figure 20: Cumulative Stress with Homeostasis (Huff et al., 1992:59) 
  
Time
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
St
re
ss
 
 
 81
Stress and inertia are interdependent; therefore, their effects upon major strategic 
change decisions must be evaluated simultaneously.  Larger stressors (and short time 
horizons) will usually generate major strategic change (second-order change); while 
smaller inconveniences lead to more incremental efforts (first-order change) (Huff et al., 
1992).   
Sastry also developed a simulation model for analyzing the dynamics of 
organizational change.  Sastry formalized a theory of organizational change by Tushman 
and Romanelli (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985), in which organizations undergo 
occasional dramatic revolutions or punctuations to overcome organizational inertia and 
set a new path for the organization to follow.  Sastry cites the need for his research 
because “critics of the existing research argue that, too often, the causal structures of the 
theories are not fully specified” (Sastry, 1997:237).  Sastry also points out that his model 
does not treat the organization as a black box, but as a collection of functions carried out 
be personnel who are influenced by organization culture, norms, and practices and who in 
turn influence these organizational phenomena (Sastry, 1997).   
Sastry uses a system dynamics approach in his research for three reasons.  First, 
system dynamics “highlights feedback processes, or circular causal relationships in which 
variables influence and, in turn, respond to each other” (Sastry, 1997:240).  Second, “an 
explicit representation of behavioral decision making is central to [his] approach” (Sastry, 
1997:240).  Sastry recognizes that decision makers are subject to bounds on their 
rationality as imperfect knowledge and expectations take time to update.  As a result of 
using a system dynamics approach, lags inherent in collecting, assembling, and 
interpreting data and in taking action are represented explicitly.   Third, “system 
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dynamics distinguishes between state variables, such as the organization’s number of 
employees or its inertia, and variables that represent rates of change, such as the rate of 
hiring and laying off or the increase in inertia per unit of time” (Sastry, 1997:240).  Sastry 
specifies that this distinction is important because state variables, which represent 
properties of the organization that have been accumulated over the organization’s history 
and characterize the system, cannot be changed instantaneously.  Also, because system 
dynamics models approximate continuous-time processes, rather than step-by-step 
discrete processes, they are able to capture ongoing processes and simultaneous 
procedures that influence one another and can be used to explore the effects of time lags 
likely to be at work in an organizational setting (Sastry, 1997).   
Sastry’s model focuses on four organizational variables modeled as state 
variables: inertia (i.e., resistance to environmental reassessment and change in social and 
structural relationships); strategic orientation (i.e., what business a firm is in and how 
does it compete); performance (i.e., consistency of activities and organizational 
efficiency as perceived by top managers); and pressure for change (i.e., environmental 
changes that render an original strategic orientation ineffective). 
Figure 21 is a simplified causal diagram for Sastry’s model.  Each internal 
variable is locked into a causal relationship with other variables.  For example, as 
organizational inertia increases, the ability of the organization to change decreases (an 
inverse relationship represented by the minus sign on the causal connecting arrow from 
Inertia to Ability to change).  As the ability of the organization to change decreases, the 
ability to change strategic orientation also decreases (a relationship shown by the plus 
sign on the causal connecting arrow from Ability to change to Change in strategic 
 
 
 83
direction).  If the reader follows the arrows that form a loop (arrows must loop in the 
same direction), the loop is either self-reinforcing or compensating.  A self-reinforcing 
loop has either none or an even number of inverse (minus) causal arrows.  A 
compensating loop always has an odd number of inverse (minus) causal arrows.  In 
Figure 21, there are three self-reinforcing loops (loops labeled with a “P”) and one 
compensating loop (loops labeled with an “N”).  The model of punctuated change is 
fairly simple, containing only four state variables.  However, it is difficult to simulate 
mentally since it contains feedback and nonlinear relationships.  System dynamics 
modeling software acts as a differential equation solver and allows the modeler to 
perform these complex simulations after the model has been formalized in the computer’s 
memory. 
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Figure 21: Simplified Causal Diagram of the Punctuated Change Theory (Sastry, 
1997:244) 
 
As long as the organization does not change its strategic orientation, inertia builds 
up over time through continuous social and structural processes, “as webs of 
interdependent relationships with buyers, suppliers, and financial backers strengthen, and 
as commitments to internal participants and external evaluating agents are elaborated into 
institutionalized patterns of culture, norms, and ideologies, the organization develops 
inertia” (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985:177).  Sastry modeled inertia as a stock (state 
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variable) representing the “degree to which these networks and relationships are 
solidified and the extent to which organizational culture is developed” (Sastry, 
1997:247).  Like other stocks, at time t, inertia is simply the integral of all previous 
changes in inertia, plus its initial value, Io.  The inertia stock is simply the difference 
between the rate of increase of inertia and the rate of decrease of inertia.  
Using similar formalization techniques for each of the stocks and after testing his 
model, Sastry was able to simulate how this organizational system would operate over 
time.  After simulating the model, Sastry found that if a new change effort followed too 
soon after a previous change, the organization did not have an opportunity to rebuild 
destroyed competence.  This finding suggested for the organization to succeed, 
organizational leaders must, under some conditions, prevent change from taking place, 
even when it appears to be indicated (i.e., even when both organization-environment fit 
and performance are low).  Usually this situation occurs right after a major reorientation, 
since this is the period when competence is lowest.  In order to prevent too much change 
from taking place, the organization needs to suspend its responses to signals of poor 
performance and fit.  To add this logic to his model, Sastry included a trial period routine, 
which represented an organizational policy of suspending the practice of monitoring, 
evaluating, and responding during the trial period (Sastry, 1997).   
Empirical evidence from General Electric (GE) supports this finding.  GE Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) Jack Welsh implemented a new strategic orientation at GE and 
wrote in a 1991 shareholder letter, “parts of the organization needed to just sit there…like 
popcorn kernels in a warm pan” (Sastry, 1997:263).  The waiting period eventually 
spawned improvements as, “suddenly, things began to pop here and there, with big ideas, 
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process breakthroughs” (Sastry, 1997:263).  Without a specific period of “soft 
initiatives,” Welsh suggests, GE would not have achieved the performance gains of the 
early 1990s (Sastry, 1997). 
Additionally, Sastry found that for organizations to survive constantly changing 
environments, they must undergo regular reorientations spaced far enough apart to 
maintain a level of competence.  In his model, with the trial period routine and constantly 
changing environment, overall performance was much better than earlier versions of the 
model (Sastry, 1997). 
Management Interventions. 
The GeoBase implementation system focuses on four major management 
interventions: change process management, learning management, reward system 
management, and continuity management.  These aggregated management intervention 
constructs all have been discussed to some extent throughout each of the sections of 
Chapter 2, but only change process management and learning management have received 
specific references in this chapter.  The discussion of the aggregate management 
interventions will be completed by briefly discussing reward system management and 
continuity management. 
Reward System Management. 
Reward system management can take a few forms.  Since personnel are motivated 
by personal gain, based on whatever the individual values, that manager should set up a 
system that rewards based on individual values.  Managers should focus on rewarding 
ideas that come to fruition and assist GeoBase integration.  These rewards may come in 
the form of money (something like the Air Force idea program), time-off, certificate 
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awards and decorations, or whatever the personnel in the organization value.  Rewards 
may not even be tangible – it could be that individuals value learning a new skill that has 
potential value in the public and/or private sectors or simply enjoy having the manager’s 
positive attention placed on them.  Whatever it may be, the manager must be able to 
effectively sell these rewards to the potential adopter to motivate the potential adopter to 
adopt the GeoBase innovation. 
Continuity Management. 
Elements of continuity management are present in most of the management 
interventions – since each assists the accumulation of organizational memory and, thus, 
inertia.  In this context as a management intervention, continuity management focuses on 
passing the accumulated memory of the organization to others in the system to prevent 
disjointed organizational knowledge.  When knowledgeable personnel leave the system 
and do not pass their knowledge on to others, the organization loses as a whole.  Each 
organization has some degree of natural continuity – personnel will typically create a 
continuity file and include some helpful hints for the next person filling the position.  
There is also a repository of recorded organizational information that usually sits 
untouched on the shelves of the organization.  The system manager can either allow the 
natural level of organizational continuity to dominate how knowledge is created, stored, 
and possibly read, or he can take a more active role in this process. 
Managers can create programs that focus on “assembling a ‘toolkit’ to ‘share the 
way ahead’” (Cullis, 2002:20).  This toolkit would possibly consist of user information 
on GIS-related technology and any other useful applicable information associated with 
successful integration.  This is a good program and can create good long-term continuity, 
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but the fact that personnel typically do not take a lot of time to read historical documents 
makes this a somewhat weak pathway to increase integration in the unit over time.  It is 
also important to understand that organizational memory contains both good and bad 
experiences, so if the IT innovation is not meeting organizational and personal needs, 
there would probably be a limited amount of positive recorded information that would be 
passed on. 
Other Management Interventions. 
The other management interventions include change process management and 
learning management, which were discussed earlier in Chapter 2. 
Summary of Literature Review 
 A wide breadth of literature has been discussed.  This discussion has been 
structured to assist the reader understand the development of the system dynamics model, 
which is forthcoming.  The high degree of aggregation in each of these concepts allows 
the research to focus on the portions of the system that will substantially change behavior 
patterns over time.  As a result, the modeler can avoid getting lost in the “dark forest of 
variables” that every system has and be able to analyze the system without rambling.  The 
next portion of the thesis document, namely Chapter 3, will outline the system dynamics 
approach and how to navigate through it properly.  Chapter 4 will delve into very specific 
information associated with the literature review in Chapter 2 while following the 
Chapter 3 methodology. 
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III. Methodology 
General View of the Modeling Process 
The system dynamics approach can be generalized into five main steps: problem 
articulation, formulation of dynamic hypothesis, formulation of a simulation model, 
testing, and policy design and evaluation.  Table 1 presents each of these steps with some 
additional explanation of meaning.   
Even though the modeling process appears to be a step-wise progression through 
various steps, it is more complex than that.  Figure 22 shows an iterative, as opposed to a 
linear, progression through the steps.  The modeler begins the modeling process with 
specific questions and a problem.  As the modeler researches the problem in more detail 
and works with the client to better understand the system, the problem and/or questions 
about the system may change.  Throughout the process, the modeler must question, test, 
and refine until both modeler and client are satisfied with the product (Sterman, 2000).   
The modeler progresses through the iterative modeling process, but does so in a 
dynamic environment.  Figure 23 shows the iterative modeling process, conditioned by 
the dynamic environment of the real world.  Modeling itself is embedded in a larger cycle 
of learning and action taking place in dynamic organizations.  Environmental context 
changes can change the way the modeler views the system.  With updated information, 
these changes in the real world force changes in the modeler’s mental model.  The 
dynamic world in which we live and within which organizations operate will always 
require adjustments to models – such is the world we live in.  “Modeling is not a one-
time activity that yields The Answer, but an ongoing process of continual cycling 
between the virtual world of the model and the real world of action” (Sterman, 2000:89). 
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Table 1: Steps of the Modeling Process (Sterman, 2000:86) 
 
Modeling Step Elements of the Step 
Theme selection: What is the problem? Why is it a  
problem? 
Key variables: What are the key variables and  
concepts we must consider? 
Time horizon: How far in the future should we  
consider?  How far back in the past lie the roots of the  
problem? 
Step 1: Problem Articulation 
(Boundary Selection) 
Dynamic problem definition (reference modes):  
What is the historical behavior of key concepts and  
variables?  What might their behavior be in the future? 
    
Initial hypothesis generation: What are the current  
theories of the problematic behavior? 
Endogenous focus: Formulate a dynamic hypothesis  
that explains the dynamics as endogenous  
consequences of the feedback structure. 
Step 2: Formulation of 
Dynamic Hypothesis 
Mapping: Develop maps of causal structure based on  
initial hypotheses, key variables, reference modes, and  
other available data, using tools such as causal loop  
diagrams. 
    
Specification of structure, decision rules 
Estimation of parameters, behavioral relationships,  
and initial conditions 
Step 3: Formulation of a 
Simulation Model 
Tests for consistency with the purpose and boundary 
    
Comparison to reference modes: Does the model  
reproduce the problem behavior adequately for your  
purposes? 
Robustness under extreme conditions: Does the  
model behave realistically when stressed by extreme  
conditions? 
Step 4: Testing 
Sensitivity: How does the model behave given  
uncertainty in parameters, initial conditions, model  
boundary, and aggregation? 
    
Scenario specification: What environmental  
conditions might arise? 
Policy design: What new decision rules, strategies,  
and structures might be tried in the real world?  How can  
they be represented in the model? 
"What if…" analysis: What are the effects of the  
policies? 
Sensitivity analysis: How robust are the policy  
recommendations under different scenarios and given  
uncertainties? 
Step 5: Policy Design and 
Evaluation 
Interaction of policies: Do the policies interact?  Are  
there synergies of compensatory responses? 
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Figure 22:  Illustration of Iterative Modeling Process (Sterman, 2000:87) 
      
Figure 23:  Modeling is Embedded in the Dynamics of the System (Sterman, 
2000:88) 
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Step 1: Problem Articulation (Boundary Selection) 
Theme Selection. 
The modeler must first determine the problem that drives the research.  The 
boundary of study is determined by the question that is posed at the forefront of the 
modeling process.  The modeler must constrain his focus to only those portions of the 
system of study that pertain to the problem and questions.  The incredibly high level of 
complexity that resides in most organizational systems forces the modeler to focus on the 
questions being asked; to do otherwise would open the way for overly complicated 
models that stifle system understanding and meaningful analysis.   
The historical problems confronting IT implementation, which were recognized 
by the Headquarters Air Force Geo Integration Office (HAF GIO) as relevant for 
GeoBase implementation and sustainment, provided the impetus for this research effort.  
The research problem and questions (reference Chapter 1) were generated with this 
GeoBase implementation research opportunity in mind.  
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Key Variables. 
To provide a link to the real world where implementation efforts are being 
conducted, the modeler required an expert client to advise as the research client.  The 
following list comprises the requirements for the research client: 
1. Client must have a good working knowledge of squadron systems where 
GeoBase implementation would occur. 
2. Client must be associated with organizations at the forefront of the GeoBase 
implementation effort. 
3. Client must commit to meet at least two times with the modeler to discuss 
hypothesized behavior and/or historical behavior patterns over time in the 
system. 
4. Client must provide input on the substantial system variables that drive the 
agreed-upon behavior patterns.    
The AMC GeoBase Implementation Officer and his staff met the client 
requirements, so they were specified as the research clients.  The research problem and 
questions were coordinated with the research clients at the forefront of this effort to 
assure the model would be useful in addressing a problem they care about. 
The modeler and clients discussed the important elements of the system that 
would determine the fate of GeoBase.  Based on discussions with the clients and the 
literature, the general IT implementation model (Figure 3) was created, which specifies 
the major aggregate variables in the IT implementation system.  The implementation 
actions of GeoBase managers and personnel, funding, and whether or not GeoBase would 
meet personal and organizational needs would define the long-term health of the IT 
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innovation.  Top-level leadership support, the quality of the GIS database, and the 
cultural fit between GeoBase and the organization are indicators if GeoBase is meeting 
organizational needs over time.   
These issues would have a delayed effect on integration – the preparation for 
change that was currently going forward and the strong leadership support would push 
GeoBase implementation onward at the forefront, so if there were to be any ill effects 
from these sustainment issues, they would come later. 
Time Horizon. 
The time horizon “should extend far enough back in history to show how the 
problem emerged and describe its symptoms.  It should extend far enough into the future 
to capture the delayed and indirect effects of potential policies” (Sterman, 2000:90).  A 
short-term view would only dictate a time horizon of one year.  Typically, a principal 
deficiency in our mental models is our propensity to think of cause and effect as local and 
immediate.  In dynamically complex systems, cause and effect are distant in time and 
space.  Most of the unintended effects of policy decisions leading to resistance involve 
feedbacks with long delays, far removed from the point of decision or the problem 
symptom (Sterman, 2000:91).  Sterman recommends long time horizons as a “critical 
antidote to the event-oriented worldview so crippling to our ability to identify patterns of 
behavior and the feedback structures generating them” (Sterman, 2000:91). 
The time scale for this GeoBase research effort is ten years.  It takes time for 
significant change to take hold in organizations – Kotter described a company that 
quantified the amount of change from a transformation each year for seven years (Kotter, 
1995:67).  In order to adequately capture the potential of GeoBase integration and be able 
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to take a long-term view, the client and modeler selected a ten-year time horizon for 
study. 
Dynamic Problem Definition (Reference Modes). 
In system dynamics modeling, the modeler must work from reference modes 
throughout the modeling process.  The reference mode is a “set of graphs and other 
descriptive data showing the development of the problem over time” (Sterman, 2000:90).  
Figure 24 shows some examples of reference mode graphs, such as exponential growth, 
goal seeking (approach to steady state or exponential decline), s-shaped growth, 
oscillation, growth with overshoot, and overshoot and collapse.  Each of these reference 
mode behavior patterns can be associated with something in the real world.  For example, 
unchecked bacterial growth often displays exponential growth, whereas innovation 
diffusion often displays cumulative s-shaped growth behavior.     
 
Figure 24: Examples of Reference Modes (Sterman, 2000:108) 
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Reference modes (named as such since the modeler refers back to them 
throughout the modeling process) help the modeler and client break out of the short-term 
event viewpoint (Sterman, 2000).  The client focus on getting to initial operating 
capability (IOC) is an example of focusing on short-term goals.  While arrival at IOC is 
an important part of the GeoBase implementation process, this research effort forces both 
the modeler and client to focus on the long-term integration effort that ultimately will 
determine GeoBase success.   
Various reference mode graphs, which capture the behavior patterns of each 
aggregate variable over a specified time period, were proposed by the modeler and clients 
for each aggregate variable.  The creation and rational behind each of the reference mode 
graphs for each aggregate variable is discussed in Chapter 4.   
Step 2: Formulation of Dynamic Hypothesis 
Initial Hypothesis Generation and Endogenous Focus. 
With the problem well articulated at the forefront of the modeling effort, the 
modeler is prepared to develop a theory to account for the problematic behavior – 
namely, the dynamic hypothesis.  This hypothesis is dynamic because it must explain the 
dynamic characterization of the problem in terms of the underlying feedback and stock 
and flow structure of the system.  It is a hypothesis because it is always provisional – the 
modeler can always adjust or abandon the model as more information is gleaned from the 
real world (Sterman, 2000).   
In defining the dynamic hypothesis, the modeler seeks an endogenous (arising 
from within the system) explanation for behavior.  An endogenous explanation generates 
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the dynamics of the system through the interaction of variables represented in the model.  
Typically, exogenous explanations (arising from outside the system boundary) do not 
adequately address system behavior.  When exogenous variables are used, the modeler 
must question whether any of the endogenous variables have an impact on the exogenous 
variable.  If so, the model boundary must be expanded to include the former exogenous 
variable and make it endogenous (Sterman, 2000). 
The usefulness of modeling lies in the fact that it simplifies reality, creating a 
representation of reality we can comprehend.  If modelers go about trying to model an 
entire system, this comprehensiveness would be just as complex as the real system and 
just as inscrutable.  Hence, the art of modeling is knowing what to cut out of the model, 
based on the problem posed (Sterman, 2000).  This research focuses on IT 
implementation; hence, the modeler can cut out portions of the more complex 
organizational system that do not significantly influence the IT implementation problem. 
Mapping: Causal Loop Diagram. 
Causal loop diagrams are tools for “diagramming the feedback structure of 
systems in any domain” (Sterman, 2000:102).  Causal loop diagrams show the causal 
links among variables with arrows from a cause to an effect.  Figure 25 shows the 
definitions, mathematics, and some examples of the link polarity of causal arrows.  For 
example, an arrow with a (+) sign above it means if variable X increases, Y also 
increases.  Likewise, if X decreases, Y also decreases.  An arrow with a (-) sign above it 
means if variable X increases, Y decreases.  Likewise, if X decreases, Y increases.  As an 
example, if the number of deaths increases, the population decreases.  This relationship 
corresponds to a (-) sign, as shown in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25: Link Polarity: Definitions and Examples (Sterman, 2000:139) 
 
Each endogenous variable always has a causal link to another variable in the 
causal loop diagram.  If a variable only has a one-way effect on another variable (and no 
other variable affects it), it is considered exogenous.  The other purpose for the causal 
loop diagram is to show the feedback loops present within the system.  Figure 26 shows 
the causal loop diagram notation.  The positive, or reinforcing loop, denoted with an “R”, 
is created by variables locked into a reinforcing behavior pattern.  The natural behavior 
for this type of loop is exponential growth (Figure 27).  The negative, or balancing 
(compensating) loop, denoted with a “C”, is created by variables locked into 
compensating behavior.  The natural behavior for this type of loop is exponential decay 
(Figure 28).  A loop is considered a reinforcing loop is there is an even number of 
negative causal polarities within the loop structure.  A loop is considered negative 
(compensating) if it has an odd number of negative causal polarities within the loop.  
Reinforcing loops tend to move a system out of balance by amplifying disturbances in the 
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system and compensating loops tend to move a system toward an equilibrium point or 
goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Causal Loop Diagram Notation (Sterman, 2000:138) 
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Figure 27: Exponential Growth (Sterman, 2000:108) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Exponential Decay (Sterman, 2000:108) 
 
It is important that each arrow connecting variables in the causal loop structure 
represents a causal relationship as opposed to a correlated relationship, as is common in 
statistical analysis.  As an example, if a statistical correlation exists between ice cream 
sales and murder, the modeler would not draw a causal arrow between these two 
variables.  Instead, the modeler would find both ice cream sales and murder rise in the 
summer while in the winter they both fall as the average temperature fluctuates.  A causal 
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correlation might exist between temperature and ice cream sales and temperature and 
murder rate, but not between ice cream sales and murder rate (Sterman, 2000:142).   
The modeler must also determine if there are delays between causal links.  Delays 
are critical in the dynamics of a system.  Delays give systems inertia, create oscillations, 
and are often responsible for the trade-offs between short and long term effects of 
policies (Sterman, 2000). 
One of the more difficult concepts in causal diagram creation is choosing the right 
level of aggregation.  There are many variables and influences in any system, especially 
human systems, so choosing the right way to combine concepts becomes important to 
prevent the model from becoming too unwieldy.  The causal loop diagram is designed to 
communicate the central feedback structure of the dynamic hypothesis, not to be a 
detailed descriptor of equations.  The modeler must balance being too complex with 
being too simple.  The audience must be able to grasp the model logic to be able to 
evaluate its plausibility and realism, but the modeler must not obfuscate the model to the 
point where no one in the audience can decipher the overall feedback structure or how the 
loops interact (Sterman, 2000).  
The modeler proposes a causal loop diagram based on the reference mode, time 
horizon, literature review, client meetings, and personal experience that provides an 
endogenous explanation of the system problem.  Once the causal diagram is proposed and 
discussed, the modeler then can move to the formulation in the virtual world using a 
stock and flow model. 
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Step 3: Formulation of a Simulation Model 
The formulation of the causal diagram in the virtual world is accomplished using 
a stock and flow diagram created using STELLA software.  Causal loop diagrams are 
very effective at capturing the interdependencies and feedback processes of a system and 
can uncover mental models of the client and modeler, but they are not effective at 
capturing the stock and flow structure of the system.  Stocks and flows, along with 
feedback, are the two central concepts of dynamic systems theory (Sterman, 2000). 
Stocks and flows are critical in generating the dynamics of any system.  Stocks 
are the accumulations in the system.  They represent the state of the system and generate 
information upon which decisions and actions are based.  Stocks provide systems with 
inertia and memory.  Stocks also create delays in the system by accumulating the 
difference between inflows and outflows (Sterman, 2000).  Flows push or pull units of 
stock per unit time into or out of a stock.  Comparing system dynamics to mathematics, a 
stock would be considered as an integral and a flow would be a rate or derivative 
(Sterman, 2000:197).  Figure 29 is an illustrative example of a stock and flow system. 
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Figure 29: Representations of Stock and Flow Structures (Sterman, 2000:194) 
  
Figure 29 presents four different, but equivalent representations of the stock and 
flow structure using a hydraulic metaphor, stock and flow diagram, integral equation, and 
a differential equation.  Once all of the relevant stocks and flows in the causal diagram 
have been specified in the virtual world, software, such as STELLA, acts as a differential 
equation solver.  Through simulation in the virtual world, the modeler can uncover how a 
system performs over time and uncover much of the dynamic complexity of the system in 
the process. 
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In addition to stocks and flows, auxiliary variables also play a role in the 
formulation model.  Auxiliary variables consist of exogenous constants or functions of 
stocks or flows.  Figure 30 presents the varying symbols used by STELLA software in 
defining stocks, flows, constant auxiliary variables (exogenous constants), and auxiliary 
variables as functions of stock.  Auxiliary variables also can serve as a unit conversion 
variable – translating a stock of A into a flow of B, or any number of conversion 
modifiers. 
 
Figure 30: Various STELLA Symbols 
Based on the reference modes and causal loop diagram, the modeler formulates 
the model in the virtual world.  Each of the variables in the causal loop diagram must be 
represented on the stock and flow diagram, which must be structured to achieve the 
reference mode behavior pattern agreed upon by the clients and the modeler.  
Once the model is formulated, the modeler must estimate parameters based on 
achieving the reference mode behavior patterns.  Unless there is empirical data associated 
with the system, the modeler must focus on behavior patterns – only levels of magnitude 
and behavioral patterns are the focus of a system dynamics model, not specific quantified 
 
 
 105
output.  In the IT implementation system, there are no easily quantifiable metrics or data 
that are available.  In this type of system, the modeler uses soft variables that capture how 
the system behaves over time.  Soft variables are created to represent essential parameters 
in the model critical to the research question.  Parameterization of all variables (hard and 
soft) is always an issue in realizing reasonable model behavior.  The modeler can define 
how the initial conditions and levels in the model relate to the real world.  Through initial 
testing, the modeler can determine if the model is consistent with the purpose and focuses 
on the model boundary specified in the problem statement. 
Step 4: Testing 
Testing allows the client and modeler to develop confidence in the model as a 
useful and relevant decision-making tool.  Validation of the simulation model only exists 
to the degree the client uses it to make decisions about the system of study.  As the model 
goes through and passes various tests, the client and modeler gain confidence in it.  
Where the model fails in the testing process, the modeler must make adjustments that can 
be either minor and easily fixable or major, requiring the modeler to move back to one of 
the earlier stages in the modeling process. 
Sterman discusses seven main tests for the assessment of dynamic models: 
boundary adequacy test, structure assessment test, parameter assessment test, extreme 
conditions test, behavior reproduction test, behavior anomaly test, and sensitivity analysis 
test.  Table 2 outlines these major tests and provides the purpose of the test (Sterman, 
2000:859-861). 
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Table 2: Tests for the Assessment of Dynamic Models (Sterman, 2000:859-861) 
Test Purpose of Test 
Are the important concepts for addressing the 
problem endogenous to the model? 
Does the behavior of the model change 
significantly when boundary assumptions are 
relaxed? 
Boundary Adequacy 
Do the policy recommendations change when the 
model boundary is extended? 
Is the model structure consistent with relevant 
descriptive knowledge of the system? 
Is the level of aggregation appropriate? 
Does the model conform to basic physical laws 
such as conservation laws? 
Structure Assessment 
Do the decision rules capture the behavior of the 
actors in the system? 
Are the parameter values consistent with relevant 
descriptive and numerical knowledge of the 
system? 
Parameter Assessment 
Do all parameters have real world counterparts? 
Does each equation make sense even when its 
inputs take on extreme values? 
Extreme Conditions 
Does the model respond plausibly when subjected 
to extreme policies, shocks, and parameters? 
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Table 2 (cont): Tests for the assessment of dynamic models (Sterman, 2000:859-861) 
  
Test Purpose of Test 
Does the model reproduce the behavior of 
interest in the system (qualitatively and 
quantitatively)? 
Does it endogenously generate the symptoms 
of difficulty motivating the study? 
Behavior Reproduction 
Does the model generate the various modes of 
behavior observed in the real system? 
Behavior Anomaly Do anomalous behaviors result when 
assumptions of the model are changed or 
deleted? 
Numerical sensitivity: Do the numerical values 
change significantly… 
Behavioral sensitivity: Do the modes of 
behavior generated by the model change 
significantly… 
Policy sensitivity: Do the policy implications 
change significantly… 
Sensitivity Analysis 
…when assumptions about parameters, 
boundary, and aggregation are varied over the 
plausible range of uncertainty? 
 
Once the model has been tested, using relevant tests and procedures as outlined in 
Table 2, and all parties in the modeling process are satisfied it meets their requirements, 
the modeler can then add management interventions that can lead to policies within the 
system. 
Step 5: Policy Design and Evaluation 
Once the model has been created and tested, the modeler can then begin 
formulating management intervention strategies that will most effectively drive the 
system in the direction deemed desirable by the client.  The modeler should look at 
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various possible environmental context situations that might arise and how policy 
interventions interact under varying conditions.  The complexities associated with 
dynamic systems make it difficult for managers to understand what impacts their 
interventions will have in the system, so the modeler should explore management 
interventions under differing conditions and contexts.   
A well-meaning manager can formulate a policy that appears to be beneficial in 
the short term, but after a while, the dubious long-term impacts may take hold.  Changing 
environmental conditions and contexts can make initially good decisions seem bad.  Even 
decisions that appear poor in the short term can have excellent long-term impacts.  These 
are the types of questions and problems that system dynamics modeling can help solve.  
The value for the client in this type of modeling effort is a reduction of uncertainty for 
various policy actions and other management interventions.  What are the best policies 
that will provide the manager with the most “bang for the buck” of his effort?  What are 
the best policies under varying organizational environmental conditions?  This research 
aims to assist managers in the organizational IT implementation system answer these 
questions.     
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IV. Results and Analysis 
General Research Model 
The system dynamics approach requires the modeler to uncover the significant, 
aggregated system components that influence the problem of study.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the diagram depicted in Figure 31 shows how successful information 
technology (IT) implementation has three simultaneous, interrelated aggregate processes 
occurring in organizations: operating capability, adoption, and integration.  Management 
intervention and organizational inertia endogenously affect each of these processes 
throughout the implementation process.  The arrows in Figure 31 show how these 
influences are interrelated.  During the overall implementation process, managers 
shepherd the innovation through the operating capability, adoption, and integration 
processes.  Each of these processes will, in a successful implementation effort, build-up 
inertia over time. 
All of the factors in the GeoBase implementation system are tied together in a 
loop.  This looping structure provides an endogenous explanation for behavior and allows 
the system structure to dictate behavior as opposed to exogenous variables that externally 
dictate behavior.  Fortunately, this problem has an endogenous explanation, so system 
dynamics can provide some insights into the system.  The system boundary shown in 
Figure 31 separates endogenous variables (inside the boundary) from exogenous 
variables (outside the boundary).  The exogenous variables are not affected by any of the 
endogenous variables, but they do have a one-way impact on the endogenous variables.  
The exogenous variables define the context within which a manager functions.  The 
funding climate, organizational culture, top-level support, and whether or not the 
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innovation will meet the needs of the organization are all exogenous influences in this 
model (since the IT implementation system manager has no direct control over them). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: General GeoBase Implementation Model 
Formulation of Dynamic Hypothesis 
Since each endogenous variable exists somewhere in the loop, it is difficult to 
speak of one without speaking of another.  For organizational clarity, the variables will be 
explained in the following order: operating capability, adoption, integration, 
organizational inertia, and the management interventions.  Please reference Chapter 3 if 
there are questions about the symbols, arrows, etc. associated with the figures in this 
section.  Chapter 2 contains an explanation of each of the aggregate model variables.  
Operating
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This section explains how the dynamic hypothesis was derived (reference mode behavior 
pattern and causal diagram) for each of the variables and how they interrelate. 
Operating Capability. 
The modeler and client agree that the desired behavior pattern for operating 
capability is a goal-seeking approach to steady state, as shown in Figure 32.  Initially, the 
level of operating capability rapidly increases and begins tapering-off as it approaches the 
operating capability goal value (to what level the organization strives to improve its 
technological operating capability).  The undesired, and more commonly seen, behavior 
pattern is a goal-seeking behavior pattern that falls off after a relatively strong start.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Desired and Undesired Reference Mode Behavior Patterns for Operating 
Capability: Goal Seeking Behavior Pattern 
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Once the reference mode behavior pattern is defined for a variable in the system, 
a causal diagram is proposed that provides the necessary structure that will generate the 
reference mode behavior pattern over time.  Figure 33 presents the causal diagram for 
operating capability, which specifies the structure that is required to generate the desired 
behavior pattern shown in the reference mode for this variable (as pictured in Figure 32).  
Within the basic goal seeking structure there are five variables that drive the behavior 
behind operating capability: operating capability goal, management operating capability 
effort, funding, increasing operating capability, and operating capability.  This structure 
will seek to attain the value of the operating capability goal after some period of time.  
One of the assumptions the model makes is that the operating capability goal is static, 
which is to say there will be no major jumps in technology capacity over the ten-year 
period of study that would cause the manager to drastically change the original operating 
capability goal.  Operating capability goal and funding are exogenous within this 
structure, but do not dictate behavior.  They only determine to what level and how rapidly 
operating capability will rise.  In the presence of no funding, there will be no operating 
capability that accumulates in the system.  Likewise, without an operating capability 
goal, there will be no operating capability that accumulates over time.  On the other hand, 
with high values for operating capability and funding, the value for operating capability 
would rise higher and faster than with lower values for these two variables.  
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Figure 33: Operating Capability Causal Diagram: Goal Seeking Structure 
 
For this undesired behavior pattern in Figure 32 to occur, there must be an 
additional compensating loop in the goal-seeking structure for operating capability to 
force it to decline after some initial build-up.  Since the compensating loop does not take 
hold until a longer-term period of time, there must be delays in the system that force this 
behavior pattern.  Later sections of Chapter 4 will discuss these delays.  
Figure 34 presents the same figure in Figure 33, but with additional information 
on how operating capability interacts with other variables and how the additional 
compensating loop that drives the undesired behavior pattern functions in the system.  If 
the reader refers to Figure 31, it is seen that operating capability affects two variables, 
adoption and management interventions, and is affected by two variables, management 
interventions and organizational inertia.   
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The additional relationships presented in Figure 34 allow the reader to see more 
specific connections between the variables.  Notice there is only one arrow from the 
operating capability structure to management interventions.  This variable is operating 
capability management effort and is tied to the management interventions aggregate 
variable.  The operating capability variable is tied to the adoption aggregate variable.  
The additional compensating loop in Figure 34 relates organizational inertia and 
operating capability.  This additional loop relates how the negative effects of 
organizational inertia can impact operating capability.  This relationship will be more 
fully explained in the organizational inertia section. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Operating Capability Causal Diagram with Additional Information on 
Undesired Reference Mode Behavior Pattern and Other Variable Relationships 
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Adoption. 
Operating capability directly affects adoption, so this aggregate variable will be 
discussed next.  Based on the research performed by Rogers (1995) and discussed at 
length in the Chapter 2 adoption section, adoption should follow s-shaped growth over 
time.  Adoption follows s-shaped growth and eventually comes to static steady state.  
Hence, the structure that generates static steady state, s-shaped growth must be based on 
one variable drawing another down until nothing is left in the first variable.  The concept 
of a pool of potential adopters transitioning to a pool of adopters fits this requirement.   
Figure 35 presents the reference mode diagram for potential adopters, whereas 
Figure 36 presents the desired and undesired reference mode behavior patterns for 
adopters.  The potential adopters reference mode shows inverse s-shaped behavior, since 
this variable drains over time.  The desired adopter reference mode is s-shaped growth 
behavior, since this variable increases over time.  The undesired adopter reference mode 
is initial s-shaped growth followed by a lagged decrease.  According to Rogers, a 
successful cumulative innovation diffusion process follows an s-shaped curve over time 
until full adoption saturation occurs.  This behavior pattern is like a goal-seeking pattern, 
with the goal being zero non-adopters.  The reader should reference Chapter 2 for more 
information about this process. 
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Figure 35: Reference Mode for Potential Adopters: Inverse S-Shaped Behavior 
Pattern 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Desired and Undesired Reference Mode Behavior Patterns for Adopters: 
S-Shaped Behavior Pattern 
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Figure 37 presents the structure that links potential adopters and adopters into 
adopter s-shaped behavior.  There is a compensating loop on the potential adopter side 
linking potential adopters to adoption rate.  This means, as the adoption rate increases, 
this will drain the potential adopters pool more rapidly.  There is a reinforcing loop on the 
adopter side of adoption rate.  This means, as the level of adoption increases, the adoption 
rate will increase.  The compensating loop runs through adoption from management 
effort, meaning the manager is the individual that keys initial movement from the 
potential adopter to the adopter pool.  Once the adopter pool begins building up, the 
reinforcing loop running through adoption from communication channels will take over 
and move the remaining personnel from the potential adopters pool to the adopter pool.  
Three factors, relative advantage, ease of use, and compatibility, also govern the adoption 
rate.  
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Figure 37: Adoption Causal Diagram: S-Shaped Growth Structure for Adopters 
 
Once an individual becomes an adopter (moving from the potential adopter pool 
to the adopter pool), he or she can either continue to remain an adopter or decide to 
discontinue adopter status (based on either positive or negative organizational inertia -- 
discussed later).  Positive organizational inertia will keep the adopter in the adopter pool.  
Negative organizational inertia will tend to drain the adopter pool as individuals 
discontinue use. 
Potential adopters become adopters through two processes.  The first process is 
aggregated as management effort.  Managers can assist potential adopters move from the 
potential adopters pool to the adopters pool through change process management and 
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interpersonal communication channels.  Managers have little direct influence on this 
feedback loop, but can strengthen it through learning management (increasing 
communication opportunities for personnel).  The reader should reference applicable 
sections in Chapter 2 for more specific guidelines and sources for these variables.   
The rate of adoption is regulated by the context of the perceived innovation 
characteristics (relative advantage, ease of use, and compatibility).  The higher the 
combination of these factors are perceived to be, the faster the transition will be from the 
potential adopters pool to the adopters pool.  High perceptions of the IT innovation 
reflect a positive IT organizational culture and low perceptions of the IT innovation 
reflect a poor IT organizational culture.  The reader should reference Chapter 2’s 
discussion on adoption for more information on these factors.   
Figure 38 presents practically the same information shown in Figure 37, but adds 
how the adoption structure interacts with other aggregated variables in the system and 
how the undesired behavior pattern is generated.  For the undesired behavior pattern to 
occur, there must be an additional compensating loop in the adopter s-shaped structure to 
force it to decline after some initial build-up.  Since the compensating loop does not take 
hold until after a longer-term period of time, there must be delays in the system that 
enable this undesired behavior pattern to occur.  Later sections of Chapter 4 will discuss 
these delays.  The adoption rate is a function of the level of operating capability, as 
shown by the arrow drawn from operating capability to adoption rate.  Management 
interventions, as discussed above, affect the adoption from management effort and 
adoption from communication channels variables.  The level of the adopter pool affects 
integration. The additional compensating loop was added to the adopter variable to show 
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how negative organizational inertia can affect the pool of adopters.  This structure 
assumes that once an individual becomes an adopter, they can either stay an adopter (if 
there is positive organizational inertia in the system) or else discontinue GeoBase 
adoption and leave the system (if there is negative organizational inertia built-up in the 
system).  
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 38: Adoption Causal Diagram with Additional Information on Variable 
Relationships and Undesired Behavior 
 
Integration. 
A major focus of this research effort is to better understand integration and what 
drives it for long-term sustainment.  Integration reflects the level of change occurring in 
organizations as a result of an IT innovation.  Kotter, a highly respected change process 
researcher, provides some empirical evidence that change typically follows an s-shaped 
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behavior pattern over time.  He states in a portion of his change research, “…in one of the 
most successful transformations that I have ever seen, we quantified the amount of 
change that occurred each year over a seven-year period.  On a scale of one (low) to ten 
(high), year one received a two, year two a four, year three a three, year four a seven, 
year five an eight, year six a four, and year seven a two.  The peak came in year five, 
fully 36 months after the first set of visible wins” (Kotter, 1995:67).  The information 
contained in the preceding quote was tabulated and included as Table 3.  Figure 39 
graphically displays a portion of the data contained in Table 3 (level of change per year 
versus year).  A straight line connects each discrete data point in Figure 39.  Figure 40 
also graphically displays a portion of the data contained in Table 3 (cumulative level of 
change per year versus year).  Figure 40 connects each discrete data point with a smooth 
curve.  It is interesting to note that the cumulative quantification of change in Kotter’s 
research follows relatively closely an s-shaped behavior pattern over time, as shown in 
Figure 40. 
Table 3: Kotter’s (1995) Quantification of Change After a Transformation Over 
Seven Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7
Level of Change Per Year 2 4 3 7 8 4 2
Cumulative Level of Change Per Year 2 6 9 16 24 28 30
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Figure 39: Kotter’s (1995) Level of Change per Year versus Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Kotter’s (1995) Cumulative Level of Change per Year versus Year 
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Based on Kotter’s findings, as well as client coordination, it is proposed that the 
desired behavior pattern for integration, a possible metric to quantify change as defined in 
this research effort, will most likely follow an s-shaped behavior pattern, as shown in 
Figure 41.  The undesired behavior pattern for integration would consist of an initial s-
shaped growth behavior pattern followed by a lagged decline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Desired and Undesired Reference Mode Behavior Patterns for 
Integration: S-Shaped Behavior Pattern 
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Figure 42 presents the causal diagram for integration.  There is one reinforcing 
loop that will tend to increase integration and two compensating loops that will tend to 
decrease integration over time.  The s-shaped structure shown in Figure 42 will produce 
the desired s-shaped behavior pattern shown in Figure 41.  At the beginning, none of the 
loops are dominating integration, but eventually, the reinforcing loop will cause 
integration to exhibit exponential growth.  When integration rises to a certain level, the 
compensating loops will begin to dominate and level-off integration until it comes to a 
dynamic steady state value.   
The reinforcing loop in the integration structure is a result of GeoBase being 
added to the business processes of the organization.  This can take place as either 
business process reengineering (when significant performance enhancements are 
necessary) or continuous improvement (when minor performance enhancements are 
required).  It is a reinforcing loop because additions, in the form of either new GeoBase 
reengineered business processes or continuous improvement processes, to integration will 
increase ideas for further business process integration.  There are two other items that 
also play a role in increasing integration.  These include the number of adopters in the 
organization and how the continuity of the organization allows information about 
integration to be passed on to new personnel.   
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Figure 42: Integration Causal Diagram: S-Shaped Growth Structure for Integration 
 
The s-shaped growth cycle shown in Figure 41 is self-perpetuating and continues 
to grow over time until dampened by compensating loops.  Since unconstrained 
exponential growth is unrealistic, compensating loops must provide an impetus to level-
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organizational resistance is the main cause for this compensating behavior.   
Organizational resistance in this model aggregates two concepts from the 
literature: resistance to change and resistance to continued learning.  People are inclined 
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Many cognitive factors are associated with resistance to change – self-efficacy, job 
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history of failed change efforts by management.  The discussion of organizational 
resistance in Chapter 2 will provide more detail on this important concept in 
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organizational change.  The model’s definition of organizational resistance takes all of 
these concepts into account, but also adds the propensity for personnel to congeal (from a 
learning perspective).   
Cunningham’s analysis of Drucker’s writings about learning takes this point into 
account (reference discussion on learning in Chapter 2).  Personnel tend to travel up the 
learning curve for a new job or task until they come to a point where they feel competent 
in their responsibilities.  Typically, from that point on, they either stop or greatly reduce 
learning new concepts directly related to their job or task because they have become 
comfortable with their surroundings.  This behavior could be referred to as congealing, or 
halting learning because of satisfaction with the status quo.  These tendencies lie at the 
heart of the model’s definition of organizational resistance.  Organizational resistance is 
defined as the sum total of all the direct organizational resistance to change and resistance 
to continued learning.  The model assumes the level of integration becomes the causal 
mechanism for organizational resistance.  The model also assumes organizational 
resistance should correspond directly with the level of integration, since integration, in 
this model, represents the level of change associated with GeoBase taking place in the 
organization.  When these loops are combined into the structure shown in Figure 42, s-
shaped behavior is the result.  
Figure 43 provides a new causal diagram with other influences from the system, 
in aggregated form, that play a role in integration and explain the undesired behavior 
pattern for integration.  For this undesired behavior pattern to occur, there must an 
additional compensating loop in the integration s-shaped structure to force it to decline 
after some initial build-up.  Since the compensating loop does not take hold until a 
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longer-term period of time, there must be delays in the system that force this behavior 
pattern.  Again, later sections of Chapter 4 will discuss these delays.  Figure 43 shows 
there are three external aggregate variables that have an influence on integration.  The 
variables with a direct causal effect on integration include adoption, management 
intervention, and organizational inertia.  Integration also has a causal effect on 
organizational inertia.  Figure 43 also includes another compensating loop involving 
abandoned reengineered processes factor.  This loop helps explain how negative 
organizational inertia causes reengineered processes involving GeoBase to be abandoned 
when they are not improving performance (this also assumes personnel can cut GeoBase 
out of non-reengineered processes involving GeoBase).  Reengineered business process 
abandonment explains the undesired behavior pattern shown in Figure 41 and provides 
the additional compensating loop that forces integration to decline. 
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Figure 43: Integration Causal Diagram With Additional Information on Variable 
Relationships 
 
Organizational Inertia. 
The level of integration directly affects the level of organizational inertia in the 
GeoBase system, so organizational inertia will be discussed next.  It is important to 
understand that organizational inertia can be either positive or negative.  Positive 
organizational inertia would tend to support further integration, support adoption, and 
continue increasing operating capability.  Negative organizational inertia, on the other 
hand, would tend to decrease integration, decrease adoption, and decrease operating 
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capability.  In this model, organizational inertia is partitioned into two concepts: 
continued use inertia (positive organizational inertia) and discontinued use inertia 
(negative organizational inertia). 
Continued use inertia represents the positive continuance practices of the 
organization as they relate to GeoBase.  For long-term sustainment of GeoBase, 
organizational memory must accumulate positive experiences within the system and pass 
them on to others in the organization.  This concept encompasses the IT innovation 
meeting the needs of the organization.  Three main factors affect continued use inertia in 
the GeoBase system: top level support, database quality, and culture fit.  GeoBase 
integration will increase over time if these organizational inertia factors are together 
positive and personnel pass their knowledge on for the benefit of others in the 
organization through continuity processes. 
As mentioned earlier, there are three main factors that affect organizational inertia 
in the GeoBase system: top level support, database quality, and culture fit.  The first 
factor, top-level support, refers to the level of support from organizational leaders with 
high authority.  Leaders can either be in favor of a change program or opposed to it.  In 
reality, for any change program to have any hope of success, leaders must at least not be 
antagonistic towards it.  They may have differing levels of support, from highly 
championing an effort, to openly antagonizing it.  Most of the change literature 
recognizes the importance of top-level support in any change effort (Kotter, 1995; 
Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Armenakis et al., 2000; Cullis, 2000; Cunningham, 1999).  
The second factor, database quality, is fairly specific to the GIS portion of the GeoBase 
system.  Aside from the personnel maintaining and using the GIS, the database is the 
 
 
 130
most important technical component in any organizational GIS.  Without reliable and 
updated database information, personnel will not be able to trust the output from the GIS, 
which will have a highly negative impact on the GeoBase system.  A large portion of 
GeoBase operating capability is getting a quality database up and running and keeping it 
maintained properly.  The database can range from very good to very poor.  Positive 
inertia will result from a good database and negative inertia will result from a poor 
database.  The third factor, culture fit, is probably the most aggregated of concepts among 
the organizational inertia factors.  Organizations can either be considered rigid or 
innovative in general.  In innovative organizations, the culture is usually supportive of 
new innovations that add to the organization’s performance.  Innovative organizations are 
usually communicative and supportive in general.  On the other hand, in rigid 
organizations, the status quo rules and does not readily allow innovations to change the 
way things are currently operating.  Rigid organizations are usually uncommunicative 
and unsupportive in general.  The culture of the organization and how GeoBase fits-in to 
that culture, will, in large measure, determine long-term GeoBase sustainment.  These 
three organizational inertia factors: top level support, database quality, and culture fit, 
provide the context for long-term GeoBase sustainment and define whether or not 
GeoBase is meeting the needs of the organization. 
Discontinued use inertia represents the negative continuance practices of the 
organization as they relate to GeoBase.  Organizational memory also applies to 
discontinued use inertia, since negative experiences with the technology will cause a 
depletion of GeoBase organizational performance.  The same three organizational inertia 
factors affect discontinued use inertia as continued use inertia (top level support, database 
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quality, and culture fit).  When these sustainment factors are together negative, they have 
far reaching impacts on operating capability, adoption, and integration.  As discontinued 
use inertia builds up in the system, operating capability will decline as the database is not 
properly supported throughout the organization, leading management to devote more of 
their time to keeping the database afloat, so to speak.  As discontinued use inertia builds 
up in the system, adopters will become un-enamored with GeoBase and leave the pool of 
adopters.  This model assumes that once an adopter leaves the adopter pool, he or she can 
never return (they leave the system).  As discontinued use inertia builds up in the system, 
integration will also decline.  As personnel find that GeoBase is not meeting their needs 
or improving business process performance, they will abandon or change business 
processes reliant on GeoBase.   
Figure 44 presents how organizational inertia will tend to behave over time.  This 
behavior pattern is referred to as accumulating behavior.  This reference mode behavior 
pattern is the same for both desired and undesired behavior.  For desired behavior, only 
positive organizational will accumulate in the system (continued use inertia).  For 
undesired behavior, only negative organizational inertia will accumulate in the system 
(discontinued use inertia).  Organizational inertia will accumulate either positive or 
negative inertia experiences, or both.  It is also important to note that organizational 
inertia is directly dependent on integration.  Hence, the accumulating behavior pattern for 
organizational inertia will have an element of the s-shaped behavior through this 
association. 
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Figure 44: Reference Mode for Organizational Inertia: Accumulating Behavior 
Pattern 
 
Figure 45 presents the accumulating structure causal diagram for organizational 
inertia, as separated into continued use inertia (positive organizational inertia) and 
discontinued use inertia (negative organizational inertia).  The accumulating structure has 
no loops, since this structure simply accumulates without feedback from anything 
endogenous to itself.  For a clearer picture of how continued use inertia and discontinued 
use inertia are separated, a Boolean identifier (continuing/discontinuing use Boolean 
determiner) is included that guides inertia to the positive or negative side based on the 
organizational inertia factors: top level support, database quality, and culture fit.  
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Figure 45: Organizational Inertia Causal Diagram: Accumulating Structure for 
Organizational Inertia 
 
Figure 46 presents the organizational inertia causal diagram with impacts on and 
effects from other portions of the model.  Organizational inertia has a strong influence on 
all aspects of the model.  Hence, this model is created in such a way as to assume the 
system will naturally increase GeoBase integration and its supporting components, 
operating capability and adoption, over time.  This natural increase defines the desired 
behavior patterns earlier discussed.  This assumption supposes there is a natural level of 
positive continued use inertia driving integration, operating capability, and adoption 
upward.  The explicit continued use inertia portion of the model assigned to 
organizational inertia represents a level of continued use inertia above and beyond what 
naturally exists in the system.  Hence, the explicit continued use inertia portion in Figure 
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46 has a smaller direct influence when compared to discontinued use inertia.  In the 
presence of discontinued use inertia, the system will readily decrease GeoBase 
integration and its supporting components, operating capability and adoption, much more 
rapidly than continued use inertia (explicitly included in the model) will increase them. 
Discontinued use inertia affects operating capability, adoption, and integration.  
From previous causal diagrams, discontinued use inertia has a negative impact on each of 
the other aggregate variables.  Since discontinued use inertia has a negative influence on 
each factor, the positive sign for the arrows running from discontinued use inertia to the 
other factors represent a positive influence on the compensating loops in the structures of 
the other systems.  Continued use inertia also has an influence on the system, but it is 
constrained to the continuity processes affecting integration.  Integration affects both 
continued use inertia and discontinued use inertia and they are derived from the level of 
integration, as discussed previously.  Figure 46 is compatible with Figure 31 as well; 
organizational inertia affects three aggregate variables (operating capability, adoption, 
and integration) and is directly affected by integration alone.  
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Figure 46: Organizational Inertia Causal Diagram with Additional Information on 
Variable Relationships 
 
Management Interventions. 
Management interventions include an assortment of the most common 
management strategies for dealing with a major change program, such as the GeoBase 
initiative, that are found in the literature.  Possible management intervention programs 
include, in aggregated form, change process management, continuity management, 
learning management, and reward system management.  The reader should reference 
Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion on specific actions managers can take under the 
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auspices of each of these management intervention aggregate variables.  The most 
important concept in this portion of the model is to understand that a manager has a finite 
amount of time to devote to each intervention.  What a wonderful world this would be if a 
manager could focus full attention on all of these interventions all of the time.  
Unfortunately, managers’ time is limited, so they have to partition their time wisely to 
have the most impact on the GeoBase implementation system.  These intervention 
strategies do not have an innate structure to them – they are part of a number of the loops 
in the system, but together do not have a pre-specified structure.  Part of the value from 
system dynamics modeling is to include the base structure, then add management 
interventions that have an uncertain conclusion as to what constitutes the best way to 
manage the system.  After simulating a variety of possibilities in the virtual world, the 
system manager should have better insight into how to manage the system depending on 
the organizational context he or she is working in. 
The model makes the assumption up front that managers must focus a portion of 
their time on accumulating operating capability.  Without operating capability, GeoBase 
would have no technological base to work from and the system would fail.  With this 
assumption firmly grounded in the model, the operating capability management variable 
is part of the operating capability structure discussed earlier.  Since discussing the 
management interventions without discussing the other aggregate variables in the system 
would be fruitless, all relevant variables in this portion of the model will be included.  
Figure 47 presents the management intervention variables with interactions with other 
system variables. 
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Figure 47 includes a number of variables and interrelationships.  The first variable 
of note is management capacity.  This variable represents the amount of time the manager 
can devote to GeoBase management.  The model screens management talent from the 
model (manager charisma, experience, etc.), so the model presupposes the manager has 
enough talent to manage each program sufficiently.  The maximum value this variable 
would attain would coincide with a manager being able to devote all of his or her time to 
GeoBase management.  If the manager has other responsibilities, then this variable would 
diminish.  The management allocator variable provides the capability for the model to 
allocate available time to the four management interventions (change process 
management, learning management, reward system management, and continuity 
management).  Operating capability management is a must, so that value from the 
operating capability structure diminishes the available capacity for the other four 
management interventions previously mentioned.  Recall operating capability 
management diminishes over time as GeoBase operating capability increases, so the 
manager, in a successful implementation effort, will generally have more time to devote 
to the other interventions over time. 
Based on percentages of time spent on each intervention, the manager will 
partition time spent on each of the four management interventions.  These interventions 
then affect various portions of the adoption and integration structures.  Change process 
management will have an impact on the adoption and integration structures.  Learning 
management will have an impact on the adoption and integration structures.  Reward 
system management will have an impact on the adoption and integration structures.  
Continuity management will have an impact on the integration structure alone. 
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Figure 47: Management Interventions in Relation to Other System Variables 
 
The reader may remember in Figure 31 that operating capability, adoption, 
integration, and organizational inertia occur in series.  This concept is represented by the 
inclusion of main chain behavior between these variables (operating capability, adoption, 
integration, and organizational inertia).  Main chain behavior allows the modeler to 
include delays in the system and cause variables to lag one another.  With main chain 
behavior between variables, the adjusted reference mode is shown in Figure 48.  The 
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main chain behavior shown in Figure 48 forces organizational inertia to lag integration, 
integration to lag adoption, and adoption to lag operating capability.   
Figure 49 presents the combination of all of the various structures discussed to 
this point, with the exception of the management interventions, locked into main chain 
structural relationships.  The main chain behavior in Figure 49 is represented by the 
arrows connecting Operating Capability (OC) and Adoption Rate, Adopters and 
Increasing Integration, and from Integration to the Organizational Inertia variables 
Continuing to Use (Cont to Use) and Discontinuing Use (Discont Use).   
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Figure 48: Desired Reference Mode for Main Chain Behavior Between Variables 
(Operating Capability, Adoption, Integration, and Organizational Inertia) 
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Figure 49: Combination of Model Structures for Main Chain Behavior Pattern 
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Figure 50 presents the complete causal diagram for the GeoBase integration 
model.  Figure 50 differs from Figure 49 in that all of the management interventions are 
added to the complete main chain structure.  It is interesting to note that each of the 
management interventions is endogenous to the system since each forms a compensating 
loop.  However, these compensating loops are only activated in the presence of 
discontinued use inertia, meaning, in the presence of discontinued use inertia, the time the 
manager must focus on operating capability increases (since the level of operating 
capability is diminishing), thus reducing the amount of time he can focus on the 
adoption-integration management interventions.  In the context of poor organizational 
inertia, database quality will suffer since personnel do not continually update their 
information in the database.  This database issue will force the manager to focus more 
time and effort on operating capability (trying to get people to update their information) 
and take away time from the adoption-integration efforts.  In the presence of no 
discontinued use inertia, the management interventions will tend to support furthered 
integration over time (as operating capability management diminishes and allows the 
manager to spend more time on the adoption-integration management interventions 
discussed earlier).   
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Figure 50: Complete Causal Diagram of GeoBase Implementation Model 
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Formulation of a Simulation Model 
Since the dynamic hypothesis has been discussed in full to this point, a simulation 
model in the virtual world can be formulated where simulation, testing, and analysis can 
occur.  In the formulation process, each model variable must be quantified (including 
equations) and only the structure derived from the dynamic hypothesis included in the 
formulated model.  In a study where empirical data from the system exist, these data 
could be used to synchronize the model with real-world information.  Unfortunately, in 
this system, there are no empirical data available, so other ways must be used to link 
variables together and define each variable range.  These variable definitions should 
coincide with realistic assumptions from the real world, as to provide the model with 
reasonable performance parameters that the reader can identify with and understand. 
Formulated Structure and Quantification of Aggregate Variables. 
Operating Capability. 
Figure 51 presents the formulation of the goal seeking structure in STELLA 
(system dynamics software package) as well as the undesired compensating influence 
from discontinued use inertia.  For discussion on what each of the objects pictured in 
Figure 51 means, the reader should reference Chapter 3.  There is one stock in this 
structure, Operating Capability (OC), which accumulates operating capability units over 
time based on its associated flows, Increasing OC and Decreasing OC.  The units for OC 
are units of OC.  It is important to assure that the model is mechanistically correct, 
meaning that each flow should increase or drain the OC stock with units of OC/unit of 
time.   
 
 
 
 145
 
Figure 51: Operating Capability Formulated Structure in STELLA 
 
OC is defined as a combination funding and OC management (OC Mgt), hence 
the Increasing OC flow equation is: 
OC Mgt * Funding (1) 
Equation 1 specifies that the increase in operating capability is a function of the 
level of funding for GeoBase and the amount of operating capability management 
intervention exerted.  OC Mgt is defined as:  
OC Goal – OC (2) 
Equation 2 stipulates that OC Mgt is a function of both the goal for operating 
capability and what the current level of operating capability is.   
Decreasing OC is a function of the level of operating capability and the level of 
discontinued use inertia (with a unit conversion factor – Decreasing OC Factor) that will 
drain OC when discontinued use inertia builds up in the system.  In a context of 
continued use inertia (positive organizational inertia), the reference mode will follow the 
desired goal-seeking pattern that approaches steady state.  In a context of discontinued 
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use inertia (negative organizational inertia), the draining structure associated with 
decreasing OC will compensate for growth by depleting the OC stock and produce the 
undesired behavior pattern previously discussed.  Without discontinued use inertia, there 
will be no structure to drain OC and deter it from its goal-seeking path.  The reader will 
recall that the main chain structure introduces delays into the system, as multiple stocks 
in series will do, so the compensating effect from discontinued use inertia will not occur 
immediately.  Drainage in this context takes a long-term view.  Decreasing OC is defined 
as: 
Discontinued Use Inertia * OC * Decreasing OC Factor (3) 
These variables were quantified to synchronize simulation output with realistic 
behavior patterns and mechanistic soundness.  For reasonable model simulation 
performance (reference Appendix B), the baseline values for each of the variables are as 
shown in Table 4.  Table 4 shows the minimum, maximum, and baseline values that the 
statically quantified variables take in the operating capability structure.  The testing 
section of the Appendix B contains more information on what these quantified values 
mean in the real world.  
 
Table 4: Operating Capability (OC) Factor Values 
 
 
 
 
Variable MIN MAX BASELINE
OC 0 1 0.05
OC Goal 0 1 1
Funding 0 1 0.2
Decreasing OC Factor NA NA 0.2
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Adoption. 
Figure 52 presents the formulation of the s-shaped growth structure for adoption 
in STELLA as well as the undesired compensating influence from discontinued use 
inertia.  There are two stocks in this structure – Potential Adopters and Adopters.  These 
stocks are connected by a flow that transfers units of potential adopters (people) to 
adopters (also in units of people).  Hence, the flow, Adoption Rate, has units of 
people/unit of time.   
The Adoption Rate flow is governed by a number of influences.  First, the 
technology adoption factors, relative advantage, ease of use, and compatibility, all play a 
role in how rapidly an innovation causes people to move from the potential adopter to the 
adopter pool.  The level of operating capability also plays a role in the adoption rate 
(naturally, the higher, the better).  Adoption Rate is also governed by two loops involving 
potential adopters and adopters.  The first is called the adoption from management effort 
loop and is a function of the level of system manager intervention focused on this 
leadership action.  The manager must spark initial interest and move personnel from the 
potential adopter to the adopter pool.  This loop will diminish as the potential adopter 
pool decreases.  As the adopter pool increases, the communication channel adoption loop 
will increase.  The communication channel adoption loop is a function of the quality of 
interpersonal communication networks.  The better the quality of the interpersonal 
communication networks, the faster the adopter pool will increase.     
The compensating loop associated with discontinued use inertia includes a flow 
out of Adopters, called Discontinued Adopters, that flows units of people out of the 
system.  This loop is activated when a level of discontinued use inertia builds up in the 
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system.  This model is formulated in such a way, based on the model’s assumption, that 
once an individual discontinues use, he or she leaves the system permanently. 
There are several other factors involved in this structure and arrows entering from 
other portions of the model.  In this case, these other variables are for unit conversion and 
equation formulation purposes.  The function of these variables in this portion of the 
model will be explained as the formulation discussion continues.  The equation 
formulation was an iterative process as all associated variables were added in stepwise 
fashion. 
 
 
Figure 52: Adoption Formulated Structure in STELLA 
 
Potential adopters are members of the organization (in ratio form, with 1 being the 
highest and 0 being the lowest) who are capable of using GIS applications in their work 
functions.  The adopter stock is defined as earlier stated (reference Chapter 2 discussion 
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of adoption).  The adopter stock is also quantified in ratio form, with 1 being the highest 
and 0 the lowest. 
The adoption rate is the most complicated equation in this structure because it 
involves quite a number of influences.  Equation 4 is the product of four influences: 
adoption from management effort, communication channel adoption, operating 
capability, and the factored sum of the three innovation adoption factors (relative 
advantage, ease of use, and compatibility).  The innovation adoption factors will be 
discussed in a later section.  The adoption rate equation is: 
Adoption from Mgt Effort * Communication channel adoption * 
(OC * ((Rel Adv Factor * Rel Adv) +  
(Compat Factor * Compat) + 
 (Ease of Use Factor * Ease of Use))) (4) 
 
Adoption from management effort is a function of management effort and the 
level of the Potential Adopter stock.  In this loop, the manager can focus on two of the 
four management interventions in the adoption-integration process: change process 
management and reward system management.  The management intervention factors will 
be discussed in a later section.  The equation for adoption from management effort is: 
(Change Process Mgt Adoption Factor*Change Process Mgt*Potential Adopters) + 
(Reward Sys Mgt Factor*Reward System Mgt*Potential Adopters)  (5) 
 
Communication channel adoption is a function of the number of adopters and the 
quality of the communication channels.  The equation for communication channel 
adoption is: 
Adopters * Quality of communication channels (6) 
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Quality of communication channels is a function of the baseline quality of 
communication inherent in the organization and how much effort the manager exerts on 
improving these channels.  In this loop, the manager can have an impact on the quality of 
communication channels through learning management, specifically focusing on team 
learning where inter-organizational communication is stressed.  The equation for quality 
of communication channels is: 
Baseline QoCC + Learning Mgt (7) 
Discontinued Adopters is a function of the level of Adopters and the level of 
Discontinued Use Inertia (with a unit conversion factor – Discontinuance Factor) that will 
drain the adopter stock when Discontinued Use Inertia builds up in the system.  In a 
context of continued use inertia (positive organizational inertia), the reference mode will 
follow s-shaped growth for adopters and inverse s-shaped decline for potential adopters.  
In a context of discontinued use inertia, the draining structure associated with 
Discontinued Adopters will drain the adopter stock and cause the undesired behavior 
pattern shown in the adoption reference mode.  The main chain structure will cause a 
delay in this compensating loop that will gain strength after some initial gains in 
adoption.  The equation for discontinued adopters is: 
Adopters * Discontinued Use Inertia * Discontinuance Factor (8) 
These variables were quantified to synchronize simulation output with realistic 
behavior patterns and mechanistic soundness.  For reasonable model simulation 
performance (reference Appendix B), the baseline values for each of the variables are as 
shown in Table 5.  Table 5 shows the minimum, maximum, and baseline values that the 
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statically quantified variables take in the adoption structure.  Appendix B contains more 
information on what these quantified values mean in the real world. 
Table 5: Adoption Factor Values 
 
 
 
 
 
Integration 
Figure 53 presents the formulation of the s-shaped growth structure for integration 
in STELLA as well as the undesired compensating influence from discontinued use 
inertia.  There is one stock in this structure -- Integration.  The integration stock has two 
flows connected to it – an inflow (Increasing Integration) and an outflow (Decreasing 
Integration).  The Integration stock accumulates units of integration and the two flows 
move units of integration/unit of time into and out of the stock.  This formulation in the 
virtual world follows the s-shaped structure in the casual diagram for integration, which 
was derived from the reference mode behavior pattern for integration. 
Increasing integration has many influences that must be accounted for, based on 
the model’s definition of integration.  Increasing integration is a function of the number 
of adopters in the organization, management interventions, organizational business 
process reengineering prowess, and, to a lesser degree, the organizational innovation 
continuity. 
Variable MIN MAX BASELINE
Potential Adopters 0 1 0.98
Adopters 0 1 0.02
Relative Advantage 0 10 9
Ease of Use 0 10 3
Compatibility 0 10 5
Baseline QoCC 0 1 0.5
Discontinuance Factor NA NA 0.2
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Decreasing integration also has multiple influences upon it.  Decreasing 
integration is a function of organizational resistance, and, when there is discontinued use 
inertia built-up in the system, abandoned reengineered processes. 
 
  
Figure 53: Integration Formulated Structure in STELLA 
 
Increasing Integration has the most complicated equation in the integration 
structure (as well as the model as a whole) because it involves quite a number of 
influences.  Equation 9 is the product of four influences: adopters, reengineered processes 
idea factor (which is a function of the level of integration), reengineering effectiveness, 
and continuity (which is a function of continued use inertia).  Continuity is additive in 
this equation because it is relatively weak in comparison to the other factors under 
normal, baseline conditions.  Baseline continuity refers to the natural level of continuity 
in the organization.  The continuity management intervention will increase organizational 
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continuity, which adds to Integration.  Management interventions play a role in the 
reengineered processes idea factor and reengineering effectiveness portions of the 
equation.  Reward system management plays a role in the reengineered processes idea 
factor portion of equation 9 because personnel will tend to pursue further reengineering 
initiatives if an idea program is in place that rewards that type of innovative thinking.  
Both learning and change process management are in the reengineering effectiveness 
portion of the equation because increased organizational learning will directly improve 
the effectiveness of business process reengineering and one of the main sections of 
change process management focuses directly on business process reengineering issues.  
The management intervention factors and how they interact will be discussed in a later 
section.  The Increasing Integration equation is: 
(Adopters * (Reengineered Processes Idea Factor + (Reward Sys Mgt Factor * Reward 
System Mgt)) *(Reengineering Effectiveness +(Learning Mgt Factor * Learning Mgt) + 
(Change Int Mgt Factor * Change Process Mgt Factor * Change Process Mgt))) 
+ ((Baseline Continuity + (Continuity Mgt Factor * Continuity Mgt)) * 
Continued Use Inertia) (9) 
 
Decreasing integration also has a few associated influences.  Equation 10 is the 
product of four influences: integration, organizational resistance (which is a function of 
the level of integration), discontinued use inertia, and abandoned reengineered processes 
factor (which is a function of integration).  The basic s-shape structure includes only the 
Integration * Organizational Resistance portion of equation 10.  The Discontinued Use 
Inertia * Abandoned Reengineered Processes Factor portion of equation 10 gives life to 
the compensating loop that diminishes integration in a negative organizational inertia 
context, leading to undesired integration behavior.  The decreasing integration equation 
is: 
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(Integration * Organizational Resistance) + (Discontinued Use Inertia * Abandoned 
Reengineered Processes Factor) (10) 
 
There are two factors in the model that are direct functions of integration.  These 
include reengineered processes idea factor and abandoned reengineered processes factor.  
They are formulated as: 
Reengineered Processes Idea Factor = Integration  (11) 
 
Abandoned Reengineered Processes Factor = Integration  (12) 
 
Organizational Resistance is also a direct function of Integration, but managers 
can have a direct influence on this variable.  Taking model functionality into account by 
adding logic that prevents simulation errors, the organizational resistance equation is: 
IF((Integration-Learning_Mgt)>0) 
THEN(Integration-Learning_Mgt) 
ELSE(0) (13) 
 
These variables were quantified to synchronize simulation output with realistic 
behavior patterns and mechanistic soundness.  For reasonable model simulation 
performance (reference Appendix B), the baseline values for each of the variables are as 
shown in Table 6.  Table 6 shows the minimum, maximum, and baseline values that the 
statically quantified variables take in the integration structure.  Appendix B contains 
more information on what these quantified values mean in the real world.  
Table 6: Integration Factor Values 
 
 
 
 
Variable MIN MAX BASELINE
Integration 0 NA 0.01
Continuity Mgt Factor NA NA 0.5
Baseline Continuity 0 1 0.25
Reengineering Effectiveness 0 10 3
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Organizational Inertia. 
Figure 54 presents the formulation of the accumulating structure for 
organizational inertia in STELLA.  There are two stocks in this structure – one for 
positive organizational inertia above and beyond the desired behavioral assumption 
discussed previously (Continued Use Inertia) and one for negative organizational inertia 
(Discontinued Use Inertia).  There are also two flows – Continuing to Use (for Continued 
Use Inertia) and Discontinuing Use (for Discontinued Use Inertia).  The organizational 
inertia concept could have been presented as one stock, but the numerical calculations 
throughout the rest of the model would have been unduly complicated and inaccessible.  
The mix of the three organizational inertia variables in this structure (Top Level Support, 
Database Quality, and Culture Fit) determines whether the inertia built-up in the system 
is positive or negative.  This aspect is formulated with a variable that uses Boolean logic 
to transfer flow to the positive or negative side.  Hence, with one generalized exception, 
if there is flow to the positive (continued use inertia) side, there cannot be flow to the 
negative (discontinued use inertia) side and vice versa.  The model makes the generalized 
assumption that in any organization, there is some level of positive continued use inertia 
that builds up -- simply by nature of the innovation existing within the organization and 
being used for something, as mundane as this something might be.  This means, even in 
the presence of negative organizational inertia, that some small measure of positive 
organizational inertia will build-up over time that supports continued use.  Each of the 
stocks has units in units of inertia.  Each of the flows has units in units of inertia/unit of 
time.  Each flow is a function of the level of integration and the level of organizational 
context (called the Organizational Fit Factor). 
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Figure 54: Organizational Inertia Formulated Structure in STELLA 
 
Continuing to Use is the flow that feeds Continued Use Inertia.  Continuing to 
Use is a function of the level of Integration and the Organizational Fit Factor (which is a 
function of the three organizational inertia factors).  The discussion in the preceding 
paragraph explains why this flow is formulated as shown.  Continuing to Use will always 
flow at least some small amount into Continued Use Inertia (the minimum 
0.05*Integration portion is relatively small).  The Continuing to Use equation is: 
IF(Organizational Fit Factor > 0.05) 
THEN(Organizational Fit Factor * Integration) 
ELSE(0.05 * Integration)  (14) 
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Discontinuing Use is the flow feeding Discontinued Use Inertia.  It is primarily 
the same as the Continuing to Use flow, but will only flow to Discontinued Use Inertia if 
there is a negative number in organizational fit factor.  The negative sign in the THEN 
statement of equation 15 acts as a switch to allow positive flow into discontinued use 
inertia (since only positive numbers can accumulate in a stock).  The Discontinuing Use 
equation is: 
IF(Organizational Fit Factor < 0) 
THEN(-Organizational Fit Factor * Integration) 
ELSE(0) (15) 
 
Organizational Fit Factor consists of a simple calculation, but the equation 
(equation 16) appears unduly complicated because of the simulation controls that must be 
placed upon it for ease of modeler use. The Constant On Off Switch allows non-static 
variable definitions into these variables.  If the switch is equal to zero, then the non-static 
variable definitions for the organizational inertia factors are used.  If the switch is equal 
to 1, then the constant definitions are used.  This switch allows the exploration of unique 
organizational situations without having to perform extensive model adjustments (just 
change one integer number).  The organizational fit factor equation is the sum of the 
organizational inertia factors (with multiplied weighted factors that will be discussed in a 
later section).  The organizational fit factor equation is: 
 
IF(Constant On Off Switch = 0) THEN((Culture Fit Factor * Culture Fit) + 
(Database Quality Factor * Database Quality) + (Top Level Support Factor * Top Level 
Support)) ELSE((Culture Fit Factor * Constant Culture Fit) +  
(Database Quality Factor * Constant Database Quality) + 
 (Top Level Support Factor * Constant Top Level Support))  (16) 
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Each of the constant variables for organizational inertia (Top Level Support, 
Database Quality, and Culture Fit) can continuously vary over a range of two (from –1 to 
1).  Any positive number specifies a positive organizational context and any negative 
number specifies a negative organizational context.  The summation of these numbers, 
with appropriate weighting, determines the overall organizational inertia context for the 
organization. 
These variables were quantified to synchronize simulation output with realistic 
behavior patterns and mechanistic soundness.  For reasonable model simulation 
performance (reference Appendix B), the baseline values for each of the variables are as 
shown in Table 7.  Table 7 shows the minimum, maximum, and baseline values that the 
statically quantified variables take in the organizational inertia structure.  Appendix B 
contains more information on what these quantified values mean in the real world.  
Table 7: Organizational Inertia Factor Values 
 
 
 
 
 
Management Interventions. 
Figure 55 presents the formulation of the management interventions in STELLA.  
There are no stocks or flows, hence no structure, but these variables are endogenous to 
the model as discussed earlier.  There are four management interventions in the adoption-
Variable MIN MAX BASELINE
Continued Use Inertia 0 NA 0
Discontinued Use Inertia 0 NA 0
Constant Top Level Support -1 1 0
Constant Database Quality -1 1 0
Constant Culture Fit -1 1 0
Constant On Off Switch 0 1 1
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integration portion of the model: learning management, change process management, 
reward system management, and continuity management.  The operating capability 
portion is locked into the operating capability structure, so is not pictured here.  It does 
have a strong influence on how the other management interventions are allocated though.   
 
 
Figure 55: Management Interventions Formulation in STELLA 
 
Mgt Effort Allocator is a variable that specifies the amount of time available to 
the manager for the four management interventions in the adoption-integration portion of 
the model.  Some logic is included in this equation to avoid simulation errors and 
inconsistencies (reference Appendix B).  OC Mgt is the management intervention 
variable in the operating capability structure that typically declines over time and frees up 
more time as operating capability increases.  By subtracting OC Mgt from Mgt Capacity, 
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the model will be able to specify a pool of time to split between the remaining four 
interventions based on the percentages specified.  The mgt effort allocator equation is: 
IF((Mgt Capacity – OC Mgt > 0) AND (OC Mgt > 0)) 
THEN(Mgt Capacity – OC Mgt) 
ELSE(Mgt Capacity)  (17) 
 
For each of the four management interventions in the adoption-integration portion 
of the system, a percentage is specified: Learning Perc, Reward System Perc, Change 
Process Perc, and Continuity Perc.  These four represent the pertinent percentages for 
each of the management interventions bearing the same root name (i.e., Reward System 
Perc is the percentage for Reward System Mgt).  The relevant equations for Learning 
Mgt, Reward System Mgt, Change Process Mgt, and Continuity Mgt are:   
Learning Perc * Mgt Effort Allocator  (18) 
 
Reward System Perc * Mgt Effort Allocator  (19) 
 
Change Process Perc * Mgt Effort Allocator  (20) 
 
Continuity Perc * Mgt Effort Allocator (21) 
 
Based on the system constraints specified earlier, the sum of the percentages 
(each of which must fall between zero and one inclusively) must not be greater than one.  
Each of these percentages can vary continuously between zero and one, but the sum 
constraint limits the number of possible combinations.  Each of the management 
interventions is included in various loops throughout the model – this portion of the 
model is where they are specified endogenously.    
These variables were quantified to synchronize simulation output with realistic 
behavior patterns and mechanistic soundness.  For reasonable model simulation 
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performance (reference Appendix B), the baseline values for each of the variables are as 
shown in Table 8.  Table 8 shows the minimum, maximum, and baseline values that the 
statically quantified variables take in the management intervention section.  Appendix B 
contains more information on what these quantified values mean in the real world. 
Table 8: Organizational Inertia Factor Values 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall Formulation. 
Figure 56 presents the overall formulated structure in STELLA.  Each of the 
aggregate variable structures were grouped within the title boxes to assist the reader 
decipher the figure.  A few controls were added to the model to assist in avoiding 
mistakes during the simulation phase.  A few of these include the table boxes in the 
center of the four management intervention percentage circles – these variables are 
defined in a table that provides easier access for number changes.  The Mgt Checker 
variable simply sums the management intervention percentages to check if they sum to 
one.  If not, the model purposefully does not run properly.  Other than these modeler 
controls, the model is the complete picture of each of the individual pictures already 
discussed.  This overall formulated structure is the same as the overall causal diagram – 
there is no structure in the overall formulated model that does not exist in the overall 
Variable MIN MAX BASELINE
Mgt Capacity 0 1 1
Learning Perc 0 1 0.25
Reward Perc 0 1 0.25
Change Process Perc 0 1 0.25
Continuity Perc 0 1 0.25
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causal diagram.  Since the overall causal diagram was derived from each of the individual 
reference mode behavior patterns, the model is consistent throughout. 
 
   
Figure 56: Overall Formulated Model in STELLA 
 
Model Factor Quantification. 
Use of the system dynamics approach allows the modeler and client to explore 
behavior patterns and behavior differences over time, even with a lack of empirical data 
from the system of study.  This approach can yield significant benefits for system 
understanding and intervention, especially when expensive empirical information 
gathering is not feasible.  However, a lack of empirical data can make quantifying the 
model difficult, specifically when variables interact with one another in the same 
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equation.  Hence, there must be a defensible method to relate variables that interact 
directly with one another.  Grounding the model quantification of interrelated variables in 
the published scholarly literature is probably the most defensible method in this context. 
The basic premise of this quantification procedure is to qualitatively explore the 
literature that has a broad view for major change initiatives and see how often certain 
elements of management interventions are discussed.  Since aggregated factors are used 
in the model, there are many specific references from the literature that can be grouped 
under each of these headings.  Based on the percentages of these aggregated discussions, 
one can get some idea of how important one factor is in relation to another.  The literature 
review pool of literature was screened for selected articles and books that took a broad 
view of change or innovation diffusion initiatives and were respected in the field (oft 
quoted in other similar research).  Tabulating specific discussions of elements present in 
this model allowed a qualitative analysis of each article for later quantification.  Table 9 
is a synopsis of this review. 
Table 9 includes a qualitative analysis of three sections.  Section 1, management 
interventions, includes the four adoption-integration management interventions (learning 
management, reward system management, change process management, and continuity 
management).  Section 2, organizational inertia, includes the three organizational inertia 
factors (top level support, database quality, and culture fit).  Section 3, technology 
adoption, includes the three technology adoption factors (relative advantage, ease of use, 
and compatibility).  This qualitative assessment used eleven of the articles and books 
from the literature review, which qualified according to the specifications in the previous 
paragraph, and analyzed each for specific references that could be grouped under one of 
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these aggregate headings.  After gathering and sorting specific references from the 
literature, the total number of Xs from each section were counted and assigned a ratio 
percentage for each individual variable in each section.  For example, in the management 
interventions section, there were 73 total Xs.  The learning management variable received 
16 of these Xs, so its ratio value was 0.21.  Likewise, the reward system management 
variable had a ratio value of 0.19, the change process management variable had a ratio 
value of 0.5, and the continuity management variable had a ration value of 0.1.  The 
change process management variable was split into four distinct stages, so each stage also 
received a ratio value where their sum would be 0.5.  The management interventions 
section was split as follows: 
Learning Management: 0.21 
Reward System Management: 0.19 
Change Process Management: 0.5 
 Analyzing and Planning Change: 0.17 
 Communicate the Change: 0.11 
 Changing from Status Quo to Desired State: 0.12 
 Institutionalizing New Approaches: 0.1 
Continuity Management: 0.1 
The same approach was followed for the organizational inertia section as was the 
management interventions section.  The organizational inertia section was split as 
follows: 
Top Level Support: 0.21 
Database Quality: 0.25 
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Culture Fit: 0.54 
A slightly different approach was followed for the technology adoption section, 
since there were more empirically quantifiable studies in the literature for this section.  
For example, some empirically quantified values were found in a study conducted by 
Agarwal and Prasad (2000) where they analyzed the same three factors used in this model 
(relative advantage, ease of use, and compatibility) in a technology adoption study.  For 
each article with a focus on technology adoption analysis factors, the importance of each 
individual factor was quantified by allowing each writer three Xs for the technology 
adoption factor section and distributing them throughout it according to either quantified 
or inferred meaning from the article.  For example, Davis et al. (1989) focus on two 
factors of the technology acceptance model: perceived usefulness and perceived ease of 
use.  They also specify that users will tolerate a difficult interface in order to access 
functionality that is very important, while no amount of ease of use will compensate for a 
system that does not do a useful task.  Hence, the it was determined that perceived ease of 
use was one quarter as important as perceived usefulness.  As a result, the relative 
advantage section (closely associated with perceived usefulness) would receive 2.25 Xs 
and the ease of use section would receive 0.75 Xs for this article.  Table 9 includes all of 
the article analysis for this section.  After compiling the information for this section, the 
technology adoption section was split as follows: 
Relative Advantage: 0.54 
Ease of Use: 0.28 
Compatibility: 0.18 
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With these weighting factors in place, a defensible equation quantification method 
(for equations with more than one factor included) could be performed to reflect these 
weightings.  Table 10 provides a synopsis of the factors from the full model associated 
with these weightings, their values, and the numbered equations they appear in for reader 
reference.  Weighting factors were not included in equations where there were not two or 
more factors together.   
The management intervention factors are not the same as those summarized 
above, whereas the factors for technology adoption and organizational inertia are the 
same as above.  For the management interventions, the baseline value for reward system 
management was set to 1 and the other factors arranged according to this specification.  
For example, the Learning Mgt Factor is 1.1.  Comparing the values derived from Table 9 
(Reward System Mgt = 0.19, Learning Mgt = .21) with the values from Table 10 
(Reward System Mgt Factor = 1, Learning Mgt Factor = 1.1), the ratio value of the Table 
9 comparison (0.19/0.21 = 0.90) is the same as Table 10 (1/1.1 = 0.90).  The Change 
Process Mgt variable was also split into two parts when entered into the model.  The first 
three portions of Change Process Mgt (Analyzing and Planning Change, Communicate 
the Change, and Changing from Status Quo to Desired State) fit best into the adoption 
portion of the management intervention (in the adoption from management effort loop), 
whereas the last portion (Institutionalizing New Approaches) seemed to fit best in the 
integration section of the model.  Hence, these variables were split into two weighting 
factors: Change Process Mgt Adoption Factor and Change Int Mgt Factor.  Change 
Process Mgt Adoption Factor took the weighting from the first three portions of Change 
Process Management (0.17 + 0.11 + 0.12 = 0.4) and Change Int Mgt Factor took the 
 
 
 167
weighting from the last portion of Change Process Management (0.1).  Hence, comparing 
Reward System Mgt Factor with Change Process Mgt Adoption Factor yields the ratio 
from Table 9 as 0.19/0.4 = 0.48 and the ratio from Table 10 as 1/2.1 = 0.48 (the same 
ratio).  All factors in the management interventions portion were derived in this manner. 
Since these weighted variables are included in the model, the model has a more 
defendable grounding in the literature.  Each of the management interventions is included 
where they would naturally assist in the adoption-integration process.  Inclusion of these 
management factors in the system structure allows the manager to investigate what type 
of context he or she is working in and better use his or her time doing the things that will 
bring the most impact on the GeoBase implementation system.  With the dynamic 
hypothesis and formulation in place, a discussion of the testing phase can begin.  
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Table 9: Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readines for Change
Diffusion of 
Innovations
Forced 
Adoption
Effective Change 
Mgt GIS in DoD Change in 90s
Section 1: Management Interventions Armenakis et al. Rogers Ram & Jung Kotter Cullis Armenakis & Bedeian
Learning Management
Encourage Peer Interaction During Implementation X
Develop Employee Competence X
The more people involved, the better the outcome X
Lone individual development led to poor GIS performance 
organization-wide X
Require participation in team building and team participation
Information acquisition programs 
(congenital,direct,experiences of others,strategic actions)
Information distribution programs (company visits, personnel 
rotation, instruction and training)
Team learning and role of dialouge
Learning Contracts and Learning Sets
Circular Structures (learning organizations transfer individual 
learning to organizational learning by making mental models 
explicit)
Structured training experiences have value
Participative decision making (participation in formalized 
strategic planning activities) X
Vicarious learning programs (personnel observing others 
using tools) X
Enactive mastery (small change step progression) X
Mass media communication channels (company newsletters, 
advertising, training) X
Interpersonal communication channels (personnel, opinion 
leaders) X
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Table 9 (cont): Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GIS Implementation 
Recommendations
Learning 
Organizations Technology Adoption TAM model Adopting IT innovation
Section 1: Management Interventions Geo InSight Romme & Dillen Agarwal & Prasad Davis et al. Moore & Benbasat
Learning Management
Encourage Peer Interaction During Implementation
Develop Employee Competence
The more people involved, the better the outcome
Lone individual development led to poor GIS performance 
organization-wide
Require participation in team building and team 
participation X
Information acquisition programs 
(congenital,direct,experiences of others,strategic actions) X
Information distribution programs (company visits, 
personnel rotation, instruction and training) X
Team learning and role of dialouge X
Learning Contracts and Learning Sets X
Circular Structures (learning organizations transfer 
individual learning to organizational learning by making 
mental models explicit) X
Structured training experiences have value X
Participative decision making (participation in formalized 
strategic planning activities)
Vicarious learning programs (personnel observing others 
using tools)
Enactive mastery (small change step progression)
Mass media communication channels (company 
newsletters, advertising, training)
Interpersonal communication channels (personnel, 
opinion leaders)
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Table 9 (cont): Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readines for Change
Diffusion of 
Innovations
Forced 
Adoption
Effective Change 
Mgt GIS in DoD Change in 90s
Armenakis et al. Rogers Ram & Jung Kotter Cullis Armenakis & Bedeian
Reward System Management
Remove obstacles to the new vision X
Narrow job categories prevent productivity after change X
Personal outcomes of adoption determine long-term use X
Selection X
Performance appraisal X
Compensation X
Individuals resist if self-interest is being threatened X
Managers should focus attention on motivating personnel by 
highlighting the relative advantage and compatibility aspects 
of a new technology
Perceived usefulness is based on forming intentions toward 
behaviors personnel believe will increase job performance 
which leads to pay increases and promotions
Relative advantage -- innovation offers better way of doing 
same task, which will lead to better pay and promotion 
possibilities X
Observability -- the degree to which the results of an 
innovation are observable to others X
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Table 9 (cont): Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GIS Implementation 
Recommendations
Learning 
Organizations Technology Adoption TAM model Adopting IT innovation
Geo InSight Romme & Dillen Agarwal & Prasad Davis et al. Moore & Benbasat
Reward System Management
Remove obstacles to the new vision
Narrow job categories prevent productivity after change
Personal outcomes of adoption determine long-term use
Selection
Performance appraisal
Compensation
Individuals resist if self-interest is being threatened
Managers should focus attention on motivating personnel 
by highlighting the relative advantage and compatibility 
aspects of a new technology X
Perceived usefulness is based on forming intentions 
toward behaviors personnel believe will increase job 
performance which leads to pay increases and 
promotions X
Relative advantage -- innovation offers better way of doing 
same task, which will lead to better pay and promotion 
possibilities X X
Observability -- the degree to which the results of an 
innovation are observable to others X
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Table 9 (cont): Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readines for Change
Diffusion of 
Innovations
Forced 
Adoption
Effective Change 
Mgt GIS in DoD Change in 90s
Armenakis et al. Rogers Ram & Jung Kotter Cullis Armenakis & Bedeian
Change Process Management
Incremental approach is important (don't skip steps) X X X
Analyzing and planning change X
Establishing a sense of urgency X
Form powerful guiding coalition X
Create a vision X
Develop strategic plan for achieving GIS success X
Require development team to set realistic expectations
Encourage Peer Interaction During Implementation X
Readiness for change assessments are helpful X
TAM is relevant for managers wanting an "early warning 
technique" for system acceptability
Communicate the Change X
Change agent builds target's self efficacy X X
Communicate the Vision X
Work through opinion leaders, interpersonal and mass media 
communication channels X X
Focus on end user and not solely on technology X
Managers should focus attention on motivating personnel by 
highlighting the relative advantage and compatibility aspects 
of a new technology
Changing from status quo to desired state X
Gaining acceptance of new behaviors X
Empower Others to Act on the Vision X
Ensure access for all users
Facilitate Trial/triability X X
Innovation adoption X
Institutionalizing New Approaches X
Planning for and creating short-term wins X
Consolidating Improvements and Producing Still More 
Change X
Consolidating and institutionalizing the new state X
Highly visible pilot project that is successful
For long-term routinization of technology, work process 
changes are necessary
Innovation reinvention X
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Table 9 (cont): Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GIS Implementation 
Recommendations
Learning 
Organizations Technology Adoption TAM model Adopting IT innovation
Geo InSight Romme & Dillen Agarwal & Prasad Davis et al. Moore & Benbasat
Change Process Management
Incremental approach is important (don't skip steps)
Analyzing and planning change
Establishing a sense of urgency
Form powerful guiding coalition
Create a vision
Develop strategic plan for achieving GIS success
Require development team to set realistic expectations X
Encourage Peer Interaction During Implementation
Readiness for change assessments are helpful
TAM is relevant for managers wanting an "early warning 
technique" for system acceptability X
Communicate the Change
Change agent builds target's self efficacy
Communicate the Vision
Work through opinion leaders, interpersonal and mass 
media communication channels
Focus on end user and not solely on technology
Managers should focus attention on motivating personnel 
by highlighting the relative advantage and compatibility 
aspects of a new technology X
Changing from status quo to desired state
Gaining acceptance of new behaviors
Empower Others to Act on the Vision
Ensure access for all users X
Facilitate Trial/triability X
Innovation adoption X
Institutionalizing New Approaches
Planning for and creating short-term wins
Consolidating Improvements and Producing Still More 
Change
Consolidating and institutionalizing the new state
Highly visible pilot project that is successful X
For long-term routinization of technology, work process 
changes are necessary X
Innovation reinvention
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Table 9 (cont): Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readines for Change
Diffusion of 
Innovations
Forced 
Adoption
Effective Change 
Mgt GIS in DoD Change in 90s
Armenakis et al. Rogers Ram & Jung Kotter Cullis Armenakis & Bedeian
Continuity Management
Readiness for change assessments are helpful X
Not anchoring changes in the corportation's culture X
Many organizations had nothing written down -- leading to 
poor performance X
Personnel turnover causes much of the corporate knowledge 
to be lost X
Develop strategic plan for achieving GIS success X
Assemble a toolkit to show the way ahead X
Storage of Information (organizational memory)
GIS Implementation 
Recommendations
Learning 
Organizations Technology Adoption TAM model Adopting IT innovation
Geo InSight Romme & Dillen Agarwal & Prasad Davis et al. Moore & Benbasat
Continuity Management
Readiness for change assessments are helpful
Not anchoring changes in the corportation's culture
Many organizations had nothing written down -- leading to 
poor performance
Personnel turnover causes much of the corporate 
knowledge to be lost
Develop strategic plan for achieving GIS success
Assemble a toolkit to show the way ahead
Storage of Information (organizational memory) X
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Table 9 (cont): Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readines for Change
Diffusion of 
Innovations
Forced 
Adoption
Effective Change 
Mgt GIS in DoD Change in 90s
Section 2: Organizational Inertia Armenakis et al. Rogers Ram & Jung Kotter Cullis Armenakis & Bedeian
Top Level Support
Form powerful guiding coalition X
High Level of Management Commitment Required
Top management support for GIS is crucial X
New organizational structures X
Revised job descriptions X
Innovation champion must have support of upper 
management X
Database Quality
Ensure minimum data quality
Confidence in the Quality of the Database X
Interpretation of information (database sharing/quality)
Compatibility/usefulness X
Cultural Fit
Forced adoption causes organizational resistance X X
Declaring victory too soon is poor management X
Poor fit of technology and organization hampers productivity X
70% of IT projects fail due to non-technical reasons X
Seek out resistance to GIS and treat as signal needing 
response X
Resistance resulting from difference between current identity 
and envisioned identity X
Develop positive attitude toward change within organization
Perceived job insecurity exhibits strong negative relationships 
with innovation 
Response to influence attempts will be determined by target's 
cultural membership X
Cynicism as a result of a history of failed change programs X
Cynicism as a result of a history of poor management 
communication X
Not anchoring changes in the corportation's culture X
Culture is explanation of why personnel did not perceive 
management pressure to adopt innovation
Innovative vs. non-innovative organizations X
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Table 9 (cont): Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GIS Implementation 
Recommendations
Learning 
Organizations Technology Adoption TAM model Adopting IT innovation
Section 2: Organizational Inertia Geo InSight Romme & Dillen Agarwal & Prasad Davis et al. Moore & Benbasat
Top Level Support
Form powerful guiding coalition
High Level of Management Commitment Required X
Top management support for GIS is crucial
New organizational structures
Revised job descriptions
Innovation champion must have support of upper 
management
Database Quality
Ensure minimum data quality X
Confidence in the Quality of the Database
Interpretation of information (database sharing/quality) X
Compatibility/usefulness X X X
Cultural Fit
Forced adoption causes organizational resistance
Declaring victory too soon is poor management
Poor fit of technology and organization hampers 
productivity
70% of IT projects fail due to non-technical reasons
Seek out resistance to GIS and treat as signal needing 
response
Resistance resulting from difference between current 
identity and envisioned identity
Develop positive attitude toward change within 
organization X
Perceived job insecurity exhibits strong negative 
relationships with innovation X
Response to influence attempts will be determined by 
target's cultural membership
Cynicism as a result of a history of failed change 
programs
Cynicism as a result of a history of poor management 
communication
Not anchoring changes in the corportation's culture
Culture is explanation of why personnel did not perceive 
management pressure to adopt innovation X
Innovative vs. non-innovative organizations
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Table 9 (cont): Qualitative Analysis of Model Variable Weightings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readines for Change
Diffusion of 
Innovations
Forced 
Adoption
Effective Change 
Mgt GIS in DoD Change in 90s
Section 3: Technology Adoption Armenakis et al. Rogers Ram & Jung Kotter Cullis Armenakis & Bedeian
Relative Advantage (0.75*X)
Perceived usefulness
Observability (0.75*X)
Ease of Use
Perceived ease of use
Complexity (0.75*X)
Users will tolerate a difficult interface in order to access 
functionality that is very important, while no amount of ease of 
use will compensate for a system that does not do a useful 
task
Compatibility (0.75*X)
GIS Implementation 
Recommendations
Learning 
Organizations Technology Adoption TAM model Adopting IT innovation
Section 3: Technology Adoption Geo InSight Romme & Dillen Agarwal & Prasad Davis et al. Moore & Benbasat
Relative Advantage R^2 = 0.41:  (1.2*X) (0.75*X)
Perceived usefulness (2.25*X)
Observability (0.75*X)
Ease of Use R^2 = 0.35:  (1.05*x)
Perceived ease of use (0.75*X)
Complexity (0.75*X)
Users will tolerate a difficult interface in order to access 
functionality that is very important, while no amount of 
ease of use will compensate for a system that does not do 
a useful task
Compatibility R^2 = 0.19:  (0.75*X) (0.75*X)
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Table 10: Weighted Factors in Formulated Model Summary Table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing 
Boundary Adequacy Test. 
The purpose of the boundary adequacy test, as stated by Sterman (2000), is as 
follows: 
Are the important concepts for addressing the problem endogenous to the   
model? 
 
Does the behavior of the model change significantly when boundary 
assumptions are relaxed? 
 
Do the policy recommendations change when the model boundary is  
extended? 
 
System dynamics models are the most useful when endogenous behavior is 
analyzed.  Based on the analysis of the system structure, the GeoBase implementation 
model structure is endogenous.  There are a few exogenous contextual variables, but they 
do not drive system behavior – there is an endogenous explanation for system behavior 
based on the system structure. 
The system boundary is based on the research problem.  Since the focus of this 
research is on a squadron-size organization, it would be difficult to extend the model 
Variable Value Equation Number in which Factor Appears
Management Interventions
Learning Mgt Factor 1.1 9
Reward System Mgt Factor 1 5, 9
Change Process Mgt Adoption Factor 2.1 5
Change Int Mgt Factor 0.5 9
Continuity Mgt Factor 0.5 9
Technology Adoption
Rel Adv Factor 0.54 4
Ease of Use Factor 0.28 4
Compat factor 0.18 4
Organizational Inertia
Top Level Support Factor 0.21 16
Database Quality Factor 0.25 16
Culture Fit Factor 0.54 16
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boundary to include variables outside the control of the system manager.  For example, 
funding is exogenous in this system since funding allocation decisions for GeoBase are 
not made at the squadron level.  Extending the study boundary to include Air Staff would 
allow for the exploration of funding decisions more closely, but the added complexity 
would force the aggregation of many of the concepts inherent in this smaller system 
boundary.  This level of aggregation would run counter to the research problem and 
questions. 
It is concluded from the system structural assessment test that the important 
concepts in this model, primarily operating capability, adoption, integration, and 
organizational inertia, are endogenous.  The management interventions are also 
endogenous.  The system boundary is adequate to address the research problem and 
questions. 
Structure Assessment Test. 
The purpose of the structure assessment test, as stated by Sterman (2000), is as 
follows: 
Is the model structure consistent with relevant descriptive knowledge of the 
system? 
 
Is the level of aggregation appropriate? 
 
Does the model conform to basic physical laws such as conservation laws? 
 
Do the decision rules capture the behavior of the actors in the system? 
 
Based on the literature review, client coordination, and other relevant system 
background, the model structure is consistent with relevant descriptive knowledge of the 
system.  The key is to accurately capture the reference mode behavior patterns and base 
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the model structure on these patterns.  Great care was taken to accomplish this element of 
the modeling process.  
The modeler must always struggle with what level of aggregation is appropriate 
for the model.  One way to determine if the model is too disaggregated is through 
sensitivity testing (reference Appendix B).  If a variable in the system does not affect the 
system in any appreciable way when altered, it can probably be aggregated into other 
variables.  The modeler must take care not to overly aggregate the model as well.  If the 
model is too aggregated, there are usually difficulties answering the questions associated 
with the research problem the model hopes to help address.   
The model is based on assumptions that are generally true in the real world.  The 
model realistically functions in accordance with organizational behavior findings 
presented in the literature.  The model also assumes that managers will want to improve 
GeoBase system performance by using recommendations by experts in the field of 
organizational improvement.  Many of the interventions discussed in this model may not 
be currently used in many of the squadron organizations attempting to implement 
GeoBase, but these management interventions represent the best methods managers can 
use to improve system performance.  One of the goals for this research is to recommend a 
cocktail of management interventions that should most effectively improve system 
performance based on the context of the organization. 
Parameter Assessment Test. 
The purpose of the parameter assessment test, as stated by Sterman (2000), is as 
follows: 
Are the parameter values consistent with relevant descriptive and numerical 
knowledge of the system? 
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Do all parameters have real world counterparts? 
 
The system parameters are as realistic as practicable based on the amount of data 
available in the literature and from the system itself.  With the lack of empirical data from 
the real world and the uniqueness of this research effort, this model is linked as closely to 
the literature and system as possible.  The model factors themselves are realistic in the 
system and are reflective of relevant factors from the literature.  The factor weightings 
were derived from a qualitative assessment of the descriptive elements of the literature – 
which was the best method available for weighting analysis under the research 
conditions. 
Behavior Reproduction Test. 
The purpose of the behavior reproduction test, as stated by Sterman (2000), is as 
follows: 
Does the model produce the behavior of interest in the system (qualitatively  
and quantitatively)? 
 
Does it endogenously generate the symptoms of difficulty motivating the  
study? 
 
Does the model generate the various modes of behavior observed in the real 
system? 
 
Figure 57 shows the baseline output from the system with all variables at their 
baseline levels.  Since this research will contain a number of these figures, the 
forthcoming discussion will explain how they are organized.  At the top of Figure 57 
there are a number of variable names: 1: OC (operating capability), 2: Potential Adopters, 
3: Adopters, and 4: Integration.  Each of the traces on the graph, labeled 1 through 4, 
represents each of their respective displayed variables.  The scale on the left side of the 
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graph (Y-axis) shows the scales for each of the traces.  These too are labeled 1 through 4 
and represent the trace scales for each of their respective variables.  The X-axis presents 
the time scale in years.  The time scope for this research is ten years, so the X-axis ends 
at ten years.  Each of the proceeding graphs will have differing variables at different 
scales. 
In the baseline condition shown in Figure 57, the various curves present the 
desired performance of each variable, as specified in each of their reference mode 
behavior patterns, as well as the main chain behavior resulting in a lagged response for 
adopters and integration.  The operating capability (OC) trace (Trace 1) displays a goal-
seeking behavior pattern as it approaches its goal value of 1.  It starts at 0.05 and 
progressively approaches 1.  After ten years, its final value is 0.87.  Had the simulation 
been allowed to run for a longer period of time, it would have eventually come to a static 
steady-state level of 1.  The potential adopters trace (Trace 2) begins at its initial value of 
0.98 and displays inverse s-shaped behavior, eventually coming to a low value of 0 after 
8.1 years.  The adopters trace (Trace 3) begins at its initial value of 0.02 and displays s-
shaped behavior, eventually coming to a high value of 1 after 8.1 years.  Remember that 
the stocks for potential adopters and adopters are linked, so when a unit of the potential 
adopters stocks flows out, it travels directly to the adopter stock (the reason for their 
inverse behavior patterns).  The integration trace (Trace 4) begins at an initial value of 
0.01 and also displays s-shaped behavior, eventually coming to a value of 3.81 after ten 
years.  The main chain behavior pattern shows the time lags between operating 
capability, adopters, and integration. 
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Figure 57: Behavior Reproduction Test for Desired System Performance (All 
Variables at Baseline Levels) 
 
Each of the unique structures must be simulated to ensure that the structure is 
driving the behavior pattern of interest as opposed to an exogenous influence.  Each 
individual model structure (operating capability, adoption, integration, and organizational 
inertia) was taken out of the holistic model and individually tested to assure the structure 
was driving the simulated behavior pattern.  Since each of the individual structures have 
been taken out of the model, so there is no main chain behavior pattern – each of the 
simulations has no initial delays.  Figure 58 shows the simulated behavior of the 
operating capability structure alone.  As expected, it displayed goal-seeking behavior.  
Figure 59 shows the simulated behavior of the adoption structure alone.  As expected, it 
displays static s-shape behavior (s-shaped goal-seeking behavior with the “the goal” of 
zero potential adopters).  Figure 60 shows the simulated behavior of the integration 
structure alone.  As expected, it displays s-shape behavior.  Figure 61 shows the 
simulated behavior of the integration structure (with all of the input going to the 
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continued use inertia stock) alone.  As expected, it displays accumulating behavior.  
Based on these results, each of the model structures drives the reference mode behavior 
pattern.    
10:59 AM   Tue, Jan 28, 2003
0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00
Time
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Figure 58: Operating Capability Behavior Reproduction Test for Operating 
Capability Structure Alone 
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Figure 59: Adoption Behavior Reproduction Test for Adoption Structure Alone 
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Figure 60: Integration Behavior Reproduction Test for Integration Structure Alone 
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Figure 61: Organizational Inertia Structure for Organizational Inertia Structure 
Alone 
 
Figure 62 presents the behavior reproduction test for the undesired condition for 
each of these variables (with discontinued use inertia built up in the system).  This 
undesired behavior pattern represents the innovation not meeting organizational needs in 
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the long-term.  Each of the variables shown in Figure 62 have short-term acceptable 
performance, but when discontinued use inertia begins building up in the system, the 
compensating loops in the system overcome the reinforcing loops and the system declines 
as expected.  The delayed compensating behavior is expected due to the main chain 
structure with multiple stocks.  
 
12:45 PM   Tue, Dec 31, 2002
0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00
Time
1:
1:
1:
2:
2:
2:
3:
3:
3:
4:
4:
4:
0.00
0.45
0.90
0.00
0.50
1.00
0.00
2.50
5.00
1: OC 2: Potential Adopters 3: Adopters 4: Integration
1
1
1 1
2
2
2
23
3
3
3
4 4
4
4
Beh Rep Test (Behavior Reprodu…  
Figure 62: Behavior Reproduction Test for Undesired System Performance 
(Discontinued Use Inertia Built Up) 
 
There is an historical problem associated with GIS-related IT investments in the 
Air Force.  As Lieutenant General Zettler, AF/IL, succinctly stated, “when it comes to 
management/fielding of new IT capabilities, ‘we do extremely poorly’” (Department of 
the Air Force, 2002a).  The model has been formulated with this important historical 
facet in mind.  Without proper management of the organizational elements of the system, 
it is doomed to failure.  Managers typically focus only on the technical aspects at the 
expense of the organizational aspects and the IT projects dwindle and die as a result.  
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Simulating this concept in the model can be done by setting all of the adoption-
integration management percentages to zero and keeping everything else at its baseline 
conditions.  Figure 63 presents this behavioral pattern.  OC functions normally over time 
in accordance with the reference mode for OC, but potential adopters and adopters 
remain flat and integration only rises slightly (notice the scale for the integration 
variable).  The performance of the variables in Figure 63 is indicative of historical 
behavior.  
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Figure 63: Behavior Reproduction Test for Historical Behavior (All Variables at 
Baseline Levels with No Adoption-Integration Management Intervention) 
 
It is important to note that the scaled numbers associated with each of these 
variables are only used for comparative purposes within individual variables, hence a 
value of 1 for adopters is not comparable to a value of 1 for integration.  The purpose for 
quantifying each of these system metrics is to enable the performance of comparative 
analysis, not to attempt to tie numbers from this model to actual empirical data from the 
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real system.  It is also important to note that magnitudes of difference between model 
outputs do not mean that metrics from the real system would compare in the same way.  
For example, if one simulation output for integration is 4 after ten years and another 
integration simulation output is 2 after ten years, this does not mean that the combination 
of variables in simulation 1 will provide twice-as-good integration performance as the 
combination of variables from simulation 2 in the real world.  A more realistic 
assessment would be that the combination of variables in simulation 1 would tend to 
produce significantly better integration performance, all else being equal, than the set of 
variables from simulation 2. 
The model simulation outputs shown in Figures 4-29 and 4-30 achieve the 
reference mode behavior patterns discussed earlier, so the model passes the behavior 
reproduction test. 
Other Tests. 
The remainder of the testing section is located in Appendix B.  Remaining tests 
include: extreme conditions, sensitivity analysis, and behavior anomaly tests.  There was 
nothing found during the course of model testing that precluded the model from going on 
into the policy design and evaluation phase.  Appendix B also contains information about 
how the model parameters correspond to real-world parameters, based on a high-low 
scale.  The reader is invited to peruse Appendix B to get a feel for the remaining types of 
tests that were completed on the model, to get a feel for what each of the model variables 
represents in the real world, and get a better feel for the model and its level of robustness. 
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Policy Design and Evaluation 
To this point, a dynamic hypothesis has been created, a model, derived from the 
dynamic hypothesis, has been formulated in the virtual world, and this formulated model 
tested.  Now that all of these requirements are in place, the discussion of the policy 
design and evaluation phase can begin.  At this point, the process of analyzing the model, 
running simulations, and making recommendations can be a bit creative.   
Model analysis will take place under a static context, meaning the system 
manager cannot have any effect on the exogenous contextual variables in the system 
(such as the level of funding, whether or not the IT innovation is meeting organizational 
needs, and organizational culture).  This type of analysis is consistent with the way the 
model was created.  To break with this assumption would force an unrealistic expansion 
of the system boundary so that the system manager would have some control over the 
context he would be working in.  In this model, if the system is bound to build-up 
negative organizational inertia (meaning the IT innovation is not meeting organizational 
needs), the system manager can do nothing to prevent eventual collapse.   
For static context analysis, a matrix of organizational contexts was created and a 
method devised to sample the management intervention space in order to make 
recommendations on what combinations of management interventions would be most 
effective under short-term and long-term scenarios.  One of the assumptions associated 
with all of the adoption-integration management interventions is that the manager must 
exert the same level of effort throughout the sampling period.  For example, if the 
manager exerts 50% of his excess effort (remember the manager must focus on operating 
capability first and spread the remainder of his effort to the adoption-integration 
interventions) on change process management at the beginning of the simulation period, 
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he cannot change this percentage.  This assumption is unrealistic in the real world, but 
provides a method to compare the strength of different combinations of management 
interventions on equal footing.   
Table 11 presents the matrix of organizational context scenarios.  There are 
specific contextual variables in the system that can be adjusted to reflect various 
organizational contexts.  The initial conditions portion of Table 11 contains two 
components: operating capability and adopters.  Two scenarios will be simulated for each 
of these: high and low.  In the high operating capability scenario, the organization has a 
relatively large initial operating capability as a result of previous investments in 
technology and GIS equipment, as well as management teams for the GIS and its 
database.  There would still be a lot to do to increase operating capability to the goal 
value, but this organization would be well ahead of its organizational peers.  The low 
value for operating capability would match the baseline assumption in the model – that 
there is some level of operating capability (probably in the form of computer equipment 
and some computer support specialists), but not much.  The high value for adopters 
would be comparable to a high number of individuals in the organization that have 
initially accepted GeoBase and have agreed to the requirements for adoption.  
Conversely, the low value would match the baseline assumptions that only two percent of 
the potential adopters have already adopted.  The organizational context variables that 
define the static context the manager must work in are adjusted based on the 
organizational context specification.   
In the poor organizational context scenario, a number of variables in the model 
are set at low values, allowing discontinued use inertia to build up fairly rapidly.  Under 
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the poor organizational context scenario, the system is assured to have an initial rise and 
then a rapid decline as discontinued use inertia builds up.  The poor organizational 
context also reflects a rigid organization that is more resistant to change than the others.   
The baseline organizational context setting is the same as the model baseline.  
There will not be any negative organizational inertia that builds up, but there isn’t much 
positive organizational inertia that builds up either.  This context will allow the model to 
generate the desired state reference mode.  The manager can affect change in the system 
by increasing the level of integration and shortening the time for integration to increase.   
In the positive organizational context setting, positive inertia will build up more 
rapidly and potential adopters will have better perceptions of the innovation, reflecting an 
innovative organization, less resistant to change than the others.  This will inherently 
increase system performance, but the manager will still be in a position to improve 
performance based on a mix of management interventions.  The 3X4 matrix has twelve 
contexts for study under the static assumption.  Each context is labeled 1 through 12 on 
the table to enable easier discussion for each context more easily throughout this 
document. 
Table 11: Organizational Context Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
Operating 
Capability Adopters
Poor 
Organizational 
Context
Baseline 
Organizational 
Context
Positive 
Organizational 
Context
High High 1 5 9
High Low 2 6 10
Low High 3 7 11
Low Low 4 8 12
Initial Conditions Organizational Context
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Table 12 includes the values assigned to specific variables under each of the 
various contexts.  The values are lower for the poor context and higher for the positive 
context.  There was some liberty taken in assigning variable values for each of these 
contexts, but the general conclusions should be the same regardless of the number 
assignment.  Even in the poor organizational context, top-level support should never fall 
below zero (this would mean top level leaders would be openly hostile towards the 
innovation, so it would never grow).  Top-level support with a value of zero means top-
level leaders are neither in favor of nor openly against the innovation – they leave it to 
the innovation manager to deal with and provide the necessary funding to keep the 
program functioning.  The other factors are derived by modeler determination, based on 
the context. 
Table 12: Variable Value Assignment Under Various Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
For the twelve contexts of study, a uniform method was devised to sample the 
management intervention sampling space.  Each of the four adoption-integration 
management interventions can vary continuously between zero and one, with the 
constraint that all must sum to one.  The reader probably recognizes that there are an 
infinite number of combinations between these variables, so the variable percentages had 
to be discretized to find a reasonable number of combinations to analyze.  The following 
High Top Level Support 0 Top Level Support 0 Top Level Support 0.4
OC 0.5 Database Quality -0.4 Database Quality 0 Database Quality 0.4
Pot Adop 0.5 Culture Fit -0.4 Culture Fit 0 Culture Fit 0.4
Adop 0.5 Rel Adv 5 Rel Adv 9 Rel Adv 9
Low Ease of Use 2 Ease of Use 3 Ease of Use 3
OC 0.05 Compatibility 3 Compatibility 5 Compatibility 7
Pot Adop 0.98 Baseline QoCC 0.3 Baseline QoCC 0.5 Baseline QoCC 0.7
Adop 0.02 Baseline Continuity 0.1 Baseline Continuity 0.25 Baseline Continuity 0.5
Positive Organizational 
Context
Operating Capability 
& Adopters
Baseline Organizational 
ContextPoor Organizational Context
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five discrete percentages were specified for each of the variables: 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 
1.  Since there are four variables with five discrete numbers, there are 625 possible 
combinations.  With the additional constraint that all must sum to one, the sampling space 
has 35 unique combinations. 
Table 13 presents each of the combinations that will be used for each of the 
twelve context simulation packages.  Since integration is the focus of this research, the 
analysis will focus solely on how integration behaves over time.  The model will be 
adjusted according to the context under study and the various simulations runs will result 
in 35 traces on the same graph (using a comparative graph).  The purpose for the 
simulation comparative graph is to look for behavioral pattern differences, as well as 
magnitudes of difference.  Since 35 traces are too numerous to label on one graph, a table 
will be created that will track behavior at various discrete points throughout the 
simulation period (making it easier to analyze integration level at each time interval).  
After completing the simulation runs, the data will be tabulated, pattern development will 
be observed, the best performing combination of management interventions for short-
term, long-term, and overall performance will be specified, and the findings discussed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 194
Table 13: Sampling Combinations for Each Organizational Context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward System 
Management
1 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0.25 0.75
3 0 0 0.5 0.5
4 0 0 0.75 0.25
5 0 0 1 0
6 0 0.25 0 0.75
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25
9 0 0.25 0.75 0
10 0 0.5 0 0.5
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25
12 0 0.5 0.5 0
13 0 0.75 0 0.25
14 0 0.75 0.25 0
15 0 1 0 0
16 0.25 0 0 0.75
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25
19 0.25 0 0.75 0
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0
25 0.25 0.75 0 0
26 0.5 0 0 0.5
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25
28 0.5 0 0.5 0
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0
31 0.5 0.5 0 0
32 0.75 0 0 0.25
33 0.75 0 0.25 0
34 0.75 0.25 0 0
35 1 0 0 0
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 Context 1 Analysis. 
Figure 64 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 1 (the high operating capability, high adopter, and poor organizational context 
scenario).  Based on the poor organizational context, Integration behaves as expected.  
Integration rises relatively early since there are high initial values for operating capability 
and adopters, but Integration eventually peaks and rapidly declines after the discontinued 
use inertia compensating loops begin to dominate.  It is interesting to note that there seem 
to be two sets of behavioral patterns, with each set’s peak separated by approximately 
one year.  The first set peaks at about the 1.8 to 2.6 year point and the second set peaks at 
the 3.2 to 4.5 year point.  The first set has better performance in the short term, but falls 
off before the second set.  The second set has a more gradual build toward its peak, but 
rises higher and has better performance in the long-term.  Each simulation run has 
approximately the same level of performance after ten years.  The values for the peak 
value and the time each simulation reaches its peak value (information gleaned from the 
comparative simulation table) were tabulated and trends in this data were observed that 
would help decipher system performance under these difficult conditions. 
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Figure 64: Context 1 (High Operating Capability, High Adopters, and Poor 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
 
Table 14 presents the results of the simulation runs for context 1, with simulations 
sorted by time to peak in ascending order (sorted by last column in the table).  The data 
sets previously mentioned (separation by time to peak) were highlighted with two 
different shades.  The first set ends at the time to peak point of 2.6 years and the second 
set begins at the time to peak point of 3.2 years.   
The trend in the Table 14 data involves reward system management.  The time to 
peak gets longer as the percentage of available time the manager invests in reward system 
management decreases.  In terms of time to peak, there does not seem to be any other 
pattern in the data for the other three management interventions. 
Table 15 presents the results of the simulation runs for context 1, with simulations 
sorted by peak in ascending order (second to last column).  The main noticeable trend 
involves continuity management.  For the most part, the peak level for Integration 
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increases as the percentage of available time the manager invests in continuity 
management decreases. 
 
Table 14: Context 1 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Time at Peak in Ascending 
Order) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management Peak
Time at 
Peak
1 0 0 0 1 1.96 1.8
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 2.06 1.9
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 2.1 2
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 1.78 2
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 2.03 2
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 1.83 2.1
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 2.18 2.1
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 1.57 2.2
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 1.85 2.2
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 2.11 2.2
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 2.7 2.3
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 2.32 2.3
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 1.81 2.4
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 2.33 2.4
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 1.56 2.5
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.99 2.5
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 1.95 2.5
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 2.19 2.5
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 1.32 2.6
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 1.66 2.6
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 2.8 3.2
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 2.63 3.3
35 1 0 0 0 2.4 3.3
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 2.73 3.4
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 2.4 3.5
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 2.23 3.5
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 2.35 3.6
5 0 0 1 0 1.85 3.8
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 1.96 3.8
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 1.98 3.8
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 1.62 3.9
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 1.39 4
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 1.16 4.2
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 1.57 4.2
15 0 1 0 0 0.93 4.5
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Table 15: Context 1 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Peak in Ascending Order) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management Peak
Time at 
Peak
15 0 1 0 0 0.93 4.5
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 1.16 4.2
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 1.32 2.6
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 1.39 4
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 1.56 2.5
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 1.57 2.2
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 1.57 4.2
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 1.62 3.9
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 1.66 2.6
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 1.78 2
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 1.81 2.4
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 1.83 2.1
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 1.85 2.2
5 0 0 1 0 1.85 3.8
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 1.95 2.5
1 0 0 0 1 1.96 1.8
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 1.96 3.8
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 1.98 3.8
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.99 2.5
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 2.03 2
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 2.06 1.9
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 2.1 2
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 2.11 2.2
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 2.18 2.1
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 2.19 2.5
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 2.23 3.5
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 2.32 2.3
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 2.33 2.4
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 2.35 3.6
35 1 0 0 0 2.4 3.3
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 2.4 3.5
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 2.63 3.3
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 2.7 2.3
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 2.73 3.4
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 2.8 3.2
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Two of the simulation runs were chosen that represent the best short-term or long-
term performance (highlighted in Table 15).  Simulation 4 has the best short-term results 
(based on peak value and its place in the lower time to peak set) and simulation 28 has 
the best long-term results (based on the highest peak overall and its place in the longer to 
peak set).  The premier management interventions do not include any focus on continuity 
management and both are focused on only two factors each.  For positive short-term 
results (at the expense of higher peak performance later) the system manager should 
focus on learning management and reward system management (with three quarters of 
the emphasis on learning management and the other quarter on reward system 
management).  For better long-term performance (at the expense of earlier peak gains) 
the system manager should focus half of his effort on change process management and 
the other half on learning management. 
Organizational context 1 is fairly unrealistic in the real world, in the sense that 
there would be high adopters and high operating capability initially, but a poor 
organizational context.  However, it does illustrate some interesting findings.  Focusing a 
large portion of time on learning management under these conditions will produce better 
performance.  For better long-term performance, the manager should also focus effort on 
change process management.  For better short-term performance, the manager should 
also focus on reward system management. 
 Context 2 Analysis. 
Figure 65 presents the comparative graph for the simulation runs under context 2 
(the high operating capability, low adopter, and poor organizational context scenario).  
Based on the poor organizational context, Integration behaves as expected.  Integration 
 
 
 200
generally does not rise as early as in context 1 (shown in Figure 64), but does peak at 
higher values for a few of the simulations.  Since Integration takes longer to build up, the 
decline is not as dramatic and some of the traces do not show a decline at all.  The 
context 2 simulations in Figure 65 do not have any groupings as in context 1 (shown in 
Figure 64).  The traces are fairly well dispersed throughout the simulation area.  A few 
rise above the others, but then drop off more precipitously.  For analysis under this 
context, data was gathered for each simulation at the 5, 7.5, and 10-year points. 
Information was included on the peak and time at peak for the three simulations that 
peaked at the highest level at various points in time.  From this data, the best short-term, 
mid-term, and long-term implications for management interventions will be studied under 
these conditions.  
Table 16 presents the information for the context 2 simulations sorted in 
ascending order based on the level at year 5.  The simulations that had an Integration 
level above 1.00 at the 5-year point were highlighted, which shall be called the good 
short-term performers.  The only pattern that can be identified in this sorted data is the 
fact that none of the good short-term performers has any continuity management focus.  
Only one of the peak performers, simulation 33 (peak performers are those with any 
numbers in the peak and time to peak columns), could be considered to have good short-
term performance.   
Table 17 presents the information for the context 2 simulations sorted in 
ascending order based on the level at year 7.5.  The simulations that had an Integration 
level above 1.00 at the 7.5-year point were highlighted, which shall be called the good 
mid-term performers.  There are more simulations with good mid-term performance than 
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short-term performance and all of the peak performers, simulations 19, 28, and 33, are 
included in this group.  Again, in each of the good mid-term performers, there are low 
values for continuity, but they are not devoid of a focus on continuity as a whole.   
Table 18 presents the information for the context 2 simulations sorted in 
ascending order based on the level at year 10.  The simulations that had an Integration 
level above 1.00 at the 10-year point were highlighted, which shall be called the good 
long-term performers.  There are only two simulations with good long-term performance, 
simulations 22 and 24, and none of the peak performers are in this group.  There is no 
focus on reward system management in the good long-term performers.  The focus is 
fairly evenly distributed to the other interventions.  It is interesting to note the high level 
of continuity management focus associated with the best long-term performance 
simulation, simulation 24. 
 
12:59 PM   Wed, Jan 01, 2003
0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00
Time
1:
1:
1:
0.00
3.00
6.00
1-35: Integration
High Low Poor (High, Low, Poor)  
Figure 65: Context 2 (High Operating Capability, Low Adopters, and Poor 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
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Table 16: Context 2 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Level at 5 Years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management Peak
Time at 
Peak
Level at 5 
years
Level at 
7.5 years
Level at 
10 years
5 0 0 1 0 0.02 0.02 0.03
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.02 0.02 0.03
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.02 0.02 0.03
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 0.02 0.03 0.04
15 0 1 0 0 0.02 0.02 0.04
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.02 0.08 0.71
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.03 0.33 1.72
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.04 1.53 1.11
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.05 1.53 0.91
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 2.98 7.5 0.07 2.98 0.56
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 0.09 0.17 0.25
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.32 0.46
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.16 0.51 0.7
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.16 2.17 0.32
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 0.2 0.82 0.84
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.23 0.48 0.6
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 0.23 1.87 0.29
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 0.98 0.81
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.39 0.88 0.66
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 0.45 0.91 0.64
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.57 1.51 0.41
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 3 6.1 0.61 1.55 0.14
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 0.63 1.29 0.46
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.64 1.25 0.49
1 0 0 0 1 0.78 1.15 0.44
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 0.82 1.35 0.28
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 0.84 1.21 0.4
35 1 0 0 0 1.01 1.2 0.13
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 1.13 1.15 0.28
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 1.21 1.32 0.19
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 2.76 5.8 1.31 1.14 0.11
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 1.39 1.1 0.2
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 1.54 0.97 0.18
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1.91 0.81 0.12
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 2.01 0.84 0.12
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Table 17: Context 2 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Level at 7.5 Years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management Peak
Time at 
Peak
Level at 5 
years
Level at 
7.5 years
Level at 
10 years
5 0 0 1 0 0.02 0.02 0.03
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.02 0.02 0.03
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.02 0.02 0.03
15 0 1 0 0 0.02 0.02 0.04
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 0.02 0.03 0.04
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.02 0.08 0.71
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 0.09 0.17 0.25
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.32 0.46
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.03 0.33 1.72
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.23 0.48 0.6
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.16 0.51 0.7
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1.91 0.81 0.12
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 0.2 0.82 0.84
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 2.01 0.84 0.12
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.39 0.88 0.66
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 0.45 0.91 0.64
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 1.54 0.97 0.18
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 0.98 0.81
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 1.39 1.1 0.2
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 2.76 5.8 1.31 1.14 0.11
1 0 0 0 1 0.78 1.15 0.44
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 1.13 1.15 0.28
35 1 0 0 0 1.01 1.2 0.13
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 0.84 1.21 0.4
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.64 1.25 0.49
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 0.63 1.29 0.46
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 1.21 1.32 0.19
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 0.82 1.35 0.28
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.57 1.51 0.41
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.04 1.53 1.11
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.05 1.53 0.91
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 3 6.1 0.61 1.55 0.14
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 0.23 1.87 0.29
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.16 2.17 0.32
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 2.98 7.5 0.07 2.98 0.56
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Table 18: Context 2 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Level at 10 Years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management Peak
Time at 
Peak
Level at 5 
years
Level at 
7.5 years
Level at 
10 years
5 0 0 1 0 0.02 0.02 0.03
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.02 0.02 0.03
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.02 0.02 0.03
15 0 1 0 0 0.02 0.02 0.04
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 0.02 0.03 0.04
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 2.76 5.8 1.31 1.14 0.11
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1.91 0.81 0.12
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 2.01 0.84 0.12
35 1 0 0 0 1.01 1.2 0.13
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 3 6.1 0.61 1.55 0.14
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 1.54 0.97 0.18
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 1.21 1.32 0.19
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 1.39 1.1 0.2
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 0.09 0.17 0.25
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 1.13 1.15 0.28
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 0.82 1.35 0.28
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 0.23 1.87 0.29
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.16 2.17 0.32
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 0.84 1.21 0.4
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.57 1.51 0.41
1 0 0 0 1 0.78 1.15 0.44
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.32 0.46
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 0.63 1.29 0.46
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.64 1.25 0.49
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 2.98 7.5 0.07 2.98 0.56
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.23 0.48 0.6
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 0.45 0.91 0.64
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.39 0.88 0.66
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.16 0.51 0.7
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.02 0.08 0.71
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 0.98 0.81
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 0.2 0.82 0.84
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.05 1.53 0.91
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.04 1.53 1.11
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.03 0.33 1.72
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The main management intervention generalization that can be made from the 
simulations under context 2 is that continuity management is useful for a long-term focus, 
but not at all if a short-term focus reigns.  For the best short-term performance, the 
system manager should focus on change process management half of the available time 
and split his focus between learning management and reward system management the 
other half of the available time.  For the best mid-term performance, the manager should 
focus a quarter of his available time on change process management and the other three 
quarters on learning management.  This mix represents one of the peak performers as 
well.  For the best long-term performance, the manager should focus half of his available 
time on continuity management and the other half split between change process 
management and learning management. 
Context 3 Analysis. 
Figure 66 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 3 (the low operating capability, high adopter, and poor organizational context 
scenario).  Based on the poor organizational context, Integration behaves as expected.  
Integration rises relatively early since there is a high initial value for adopters, but 
Integration eventually peaks and rapidly declines after the discontinued use inertia 
compensating loops begin to dominate.  In this context, the model behaves very similarly 
with the simulations for context 1 (in terms of two sets of time to peak data).  However, 
in Figure 3, the first set peaks at about the 2.6 to 3.5 year point and the second set peaks 
at the 4.1 to 4.6 year point.  The peaks are also appreciably smaller than those for context 
1 (Figure 64), since there is a low value for operating capability initially.  The first set has 
better performance in the short term, but falls off before the second set.  The second set 
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has a more gradual build toward its peak, but rises higher and has better performance in 
the long term.  Each simulation run has approximately the same level of performance 
after ten years.  The values for the peak and the time each simulation reaches its peak 
value (information gleaned from the comparative simulation table) were tabulated and 
trends in this data observed that would help decipher system performance under these 
difficult conditions. 
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Figure 66: Context 3 (Low Operating Capability, High Adopters, and Poor 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
 
Table 19 presents the results of the simulation runs for context 3, with simulations 
sorted by time to peak in ascending order (sorted by last column in the table).  The data 
sets previously mentioned (separation by time to peak) were highlighted with two 
different shades.  The first set ends at the time to peak point of 3.5 years and the second 
set begins at the time to peak point of 4.1 years. 
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The main noticeable trend in the data involves reward system management, just as 
context 1.  The time to peak gets longer as the percentage of available time the manager 
invests in reward system management decreases.  For time to peak sorting, there does not 
seem to be any other pattern in the data for the other three management interventions. 
Table 20 presents the results of the simulation runs for context 3, with simulations 
sorted by peak in ascending order (second to last column).  Again, the main noticeable 
trend involves continuity management.  For the most part, the peak level for Integration 
increases as the percentage of available time the manager invests in continuity 
management decreases. 
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Table 19: Context 3 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Time to Peak) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management Peak
Time at 
Peak
1 0 0 0 1 1.47 2.6
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 1.38 2.8
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 1.51 2.8
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 1.48 2.9
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 1.38 3
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 1.41 3
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 1.55 3
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 1.28 3.1
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 1.54 3.1
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 1.5 3.2
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 1.14 3.3
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 1.28 3.3
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 1.57 3.3
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 1.43 3.4
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.44 3.4
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 1.61 3.4
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 1.28 3.5
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 1.42 3.5
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1.56 3.5
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 1.61 3.5
5 0 0 1 0 1.58 4.1
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 1.25 4.2
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 1.42 4.2
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 1.81 4.2
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 1.91 4.2
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 1.6 4.3
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 1.9 4.3
15 0 1 0 0 0.92 4.4
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 1.09 4.4
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 1.38 4.4
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 1.66 4.4
35 1 0 0 0 1.81 4.4
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 1.41 4.5
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 1.63 4.5
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 1.17 4.6
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Table 20: Context 3 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Peak) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management Peak
Time at 
Peak
15 0 1 0 0 0.92 4.4
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 1.09 4.4
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 1.14 3.3
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 1.17 4.6
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 1.25 4.2
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 1.28 3.1
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 1.28 3.3
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 1.28 3.5
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 1.38 2.8
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 1.38 3
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 1.38 4.4
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 1.41 3
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 1.41 4.5
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 1.42 4.2
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 1.42 3.5
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 1.43 3.4
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.44 3.4
1 0 0 0 1 1.47 2.6
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 1.48 2.9
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 1.5 3.2
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 1.51 2.8
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 1.54 3.1
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 1.55 3
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1.56 3.5
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 1.57 3.3
5 0 0 1 0 1.58 4.1
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 1.6 4.3
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 1.61 3.4
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 1.61 3.5
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 1.63 4.5
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 1.66 4.4
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 1.81 4.2
35 1 0 0 0 1.81 4.4
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 1.9 4.3
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 1.91 4.2
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Two of the simulation runs were chosen that represent the best short-term or long-
term performance (highlighted in Table 20).  Simulation 18 has the best short-term results 
(based on peak value and its position in the lower time to peak set) and simulation 28 has 
the best long-term results (based on the highest peak overall and its position in the longer 
to peak set).  The premier management interventions do not include any focus on 
continuity management.  For the best short-term results (at the expense of higher peak 
performance later) the system manager should focus on learning management, change 
process management, and reward system management.  The manager should focus half of 
his available time on learning management and split the other half between change 
process management and reward system management.  For better long-term performance 
(at the expense of earlier peak gains) the system manager should focus half of his effort 
on change process management and the other half on learning management (the same 
best long-term mix as for context 1). 
Context 4 Analysis. 
Figure 67 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 4 (the low operating capability, low adopter, and poor organizational context 
scenario).  Based on the poor organizational context, Integration behaves as expected.  
Based on the low initial values for operating capability and adopters, Integration takes 
quite awhile to accumulate.  Integration is depressed in the system until approximately 
year six, where some of the traces begin growing.  Most of the peaks are in the eight to 
ten-year timeframe, so there is not much time between the short and long time horizons.  
Since Integration takes longer to build up, the decline is not as dramatic and some of the 
traces do not show a decline at all.  Like the simulations for context 2, the traces are fairly 
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well dispersed throughout the simulation area, with a few rising above the others, but 
then dropping off more precipitously.  For analysis under this context, data was gathered 
for each simulation at the 7 and 10-year points.  Information on the peak and time at peak 
was included for the three simulations that peaked at the highest level at various points in 
time.  From this data, the best short-term and long-term implications for management 
interventions will be specified under these conditions. 
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Figure 67: Context 4 (Low Operating Capability, Low Adopters, and Poor 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
 
Table 21 presents the information for the context 4 simulations sorted in 
ascending order based on the level at year 7.  The simulations that had an Integration 
level above 1.00 at the 5-year point were highlighted, which shall be called the good 
short-term performers.  There are only two simulations with good short-term 
performance, simulations 27 and 32.  The only pattern that can be identified in this sorted 
data is the fact that none of the good short-term performers has any management focus on 
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continuity management.  Only one of the peak performers, simulation 27, could be 
considered to have good short-term performance. 
Table 22 presents the information for the context 4 simulations sorted in 
ascending order based on the level at year 10.  The simulations that had an Integration 
level above 1.00 at the 10-year point were highlighted, which shall be called the good 
long-term performers.  There are quite a few good long-term performers and two of the 
three peak performers are good long-term performers.  The manager’s focus is fairly 
evenly distributed for all of the management interventions in the good long-term 
performer simulations.  The manager only focuses on learning management and change 
process management in the best long-term simulation, simulation 19. 
For the best short-term performance, the system manager should focus on change 
process management three quarters of his available time and focus one quarter of his time 
on reward system management.  For the best long-term performance, the system manager 
should focus on learning management three quarters of his available time and focus one 
quarter of his time on change process management.  For the best mix of short and long-
term performance, the manager should focus half of his available time on change process 
management and split his or her remaining time between learning management and 
reward system management (this is reflective of peak performer simulation 27).  
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Table 21: Context 4 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Level at Year 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management Peak
Time at 
Peak
Level at 
7 years
Level at 
10 years
5 0 0 1 0 0.02 0.03
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.02 0.03
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.02 0.03
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 0.02 0.03
15 0 1 0 0 0.02 0.03
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.03 0.09
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.03 0.28
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.03 1.04
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.04 1.3
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 0.04 2.61
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 0.07 1.13
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.08 2.2
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 0.09 0.16
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.11 0.28
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 0.11 1.85
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.13 0.4
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 0.14 0.6
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 2.86 8.8 0.16 1.69
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.18 0.4
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 0.18 0.8
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.28 0.7
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 0.32 0.75
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.32 1.4
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.39 1.05
35 1 0 0 0 0.39 1.17
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 0.4 1.16
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 2.65 8.4 0.41 1.18
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 0.44 1.36
1 0 0 0 1 0.52 1.02
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 0.53 1.07
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 0.55 1.44
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.77 1.17
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.93 1.02
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 2.02 8.2 1.08 0.95
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1.14 0.86
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Table 22: Context 4 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Level at Year 10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management Peak
Time at 
Peak
Level at 
7 years
Level at 
10 years
5 0 0 1 0 0.02 0.03
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.02 0.03
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.02 0.03
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 0.02 0.03
15 0 1 0 0 0.02 0.03
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.03 0.09
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 0.09 0.16
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.11 0.28
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.03 0.28
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.13 0.4
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.18 0.4
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 0.14 0.6
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.28 0.7
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 0.32 0.75
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 0.18 0.8
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1.14 0.86
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 2.02 8.2 1.08 0.95
1 0 0 0 1 0.52 1.02
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.93 1.02
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.03 1.04
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.39 1.05
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 0.53 1.07
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 0.07 1.13
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 0.4 1.16
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.77 1.17
35 1 0 0 0 0.39 1.17
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 2.65 8.4 0.41 1.18
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.04 1.3
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 0.44 1.36
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.32 1.4
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 0.55 1.44
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 2.86 8.8 0.16 1.69
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 0.11 1.85
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.08 2.2
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 0.04 2.61
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Context 5 Analysis. 
The focus is now turned from the poor organizational context scenarios to the 
baseline scenarios.  The baseline scenarios provide the system with the context to behave 
according to the desired behavior pattern in the reference modes diagrams.  Discontinued 
use inertia does not build up in the system, so none of the discontinued use inertia 
compensating loops will dominate and force integration to decline after some initial 
gains.  The focus for the manager now is going to be how to intervene in the system to 
maximize performance.  The system context will allow positive performance behavior, 
but the system manager can have a large impact on the magnitude of that positive 
performance and how quickly it occurs.  These scenarios are more realistic in the real 
world and should provide some useful insights into how best to manage a typical 
squadron system. 
Figure 68 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 5 (the high operating capability, high adopter, and baseline organizational context 
scenario).  Based on the baseline organizational context, Integration behaves in line with 
the desired system behavior.  Based on the high initial values for operating capability and 
adopters, Integration increases rapidly and eventually levels-off.  In this type of context, 
the system will tend to shepherd itself, but the manager can still have a significant impact 
on performance.  From immediate inspection of Figure 68, there appears to be two sets of 
traces; one set increases and levels-off earlier and a second set increases at a later time.  
For comparative purposes, each simulation trace will be compared at the 1.5, 5, and 10-
year points and any patterns and conclusions that result will be discussed.      
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Figure 68: Context 5 (High Operating Capability, High Adopters, and Baseline 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
 
Table 23 presents the information for the context 5 simulations sorted in 
ascending order based on the level at year 1.5.  From this sorted information, one can 
discern between the better short-term performers and the not as effective short-term 
performers.  The not as effective short-term performers are highlighted in Table 23 in the 
lighter shade and the better short-term performers are highlighted in Table 23 with the 
darker shade (at the bottom).  Reward system management was a required element for the 
simulation to fall into the better short-term performers set.  If the manager did not focus 
on reward system management, the associated simulation would take longer to develop a 
high level of Integration.  There are a number of intersections in Figure 68 where 
simulations may be poor short-term performers, but much better long-term performers. 
Since there are a number of these intersections in the data throughout the 
simulation period, making it difficult to ascertain which management intervention 
cocktail is the most effective overall, a method was devised to find a composite score for 
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each simulation based on ranked performance at the 1.5, 5, and 10 year points (which 
would respectively represent short, mid, and long-term performance).  This ranking 
method was accomplished by first gathering all of the data shown in Table 23.  Each 
simulation (1 – 35) was then ranked based on its position in the sorted tables for each 
point in time.  In each case, the simulation with the highest Integration level at that point 
in time would receive a ranking of 1.  Likewise, the simulation with the lowest 
Integration level at that point in time would receive a ranking of 35.  Each simulation was 
ranked at each of the year points previously mentioned and the compiled the information 
was compiled into a table.  The composite score is the sum of the rankings, so a lower 
score would represent better overall performance. 
Table 24 presents the composite score table sorted by composite score throughout 
simulation period in ascending order for context 5.  The simulations with a composite 
score of 30 or lower (meaning, as a whole, these simulations ranked in the top 10 for each 
point in time) were highlighted.  Based on the goals of the organization or manager being 
good overall performance in all of the periods of time, simulation 3 is recommended as 
the best overall performer.  In this case, the manager should focus half of his or her 
available time on learning management and the other half on reward system management.  
For mediocre short-term performance, but very good mid-term and long-term 
performance, the simulation 4 is recommended.  In this case, the manager would devote 
three-quarters of his or her available time to learning management and the other quarter 
to reward system management.  For excellent short-term performance and fairly good 
mid and long-term performance, simulation 2 is recommended.  In this case, the manager 
would devote a quarter of his or her available time to learning management and three-
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quarters to reward system management.  In any case, the goals of the organization and 
manager would dictate which of the simulations would offer the best management 
intervention cocktail to achieve those goals.  In common with the three best management 
cocktails is the lack of focus on change process management or continuity management 
in this positive context with high initial values for operating capability and adopters. 
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Table 23: Context 5 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Level at Year 1.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Level at 
1.5 years
Level at 5 
years
Level at 
10 years
15 0 1 0 0 0.08 1.41 1.7
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 0.09 1.79 2.03
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.1 2.12 2.37
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.11 2.45 2.69
5 0 0 1 0 0.12 2.76 3.02
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.12 3.08 3.31
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.15 3.55 3.77
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.16 3.25 3.4
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.18 3.98 4.22
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 0.22 4.4 4.67
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.22 3.67 3.85
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 0.22 3.34 3.48
35 1 0 0 0 0.28 3.43 3.56
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.29 4.08 4.3
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 0.31 3.76 3.93
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 0.91 2.82 3.39
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 1.13 3.4 3.85
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 1.26 3.34 3.51
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 1.38 3.92 4.3
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 1.58 3.35 3.57
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 1.63 3.44 3.59
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.65 3.76 3.95
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 1.66 4.4 4.74
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 1.95 3.8 4.01
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1.98 3.53 3.66
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 2.03 3.51 3.66
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 2.09 4.16 4.38
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 2.12 3.56 3.71
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 2.15 3.85 4.02
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 2.36 4.22 4.44
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 2.45 3.6 3.74
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 2.55 3.91 4.09
1 0 0 0 1 2.58 3.7 3.83
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 2.58 3.66 3.79
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 2.59 3.96 4.14
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Table 24: Context 5 Composite Score Table (Sorted by Composite Score 
Throughout Simulation Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Rank 
at 1.5 
Years
Rank 
at 5 
Years
Rank 
at 10 
Years
Composite 
Score 
Throughout 
Simulation 
Period
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 6 3 3 12
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 13 1 1 15
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 1 7 8 16
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 9 4 4 17
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 4 9 9 22
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 7 10 10 27
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 26 2 2 30
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 17 8 6 31
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 22 5 5 32
1 0 0 0 1 3 14 16 33
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 12 11 11 34
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 2 16 17 35
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 14 12 12 38
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 27 6 7 40
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 5 17 19 41
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 8 18 20 46
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 21 13 13 47
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 11 20 21 52
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 10 21 22 53
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 25 15 14 54
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 19 24 15 58
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 15 22 23 60
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 16 25 24 65
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 29 19 18 66
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 18 26 26 70
35 1 0 0 0 23 23 25 71
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 24 27 27 78
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 20 30 29 79
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 28 28 28 84
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 30 29 30 89
5 0 0 1 0 31 31 31 93
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 32 32 32 96
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 33 33 33 99
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 34 34 34 102
15 0 1 0 0 35 35 35 105
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Context 6 Analysis. 
Figure 69 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 6 (the high operating capability, low adopter, and baseline organizational context 
scenario).  Based on the baseline organizational context, Integration behaves in line with 
the desired system behavior.  Based on the high initial values for operating capability, 
Integration increases fairly rapidly and eventually levels-off.  Figure 69 does not appear 
to have any kind of groupings and the simulations are spread fairly uniformly through the 
middle portion of the graph.  There are a number of intersections of simulation data, so 
similar analysis will be performed for context 6 as for context 5.  For comparative 
purposes, each simulation trace will be compared at the 3.7, 6.2, and 10-year points and 
any patterns and conclusions that result will be discussed. 
 
3:20 PM   Thu, Jan 02, 2003
0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00
Time
1:
1:
1:
0.00
3.00
6.00
1-35: Integration
High Low Baseline (High Low Ba…  
Figure 69: Context 6 (High Operating Capability, Low Adopters, and Baseline 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
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Table 25 presents the composite score table sorted by composite score throughout 
simulation period in ascending order for context 6.  The simulations with a composite 
score of 30 or lower (meaning, as a whole, these simulations ranked in the top 10 for each 
point in time) were highlighted.  Based on the goals of the organization or manager being 
good overall performance in all of the periods of time, simulation 18 is recommended as 
the best overall performer.  In this case, the manager should focus a quarter of his 
available time on change process management, a half on learning management, and a 
quarter on reward system management.  Simulations 17 and 27 also have balanced 
performance and these also focus on the same three management interventions to varying 
degrees.  For very mediocre short-term performance, but very good mid-term and long-
term performance, simulation 19 is recommended.  In this case, the manager would 
devote a quarter of his available time to change process management and three-quarters 
to learning management.  In any case, the goals of the organization and manager would 
dictate which of the simulations would offer the best management intervention cocktail to 
achieve those goals.  In common with all of the better management cocktails is the lack 
of focus on continuity management in this positive context with a high initial value for 
operating capability and a low initial level of adopters. 
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Table 25: Context 6 Composite Score Table (Sorted by Composite Score 
Throughout Simulation Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Rank at 
3.7 Years
Rank at 
6.2 Years
Rank at 
10 Years
Composite 
Score 
Throughout 
Simulation 
Period
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 5 3 4 12
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 3 7 9 19
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 1 8 10 19
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 15 2 3 20
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 8 5 8 21
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 14 4 5 23
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 24 1 2 27
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 10 9 12 31
1 0 0 0 1 9 11 15 35
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 6 13 16 35
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 13 10 13 36
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 4 15 17 36
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 22 16 1 39
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 2 17 20 39
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 28 6 7 41
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 18 14 11 43
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 20 12 14 46
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 11 18 21 50
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 7 20 23 50
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 16 19 19 54
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 23 27 6 56
35 1 0 0 0 12 21 24 57
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 17 22 26 65
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 19 23 27 69
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 21 26 25 72
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 29 25 18 72
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 26 28 22 76
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 25 24 28 77
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 27 30 30 87
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 30 29 29 88
15 0 1 0 0 31 31 32 94
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 32 32 31 95
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 33 33 33 99
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 34 34 34 102
5 0 0 1 0 35 35 35 105
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Context 7 Analysis. 
Figure 70 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 7 (the low operating capability, high adopter, and baseline organizational context 
scenario).  Based on the baseline organizational context, Integration behaves in line with 
the desired system behavior.  Based on the high initial values for operating capability, 
Integration increases fairly rapidly and eventually levels-off.  The context 7 simulations 
are similar to the context 5 simulations in that there appear to be short-term groupings.  
There are a number of intersections of simulation data, so a similar analysis for context 7, 
as for contexts 5 and 6, will be performed.  For comparative purposes, each simulation 
trace will be compared at the 3, 6, and 10-year points and any patterns and conclusions 
that result will be discussed. 
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Figure 70: Context 7 (Low Operating Capability, High Adopters, and Baseline 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
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Table 26 presents the information for the context 7 simulations sorted in 
ascending order based on the level at year 3.  From this sorted information, one is able to 
discern between the better short-term performers and the not as effective short-term 
performers.  The not as effective short-term performers are highlighted in Table 26 in the 
lighter shade and the better short-term performers are highlighted in Table 26 with the 
darker shade (at the bottom).  Reward system management was a required element for all 
of the simulations falling into the better short-term performers set.  For the most part, if 
the manager did not focus on reward system management, the associated simulation 
would take longer to develop a high level of Integration.  There are a number of 
intersections in Figure 70 where simulations may be poor short-term performers, but 
much better long-term performers. 
Table 27 presents the composite score table sorted by composite score throughout 
simulation period in ascending order for context 7.  The simulations with a composite 
score of 30 or lower (meaning, as a whole, these simulations ranked in the top 10 for each 
point in time) were highlighted.  Based on the goals of the organization or manager being 
good overall performance in all of the periods of time, simulation 3 is recommended as 
the best overall performer.  In this case, the manager should focus a half of his available 
time on learning management and the other half on reward system management.  
Simulations 18, 2, and 17 also have balanced performance and these also focus on 
learning and reward system management, but simulation 18 also focuses on change 
process management.  For mediocre short-term performance, but very good long-term 
performance, simulation 4 is recommended.  In this case, the manager would devote 
three-quarters of his available time to learning and a quarter to reward system 
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management.  In any case, the goals of the organization and manager would dictate which 
of the simulations would offer the best management intervention cocktail to achieve those 
goals.  In common with all of the better management cocktails is the lack of focus on 
continuity management in this positive context with a low initial value for operating 
capability and a high initial level of adopters. 
 
Table 26: Context 7 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Level at Year 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Level at 3 
years
Level at 6 
years
Level at 
10 years
15 0 1 0 0 0.49 1.53 1.69
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 0.61 1.8 2
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.64 2.8 3.26
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.71 2.07 2.3
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.81 3.31 3.69
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.81 3.18 3.35
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.82 2.34 2.61
5 0 0 1 0 0.93 2.6 2.91
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.99 3.76 4.12
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 1.02 3.3 3.44
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 1.07 3.57 3.78
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 1.19 4.17 4.55
35 1 0 0 0 1.25 3.38 3.51
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 1.33 3.94 4.2
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 1.35 2.42 3.23
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 1.35 3.66 3.86
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 1.56 2.89 3.73
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 1.64 3.19 3.45
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 1.77 3.03 3.51
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 1.78 3.37 4.18
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.92 3.61 3.87
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 1.93 3.37 3.53
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 2 3.84 4.61
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 2 3.52 3.93
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 2.07 3.38 3.65
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 2.07 3.41 3.6
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 2.21 4 4.28
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 2.23 3.46 3.61
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 2.25 3.95 4.34
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 2.28 3.74 3.95
1 0 0 0 1 2.32 3.58 3.78
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 2.33 3.8 4.06
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 2.37 3.57 3.74
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 2.37 3.79 4.01
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 2.37 3.53 3.68
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Table 27: Context 7 Composite Score Table (Sorted by Composite Score 
Throughout Simulation Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Rank at 3 
Years
Rank at 6 
Years
Rank at 
10 Years
Composite 
Score 
Throughout 
Simulation 
Period
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 7 3 3 13
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 9 2 4 15
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 4 6 8 18
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 2 7 9 18
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 13 5 1 19
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 6 9 10 25
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 24 1 2 27
1 0 0 0 1 5 12 14 31
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 22 4 5 31
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 3 13 16 32
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 15 19 35
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 15 11 12 38
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 12 16 11 39
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 27 8 7 42
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 20 10 13 43
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 16 22 6 44
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 8 17 21 46
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 11 19 20 50
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 10 18 22 50
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 25 14 15 54
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 14 21 23 58
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 19 28 17 64
35 1 0 0 0 23 20 24 67
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 17 27 25 69
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 18 25 26 69
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 31 23 18 72
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 26 24 27 77
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 21 31 30 82
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 30 26 28 84
5 0 0 1 0 28 30 31 89
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 33 29 29 91
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 29 32 32 93
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 32 33 33 98
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 34 34 34 102
15 0 1 0 0 35 35 35 105
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Context 8 Analysis. 
Context 8 is the baseline context for the model overall.  In most squadron settings, 
this would represent the general context that a manager would probably be working in, so 
analysis in this context is probably the most common and realistic of the twelve static 
scenarios. 
Figure 71 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 8 (the low operating capability, low adopter, and baseline organizational context 
scenario).  Based on the baseline organizational context, Integration behaves in line with 
the desired system behavior.  Based on the low initial values for operating capability and 
adopters, Integration increases slower in comparison to other contexts under the baseline 
conditions, but it still eventually increases and levels-off.  There are a number of 
intersections of simulation data, so similar analysis will be performed for context 8 as for 
the others under the baseline conditions.  For comparative purposes, each simulation trace 
will be compared at the 5.5, 8, and 10-year points and any patterns and conclusions that 
result will be discussed. 
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Figure 71: Context 8 (Low Operating Capability, Low Adopters, and Baseline 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
 
Table 28 presents the composite score table sorted by composite score throughout 
simulation period in ascending order for context 8.  The simulations with a composite 
score of 30 or lower (meaning, as a whole, these simulations ranked in the top 10 for each 
point in time) were highlighted.  Based on the goals of the organization or manager being 
good overall performance in all of the periods of time, simulation 18 is recommended as 
the best overall performer.  In this case, the manager should focus a quarter of his 
available time on change process management, a half on learning management, and a 
quarter on reward system management.  Simulations 17 and 27 also have balanced 
performance and these also focus on the same three management interventions to varying 
degrees.  For very mediocre short-term performance, but very good mid-term and long-
term performance, simulation 19 is recommended.  In this case, the manager would 
devote a quarter of his available time to change process management and three-quarters 
to learning management.  In any case, the goals of the organization and manager would 
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dictate which of the simulations would offer the best management intervention cocktail to 
achieve those goals.  In common with all of the better management cocktails is the lack 
of focus on continuity management in this positive context with low initial values for 
operating capability and adopters. 
 
Table 28: Context 8 Composite Score Table (Sorted by Composite Score 
Throughout Simulation Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Rank at 
5.5 Years
Rank at 8 
Years
Rank at 
10 Years
Composite 
Score 
Throughout 
Simulation 
Period
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 9 2 4 15
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 5 5 8 18
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 3 7 9 19
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 13 4 3 20
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 8 6 7 21
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 17 3 5 25
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 4 10 15 29
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 27 1 1 29
1 0 0 0 1 6 11 13 30
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 11 8 11 30
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 2 13 16 31
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1 14 18 33
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 15 9 12 36
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 7 16 21 44
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 21 24 2 47
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 16 21 10 47
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 12 15 20 47
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 22 12 14 48
35 1 0 0 0 10 17 22 49
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 14 20 17 51
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 28 19 6 53
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 18 18 24 60
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 19 23 25 67
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 20 25 27 72
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 23 27 23 73
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 29 26 19 74
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 26 22 26 74
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 24 28 29 81
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 25 29 30 84
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 30 30 28 88
15 0 1 0 0 31 31 31 93
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 32 32 32 96
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 33 33 33 99
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 34 34 34 102
5 0 0 1 0 35 35 35 105
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Context 9 Analysis. 
The focus now shifts from the baseline organizational context scenarios to the 
positive scenarios.  The positive scenarios provide the system with the context to behave 
according to the desired behavior pattern in the reference mode diagrams, but also allow 
the system to steadily increase performance after the s-shaped leveling-off has occurred.  
Again, discontinued use inertia does not build up in the system, so none of the 
discontinued use inertia compensating loops will dominate and force integration to 
decline after some initial gains.  Just like under the baseline conditions, the focus for the 
manager is going to be how to intervene in the system to maximize performance.  The 
system context will allow positive performance behavior, but the system manager can 
still have a large impact on the magnitude of that positive performance and how quickly 
it occurs.  These scenarios are fairly realistic in the real world and would coincide with an 
innovative organization.  The simulations in this scenario should provide some useful 
insights into how best to manage an innovative squadron system. 
Figure 72 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 9 (the high operating capability, high adopter, and positive organizational context 
scenario).  Of the positive organizational context scenarios, this is one of the more 
realistic under these conditions.  Based on the positive organizational context, Integration 
behaves in line with the desired system behavior.  Based on the high initial values for 
operating capability and adopters, Integration increases rapidly and keeps steadily rising 
based on the continued use inertia–integration reinforcing loop additions.  In this type of 
context, the system will tend to shepherd itself, but the manager can still have a 
significant impact on performance.  From immediate inspection of Figure 72, there 
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appear to be two sets of traces; one set increases earlier than a second set, which 
increases at a later time.  For comparative purposes, each simulation trace will be 
compared at the 2, 5, and 10-year points and any patterns and conclusions that result will 
be discussed. 
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Figure 72: Context 9 (High Operating Capability, High Adopters, and 
Positive Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
 
Table 29 presents the information for the context 9 simulations sorted in 
ascending order based on the level at year 2.  From this sorted information, one can 
discern between the better short-term performers and the not as effective short-term 
performers.  The not as effective short-term performers are highlighted in Table 29 in the 
lighter shade and the better short-term performers are highlighted in Table 29 with the 
darker shade (at the bottom).  Reward system management was a required element for the 
simulation to fall into the better short-term performers set.  If the manager did not focus 
on reward system management, the associated simulation would take longer to develop a 
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high level of Integration.  There are a number of intersections in Figure 72 where 
simulations may be poor short-term performers, but much better long-term performers. 
 
Table 29: Context 9 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Level at Year 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Level at 2 
years
Level at 5 
years
Level at 
10 years
15 0 1 0 0 0.19 1.91 3.32
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 0.23 2.24 3.56
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.26 2.54 3.76
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.29 2.82 3.94
5 0 0 1 0 0.32 3.09 4.09
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.43 3.69 5.06
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.63 4.1 5.37
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.73 3.8 5.01
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.85 4.48 5.64
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 1 3.85 4.9
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 1.08 4.18 5.28
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 1.14 4.85 5.89
35 1 0 0 0 1.21 3.88 4.76
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 1.41 4.21 5.15
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 1.46 4.54 5.53
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 1.73 3.75 5.21
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 2.15 4.2 5.5
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 2.59 4.6 5.76
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 2.62 4.1 5.24
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 2.62 4.05 5.21
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 3.05 4.96 6
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 3.08 4.09 5.09
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 3.1 4.44 5.49
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 3.16 4.2 5.17
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3.17 4.4 5.46
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 3.23 4.16 5.15
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 3.3 4.09 4.94
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 3.48 4.17 5
1 0 0 0 1 3.49 4.25 5.05
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 3.53 4.22 5.04
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 3.55 4.41 5.32
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 3.58 4.77 5.71
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 3.62 4.52 5.39
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 3.67 4.48 5.37
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 3.68 4.72 5.68
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Table 30 presents the composite score table sorted by composite score throughout 
the simulation period in ascending order for context 9.  The simulations with a composite 
score of 30 or lower (meaning, as a whole, these simulations ranked in the top 10 for each 
point in time) were highlighted.  Based on the goals of the organization or manager being 
good overall performance in all of the periods of time, simulation 18 is recommended as 
the best overall performer.  In this case, the manager should focus a quarter of his or her 
available time on change process management, half his or her time on learning 
management, and the last quarter on reward system management.  For mediocre short-
term performance, but very good mid-term and long-term performance, simulation 4 is 
recommended.  In this case, the manager would devote three-quarters of his available 
time to learning management and the other quarter to reward system management.  It is 
interesting to note that a focus on continuity management ranks in the group of better 
management intervention cocktails (simulation 8).  In this case, the short-term 
performance is mediocre, but the long-term performance is very good.  In any case, the 
goals of the organization and manager would dictate which of the simulations would 
offer the best management intervention cocktail to achieve those goals.  In this context, 
the manager has more flexibility in what he focuses on to get better system performance 
– there is a place for all of the management interventions if so desired.  
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Table 30: Context 9 Composite Score Table (Sorted by Composite Score 
Throughout Simulation Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Rank at 2 
Years
Rank at 5 
Years
Rank at 
10 Years
Composite 
Score 
Throughout 
Simulation 
Period
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 1 4 5 10
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 4 3 4 11
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 15 1 1 17
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 3 7 11 21
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 2 8 12 22
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 18 5 3 26
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 24 2 2 28
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 5 11 14 30
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 13 10 9 32
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 11 12 10 33
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 21 6 7 34
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 27 9 6 42
1 0 0 0 1 7 13 24 44
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 19 17 8 44
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 6 14 25 45
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 12 16 19 47
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 10 20 21 51
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 17 21 16 54
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 8 19 27 54
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 22 15 20 57
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 16 25 17 58
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 25 18 15 58
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 14 24 22 60
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 9 23 28 60
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 29 22 13 64
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 20 29 18 67
35 1 0 0 0 23 26 30 79
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 28 28 26 82
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 26 27 29 82
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 30 30 23 83
5 0 0 1 0 31 31 31 93
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 32 32 32 96
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 33 33 33 99
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 34 34 34 102
15 0 1 0 0 35 35 35 105
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Context 10 Analysis. 
Figure 73 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 10 (the high operating capability, low adopter, and positive organizational 
context scenario).  Based on the positive organizational context, Integration behaves in 
line with the desired system behavior.  Based on the high initial values for operating 
capability and adopters, Integration increases rapidly and keeps steadily rising based on 
the continued use inertia–integration reinforcing loop additions.  Figure 10 does not 
appear to have any kind of groupings and the simulations are spread fairly uniformly 
through the middle portion of the graph.  There are a number of intersections of 
simulation data, so similar analysis will be performed for context 10 as for the others in 
the baseline and positive contexts.  For comparative purposes, each simulation will be 
compared at the 3.5, 5.5, and 10-year points and any patterns and conclusions that result 
will be discussed. 
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Figure 73: Context 10 (High Operating Capability, Low Adopters, and Positive 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
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Table 31 presents the composite score table sorted by composite score throughout 
simulation period in ascending order for context 10.  The simulations with a composite 
score of 30 or lower (meaning, as a whole, these simulations ranked in the top 10 for each 
point in time) were highlighted.  Based on the goals of the organization or manager being 
good overall performance in all of the periods of time, simulation 18 is recommended  as 
the best overall performer.  In this case, the manager should focus a quarter of his 
available time on change process management, half his time on learning management, 
and the last quarter on reward system management.  For very mediocre short-term 
performance, but the best mid-term and long-term performance, simulation 19 is 
recommended.  In this case, the manager would devote three-quarters of his available 
time to learning management and the other quarter to change process management.  
Continuity dropped out of the group of better management intervention cocktails under 
this context, but was close to being included (simulation 21 missed the top group by one 
composite score point).  In any case, the goals of the organization and manager would 
dictate which of the simulations would offer the best management intervention cocktail to 
achieve those goals.  In this context, it would be more fruitful for the manager to focus on 
change process management, learning management, and reward system management -- a 
combination of these, which does not include continuity management. 
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Table 31: Context 10 Composite Score Table (Sorted by Composite Score 
Throughout Simulation Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Rank at 
3.5 Years
Rank at 
5.5 Years
Rank at 
10 Years
Composite 
Score 
Throughout 
Simulation 
Period
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 3 2 3 8
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 2 5 8 15
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 1 7 11 19
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 15 3 4 22
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 14 4 5 23
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 8 6 10 24
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 23 1 1 25
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 13 9 9 31
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 5 11 17 33
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 11 10 14 35
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 4 13 19 36
1 0 0 0 1 7 12 20 39
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 26 8 6 40
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 10 17 16 43
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 9 18 18 45
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 6 16 23 45
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 24 20 2 46
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 20 14 12 46
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 18 15 13 46
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 16 19 21 56
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 25 27 7 59
35 1 0 0 0 12 21 28 61
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 19 23 22 64
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 17 22 26 65
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 29 24 15 68
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 21 26 25 72
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 22 25 27 74
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 27 29 24 80
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 30 28 29 87
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 28 30 30 88
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 32 32 32 96
15 0 1 0 0 31 31 34 96
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 33 33 31 97
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 34 34 33 101
5 0 0 1 0 35 35 35 105
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Context 11 Analysis. 
Figure 74 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 11 (the low operating capability, high adopter, and positive organizational 
context scenario).  Based on the positive organizational context, Integration behaves in 
line with the desired system behavior.  Based on the high initial values for adopters, 
Integration increases rapidly and keeps steadily rising based on the continued use inertia–
integration reinforcing loop additions.  The context 11 simulations are similar to the 
context 9 simulations in that there appear to be short-term groupings.  There are a number 
of intersections of simulation data, so similar analysis will be performed for context 11 as 
for the other contexts under the baseline and positive conditions.  For comparative 
purposes, each simulation will be compared at the 2.5, 5, and 10-year points and any 
patterns and conclusions that result will be discussed. 
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Figure 74: Context 11 (Low Operating Capability, High Adopters, and Positive 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
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Table 32 presents the information for the context 11 simulations sorted in 
ascending order based on the level at year 2.5.  From this sorted information, one can 
discern between the better short-term performers and the not as effective short-term 
performers.  The not as effective short-term performers are highlighted in Table 32 in the 
lighter shade and the better short-term performers are highlighted in Table 32 with the 
darker shade (at the bottom).  Reward system management was a required element for the 
simulation to fall into the better short-term performers set.  If the manager did not focus 
on reward system management, the associated simulation would take longer to develop a 
high level of Integration.  There are a number of intersections in Figure 11 where 
simulations may be poor short-term performers, but much better long-term performers. 
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Table 32: Context 11 Tabulated Information (Sorted by Level at Year 2.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Level at 
2.5 years
Level at 5 
years
Level at 
10 years
15 0 1 0 0 0.35 1.85 3.24
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 0.41 2.09 3.44
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.43 3.09 4.78
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.45 2.32 3.62
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.49 2.54 3.77
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.51 3.51 5.07
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.52 3.49 4.77
5 0 0 1 0 0.53 2.76 3.92
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.58 3.9 5.35
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.62 3.83 5.04
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 0.62 3.6 4.7
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 0.65 4.26 5.6
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.73 4.14 5.29
35 1 0 0 0 0.73 3.65 4.61
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 0.76 3.91 4.95
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 1.11 2.84 4.81
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 1.24 3.19 5.12
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 1.31 3.58 4.89
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 1.39 3.54 5.39
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.49 3.92 5.14
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 1.53 3.74 4.83
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 1.55 3.89 5.65
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 1.58 3.43 4.91
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 1.69 4.23 5.38
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 1.75 3.79 5.17
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 1.76 4.04 5.06
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1.76 3.8 4.73
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 1.82 3.79 4.88
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 1.92 3.75 4.89
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 1.93 4.14 5.41
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 2.04 4.08 5.11
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 2.07 3.87 4.78
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 2.12 4.07 5.13
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 2.18 3.91 4.82
1 0 0 0 1 2.2 3.91 4.83
 
 
 242
Table 33 presents the composite score table sorted by composite score throughout 
simulation period in ascending order for context 11.  The simulations with a composite 
score of 30 or lower (meaning, as a whole, these simulations ranked in the top 10 for each 
point in time) were highlighted.  Based on the goals of the organization or manager being 
good overall performance in all of the periods of time, simulation 3 is recommended as 
the best overall performer.  In this case, the manager should focus half of his available 
time on learning management and the other half on reward system management.  For 
very mediocre short-term performance, but very good mid-term and long-term 
performance, simulation 19 is recommended.  In this case, the manager would devote 
three-quarters of his available time to learning management and the other quarter to 
change process management.  Continuity management is the only management 
intervention not in the mix for this context.  In any case, the goals of the organization and 
manager would dictate which of the simulations would offer the best management 
intervention cocktail to achieve those goals.  By focusing on learning management and 
reward system management alone, in this context, the manager has the best opportunity 
to maximize system performance.  
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Table 33: Context 11 Composite Score Table (Sorted by Composite Score 
Throughout Simulation Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Rank at 
2.5 Years
Rank at 5 
Years
Rank at 
10 Years
Composite 
Score 
Throughout 
Simulation 
Period
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 6 3 3 12
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 3 6 10 19
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 12 2 5 19
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 5 5 12 22
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 24 1 2 27
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 14 13 1 28
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 10 7 14 31
1 0 0 0 1 1 10 21 32
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 16 8 9 33
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 23 4 7 34
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 11 17 8 36
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 2 11 23 36
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 4 14 25 43
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 7 19 18 44
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 17 24 4 45
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 27 12 6 45
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 8 18 20 46
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 21 9 16 46
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 9 16 28 53
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 26 15 15 56
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 13 27 17 57
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 15 20 22 57
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 19 28 11 58
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 18 23 19 60
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 30 25 13 68
35 1 0 0 0 22 21 30 73
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 20 30 24 74
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 25 22 29 76
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 29 26 27 82
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 33 29 26 88
5 0 0 1 0 28 31 31 90
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 31 32 32 95
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 32 33 33 98
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 34 34 34 102
15 0 1 0 0 35 35 35 105
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Context 12 Analysis. 
Figure 75 presents the comparative graph for the set of simulation runs under 
context 12 (the low operating capability, low adopter, and positive organizational context 
scenario).  This contextual study is realistic in the sense that an organization may have a 
history of innovativeness, hence a positive context, but GeoBase is so new that the 
organization must go through the growth process in operating capability and adoption.  
Based on the positive organizational context, Integration behaves in line with the desired 
system behavior.  Based on the low initial values for operating capability and adopters, 
Integration begins to rise later than Integration for the other positive contexts.  After 
leveling-off, Integration keeps steadily rising due to the continued use inertia–integration 
reinforcing loop additions.  For comparative purposes, each simulation will be compared 
at the 5, 7.5, and 10-year points and any patterns and conclusions that result will be 
discussed. 
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Figure 75: Context 12 (Low Operating Capability, Low Adopters, and Positive 
Organizational Context) Comparative Graph 
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Table 34 presents the composite score table sorted by composite score throughout 
the simulation period in ascending order for context 12.  The simulations with a 
composite score of 30 or lower (meaning, as a whole, these simulations ranked in the top 
10 for each point in time) were highlighted.  Based on the goals of the organization or 
manager being good overall performance in all of the periods of time, simulation 18 is 
recommended as the best overall performer.  In this case, the manager should focus a 
quarter of his available time on change process management, half his time on learning 
management, and the last quarter on reward system management.  For very mediocre 
short-term performance, but the best mid-term and long-term performance, simulation 19 
is recommended.  In this case, the manager would devote three-quarters of his available 
time to learning management and the other quarter to change process management.  In 
any case, the goals of the organization and manager would dictate which of the 
simulations would offer the best management intervention cocktail to achieve those 
goals.  In this context, it would be more fruitful for the manager to focus on a 
combination of the three management interventions represented in the better overall 
performer group, which does not include continuity management. 
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Table 34: Context 12 Composite Score Table (Sorted by Composite Score 
Throughout Simulation Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
Trace
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Rank at 5 
Years
Rank at 
7.5 Years
Rank at 
10 Years
Composite 
Score 
Throughout 
Simulation 
Period
18 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 12 2 2 16
17 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 5 5 7 17
27 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 3 6 8 17
28 0.5 0 0.5 0 15 3 5 23
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 17 4 4 25
2 0 0 0.25 0.75 10 7 9 26
16 0.25 0 0 0.75 4 10 14 28
33 0.75 0 0.25 0 9 8 11 28
19 0.25 0 0.75 0 27 1 1 29
26 0.5 0 0 0.5 2 12 15 29
32 0.75 0 0 0.25 1 15 18 34
21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 16 9 10 35
1 0 0 0 1 7 13 17 37
22 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 28 11 6 45
29 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 8 17 20 45
30 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 19 14 12 45
20 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 11 16 19 46
35 1 0 0 0 6 18 23 47
4 0 0 0.75 0.25 23 26 3 52
7 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 18 21 13 52
6 0 0.25 0 0.75 14 19 21 54
34 0.75 0.25 0 0 13 20 24 57
23 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 20 22 25 67
8 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 24 28 16 68
31 0.5 0.5 0 0 22 23 26 71
10 0 0.5 0 0.5 21 25 27 73
24 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 29 24 22 75
11 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 25 29 29 83
25 0.25 0.75 0 0 30 27 28 85
13 0 0.75 0 0.25 26 30 30 86
14 0 0.75 0.25 0 31 31 32 94
12 0 0.5 0.5 0 33 32 31 96
15 0 1 0 0 32 33 34 99
9 0 0.25 0.75 0 34 34 33 101
5 0 0 1 0 35 35 35 105
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Summary of Contextual Analysis. 
Table 35 presents the best management intervention packages, based on a short-
term, long-term, and overall performance, for each of the twelve contexts discussed to 
this point.  For contexts 1 through 4 under the poor organizational context simulations, 
there is not an entry included for the best long-term performance based on the fact that all 
simulations end at approximately the same low point after ten years (due to the 
innovation not meeting organizational needs in the long-term).  In each case under the 
poor organizational context, the best overall performer was based on the simulation with 
the highest peak value.  The best short-term performer was selected from the simulations 
falling in the early peak set (if there was set separation as discussed in each applicable 
section) and having the highest peak.  For the simulations under the baseline and positive 
organizational contexts, the best short-term performer was selected based on the best 
performance measured at the short-term point.  The best long-term performer in these 
contexts was selected based on the best performance in the mid and long-term points.  
The best overall performer was selected from the simulations having the lowest 
composite score (explained in each applicable section).   
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Table 35: Best Management Intervention Packages for Each Context Based on 
Short-Term, Long-Term, and Overall Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** Context 
Parameters
Change 
Process 
Management
Continuity 
Management
Learning 
Management
Reward 
System 
Management
Context 1 H,H,Poor -- -- -- --
Short-term H,H,Poor 0 0 0.75 0.25
Long-term H,H,Poor -- -- -- --
Overall H,H,Poor 0.5 0 0.5 0
Context 2 H,L,Poor -- -- -- --
Short-term H,L,Poor 0.75 0 0.25 0
Long-term H,L,Poor -- -- -- --
Overall H,L,Poor 0.25 0 0.75 0
Context 3 L,H,Poor -- -- -- --
Short-term L,H,Poor 0.25 0 0.5 0.25
Long-term L,H,Poor -- -- -- --
Overall L,H,Poor 0.5 0 0.5 0
Context 4 L,L,Poor -- -- -- --
Short-term L,L,Poor 0.5 0 0.25 0.25
Long-term L,L,Poor -- -- -- --
Overall L,L,Poor 0.5 0 0.5 0
Context 5 H,H,Baseline -- -- -- --
Short-term H,H,Baseline 0 0 0.25 0.75
Long-term H,H,Baseline 0 0 0.75 0.25
Overall H,H,Baseline 0 0 0.5 0.5
Context 6 H,L,Baseline -- -- -- --
Short-term H,L,Baseline 0.5 0 0.25 0.25
Long-term H,L,Baseline 0.25 0 0.75 0
Overall H,L,Baseline 0.25 0 0.5 0.25
Context 7 L,H,Baseline -- -- -- --
Short-term L,H,Baseline 0.5 0 0 0.5
Long-term L,H,Baseline 0.25 0 0.75 0
Overall L,H,Baseline 0 0 0.5 0.5
* Context 8 L,L,Baseline -- -- -- --
Short-term L,L,Baseline 0.75 0 0 0.25
Long-term L,L,Baseline 0.25 0 0.75 0
Overall L,L,Baseline 0.25 0 0.5 0.25
* Context 9 H,H,Positive -- -- -- --
Short-term H,H,Positive 0.25 0 0.5 0.25
Long-term H,H,Positive 0 0 0.75 0.25
Overall H,H,Positive 0.25 0 0.5 0.25
Context 10 H,L,Positive -- -- -- --
Short-term H,L,Positive 0.5 0 0.25 0.25
Long-term H,L,Positive 0.25 0 0.75 0
Overall H,L,Positive 0.25 0 0.5 0.25
Context 11 L,H,Positive -- -- -- --
Short-term L,H,Positive 0 0 0 1
Long-term L,H,Positive 0.25 0 0.75 0
Overall L,H,Positive 0 0 0.5 0.5
* Context 12 L,L,Positive -- -- -- --
Short-term L,L,Positive 0.75 0 0 0.25
Long-term L,L,Positive 0.25 0 0.75 0
Overall L,L,Positive 0.25 0 0.5 0.25
* Most realistic contexts that may be encountered in real world organizations
** Initial operating capability (high or low), initial adopters (high or low), organizational context
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Comparison of Top Performers within Contexts. 
Table 35 contains information for each of the top performers for each of the 
contexts, but the most realistic contexts (for long-term sustainment) include: context 8 
(low initial operating capability, low initial adoption, baseline organizational context), 
context 9 (high initial operating capability, high initial adoption, positive organizational 
context), and context 12 (low initial operating capability, low initial adoption, positive 
organizational context).  Within these more realistic contexts, the top short-term 
performer, top long-term performer, and top overall performer will be compared on the 
same graphs.  
Figure 76 compares the top short-term performer (Trace 1), top long-term 
performer (Trace 2), and top overall performer (Trace 3) for context 8.  There are 
tradeoffs for each of these.  The top short-term performer rises more quickly, but does not 
have the same long-term impact as the others.  The top overall performer seems to have 
the best combination of short-term and long-term performance of the group. 
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Figure 76: Context 8 Top-Performer Comparison 
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Figure 77 compares the top short-term performer (which also happens to be the 
top over all performer) (Trace 1) and top long-term performer (Trace 2) for context 9.  
These traces do not vary significantly from one another – the manager is bound to be 
successful since the high initial values for operating capability and adoption drive the 
system for good early performance, regardless of the better short-term or long-term 
performance management cocktail combinations.  This is a highly desirable context to 
work in and may be present in a highly innovative organization with a good GIS history. 
7:43 AM   Sat, Feb 22, 2003
0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00
Time
1:
1:
1:
0.00
3.00
6.00
1: Integration 2: Integration
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
Context 9 Comp (Context 9)  
Figure 77: Context 9 Top-Performer Comparison 
 
Figure 78 compares the top short-term performer (Trace 1), top long-term 
performer (Trace 2), and top overall performer (Trace 3) for context 12.  There are 
tradeoffs for each of these.  The top short-term performer rises more quickly, but does not 
have the same long-term impact as the others.  The top overall performer seems to have 
the best combination of short-term and long-term performance of the group, especially 
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since there is an appreciable difference in short-term performance when compared to the 
top long-term performer, but no major long-term difference between the two. 
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Figure 78: Context 12 Top-Performer Comparison 
 
Comparison of Top Performers Across Contexts. 
To this point, only comparisons between top performers have been completed 
within each discrete context.  In this section, the top performers (short-term, long-term, 
and overall) will be compared across the three organizational contexts (poor, baseline, 
and positive) for 1) low initial operating capability and low initial adoption (low/low) and 
2) high initial operating capability and high initial adoption (high/high).  All of the top 
short-term performers will be compared across the three organizational contexts (poor, 
baseline, and positive) under low/low initial conditions and high/high initial conditions.  
The same will hold for the top long-term performers and top overall performers for the 
low/low and high/high initial conditions.  The low/low and high/high initial conditions 
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are the most realistic, so comparisons under low/high and high/low will not be included 
here.  Hence, there will be six comparative graphs in this section.  
Figure 79 compares all of the top short-term performers under low/low initial 
conditions for each of the organizational contexts.  Trace 1 shows the top short-term 
performer under the poor organizational context (context 4 top short-term performer).  
Trace 2 shows the top short-term performer under the baseline organizational context 
(context 8 top short-term performer).  Trace 3 shows the top short-term performer under 
the positive organizational context (context 12 top short-term performer).  As expected, 
the timelines for integration decrease and the long-term integration levels increase as the 
organizational context improves.  Trace 1 (poor organizational context) has the expected 
rise and fall behavior pattern since the IT innovation is not meeting the needs of the 
organization.     
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Figure 79: Top Short-Term Performer Comparison Across Contexts Under 
Low/Low Initial Conditions 
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Figure 80 compares all of the top long-term performers under low/low initial 
conditions for each of the organizational contexts.  Trace 1 shows the top long-term 
performer under the baseline organizational context (context 8 top long-term performer).  
Trace 2 shows the top long-term performer under the positive organizational context 
(context 12 top long-term performer).  Since there is not a top long-term performer under 
the poor organizational context (the fall-off will result in long-term failure), an associated 
trace is not included.  As expected, the timelines for integration decrease and the long-
term integration levels increase as the organizational context improves.   
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Figure 80: Top Long-Term Performer Comparison Across Contexts Under 
Low/Low Initial Conditions 
 
Figure 81 compares all of the top overall performers under low/low initial 
conditions for each of the organizational contexts.  Trace 1 shows the top overall 
performer under the poor organizational context (context 4 top overall performer).  Trace 
2 shows the top overall performer under the baseline organizational context (context 8 
top overall performer).  Trace 3 shows the top overall performer under the positive 
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organizational context (context 12 top overall performer).  As expected, the timelines for 
integration decrease and the long-term integration levels increase as the organizational 
context improves.  Trace 1 (poor organizational context) has the expected rise and fall 
behavior pattern since the IT innovation is not meeting the needs of the organization. 
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Figure 81: Top Overall Performer Comparison Across Contexts Under Low/Low 
Initial Conditions 
 
Figure 82 compares all of the top short-term performers under high/high initial 
conditions for each of the organizational contexts.  Trace 1 shows the top short-term 
performer under the poor organizational context (context 1 top short-term performer).  
Trace 2 shows the top short-term performer under the baseline organizational context 
(context 5 top short-term performer).  Trace 3 shows the top short-term performer under 
the positive organizational context (context 9 top short-term performer).  For the most 
part, the timelines for integration decrease and the long-term integration levels increase 
as the organizational context improves.  Trace 2 slightly outperforms Trace 3 for the first 
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portion of the simulation period – this is due to the different percentages for the 
management interventions.  The top short-term performer for context 5 
(baseline/high/high) was measured at the 1.5-year point, whereas the top short-term 
performer for context 9 (positive/high/high) was measured at the 2-year point.  At the 2-
year point in Figure 82, Trace 3 outperforms Trace 2, which makes sense.   
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Figure 82: Top Short-Term Performer Comparison Across Contexts Under 
High/High Initial Conditions 
 
Figure 83 compares all of the top long-term performers under high/high initial 
conditions for each of the organizational contexts.  Trace 1 shows the top long-term 
performer under the baseline organizational context (context 5 top long-term performer).  
Trace 2 shows the top long-term performer under the positive organizational context 
(context 9 top long-term performer).  Since there is not a top long-term performer under 
the poor organizational context (the fall-off will result in long-term failure), an associated 
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trace is not included.  As expected, the timelines for integration decrease and the long-
term integration levels increase as the organizational context improves.   
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Figure 83: Top Long-Term Performer Comparison Across Contexts Under 
High/High Initial Conditions 
 
Figure 84 compares all of the top overall performers under high/high initial 
conditions for each of the organizational contexts.  Trace 1 shows the top overall 
performer under the poor organizational context (context 1 top overall performer).  Trace 
2 shows the top overall performer under the baseline organizational context (context 5 
top overall performer).  Trace 3 shows the top overall performer under the positive 
organizational context (context 9 top overall performer).  For the most part, the timelines 
for integration decrease and the long-term integration levels increase as the 
organizational context improves.  Trace 2 slightly outperforms Trace 3 for the first 
portion of the simulation period – this is again due to the different percentages for the 
management interventions.  The composite values to determine the top overall performer 
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for context 5 (baseline/high/high) were computed at earlier points in time initially when 
compared to context 9 (positive/high/high).  This earlier measurement biases the baseline 
values in the short-term (context 5), so it is not unexpected that the short-term baseline 
performance is slightly better than the positive context (context 9) short-term 
performance.   
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Figure 84: Top Overall Performer Comparison Across Contexts Under High/High 
Initial Conditions 
  
Overall Analysis. 
The main pattern to note is that for the most effective management mix, 
continuity management should not be exercised.  This is not to say it is not of value, but 
the other management interventions have more “bang for the buck.”  In each of the 
overall best performers for each context, learning management is the most common.  In 
the baseline and positive contexts learning management is always present at 0.50, 
meaning half of the manager’s available time should focus on this important intervention.  
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Change process management and reward system management are also dispersed 
throughout the best context management intervention packages.   
Generally, when there were a high number of adopters initially, the system 
favored a mix of learning management and reward system management.  When the 
number of adopters was initially low, the system favored a level of change process 
management to move adopters from the potential adopter pool to the adopter pool.  This 
result makes sense in the real world because change process management is focused on 
preparing personnel for change and moving them through the change process.  When a 
high number of personnel are already bought-in to the change, the manager can focus on 
other things to increase system performance more effectively. 
Reward system management was very correlated with the speed at which the 
system accumulated integration.  In many of the contexts, there were two sets of 
simulations: those that rose faster and those that rose slower.  Usually the simulation 
rising to the greatest overall level of integration was in the later-to-rise group however.  
Reward system management was present in all of the contexts under the best short-term 
performer to some level.  A lack of reward system management focus was usually the 
factor that separated the early from the late risers.  This result makes sense in the real 
world because personnel will usually get things done faster if there is a reward, but the 
long-term quality may not be as good (from a lack of focus on other types of management 
interventions). 
Learning management was always present in high proportion in all of the best 
long-term results for the baseline and positive contexts.  However, the best long-term 
simulation usually had very mediocre short-term performance.  This result makes sense 
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in the real world because learning management is the key to long-term success.  The 
short-term results from increased learning are minimal because it takes time for increased 
learning to have an effect in the system.  In the best long-term management scenarios 
under the baseline and positive contexts, learning management had at least three quarters 
of the management focus.  
In the model analysis, the poor organizational context held the stigma of not only 
a rigid organization, but also the concept of the IT innovation not meeting the needs of 
the organization (resulting in the rise and fall behavior pattern).  A rigid organization can 
still implement IT innovations without the rise and fall behavior pattern, but it will take 
longer when compared to more innovative organizations.  The fact that the IT innovation 
is not meeting the needs of the organization, which is not initially known, only becomes 
apparent after actually integrating the IT innovation into organizational business 
processes; hence the need for good initial planning at a strategic level (HAF GIO) to 
assure the IT innovation will meet the needs of the organization when it actually begins 
the implementation process.  The rise and fall behavior pattern can occur for any of the 
contexts (baseline and positive included), but is aggregated into the poor organizational 
context for analysis (and as much brevity as possible). 
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V. Discussion 
Discussion of Results 
At this point, the reader may be wondering how the research results can be 
applied in the field for actual practitioners.  To better outline the conclusions from this 
research, two tables have been included.  Table 36 identifies general conditions and 
contexts, signs that may elucidate which context one is working in, and what 
management intervention is best applied under the applicable conditions.  Table 37 
disaggregates each of the management interventions to a certain degree to show some 
ways managers can actually intervene according to the best long-term strategy.  Chapter 2 
includes a more exhaustive discussion on each of the management interventions. 
Table 36 refers to opinion leaders as a distinguishing factor among various 
contexts.  It is usually relatively easy to identify the type of organization one is working 
in based on the characteristics of opinion leaders (also known as graybeards).  Opinion 
leadership is defined as “the degree to which an individual is able to influence other 
individuals’ attitudes or overt behavior informally in a desired way with relative 
frequency” (Rogers, 1995:27).  Opinion leadership is earned and maintained by an 
individual’s technical competence, social accessibility, and conformity to the system’s 
norms; not by their ranked authority (though they typically have somewhat higher social 
status than their peers).  Innovative organizations tend to foster opinion leaders that 
display innovative qualities (accepting of change, willing to try new approaches, wanting 
to make a large impact, etc.).  On the other hand, rigid organizations tend to foster 
opinion leaders that display rigid tendencies (opposing change, cynical, etc.).     
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As shown in Table 36, under every context, when there are a low number of 
initial adopters, the manager should focus on change process management until a fairly 
sizeable number of adopters build up.  If there are already a relatively high number of 
initial adopters, then the manager should use the management intervention associated 
with their particular context.  After the initial build-up, in the baseline and positive 
contexts, the manager should gradually transition his or her efforts to a learning 
management intervention.  Under poor conditions, it is usually better to continue the 
adoption-integration process using change process management techniques.  Under every 
context, there is also the possibility of using reward system management to create an 
initial spark of interest.  For long-term performance, however, the manager should 
transition away from placing his effort in reward system management after the initial 
spark period has passed (probably when personnel stop referring to the IT innovation as 
an initiative). 
It is important to understand that during the course of the implementation process, 
the manager should continue investing time in the technology portion of the system.  The 
historical implementation problem has not been restricted to technology issues alone – it 
has been an overemphasis on the technology issues over time that has caused the 
problems.  A fair way to approach the technology portion is to get the system to an initial 
operating capability (focusing full time and effort on this technology function at the start) 
and then transitioning effort to the adoption-integration management interventions as the 
technology management needs diminish over time.  Operating capability, adoption, and 
integration are all simultaneous processes, so the manager has to balance his or her effort 
throughout the implementation period to achieve the desired sustainment objectives. 
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Kotter’s and Armenakis’ change process management recommendations and 
Cunningham’s ideas on learning management seemed to be the most applicable and 
beneficial for the Air Force practitioner.  Starting a GeoBase version of the Air Force 
Idea Program (reward system management) was also impressive -- individuals could win 
cash awards for ideas leading to time/money savings as a result of GeoBase.  The best 
place to focus effort in a GeoBase Idea Program would be how best to integrate GeoBase 
into the business processes of the organization (leading to time and money savings).  
There are many business processes that occur simultaneously in any organization – a 
common organizational problem is personnel not viewing organizational business as 
process related.  Each organization is designed to take some kind of input and create an 
output of value to a customer – without an output of value to a customer, the organization 
probably would not exist at all.  Learning to view this input-output stream as a process is 
one of the keys to understanding how to integrate GeoBase effectively.  A good process 
view mixed with the need for major performance improvements usually leads 
organizations to business process reengineering (not a trivial undertaking in itself), 
which, for those who learn and make substantive attempts in this area, can achieve great 
ends. 
The reader should reference the Chapter 2 discussion concerning Cunningham’s 
learning set idea for a good understanding of this innovative learning construct.  The 
learning set approach seems to fit in best with IT implementation efforts and the Air 
Force way of operating.  The Air Force is primed for major changes in how its personnel 
learn and accomplish professional military education, so a general approach using 
learning sets would bring many benefits to the GeoBase system as well as the Air Force 
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as a whole.  Team learning allows personnel from different organizational units to 
communicate more effectively and spread the GeoBase initiative message.  In this 
context, organizational resistance to both continued learning and GeoBase induced 
organizational change are reduced.  In this learning environment, personnel can also 
collaborate for ways to integrate GeoBase into their business processes. 
From this research, generally, managers must take a cosmopolitan managerial 
intervention approach, which is to say, managers need to use a variety of management 
interventions to be the most effective.  In this research model, focusing on change process 
management, learning management, and reward system management tended to have the 
most positive effects.  There are major differences in how much time to spend on each 
under different conditions, but the manager who works diligently on these should find 
very positive organizational performance effects from the IT innovation.  The manager 
attempting to start these programs in his organization will probably run into obstacles and 
resistance if this is the first time something like this has been done in his organization.  It 
is important for the manager to first attempt to gain buy-in from the opinion leaders in the 
organization and, if this is successful, the manager will be in a much better position to get 
things done.  The manager must also consider what he is most effective at doing.  If he 
were a people-person, he would probably enjoy the change process management and 
learning management interventions.  If he is less inclined towards these types of 
interventions, he can also work on continuity or reward system management.  This 
research assumes the manager is equally proficient at all interventions, but this is 
probably not a great assumption for the practitioner. 
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Table 36: Organizational Description, Helpful Identification Signs, and Relevant Management Interventions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizational Description Signs
Long-Term 
Management 
Intervention 
For Short-term 
Spark
-- Probably Poor or Baseline Organizational Context
-- Low Initial Interest
-- General Cynicism About GeoBase
-- Personnel Delaying Implementation
-- Opinion Leaders are Cynical
-- Opinion Leaders Resistant to New Ideas
-- Organization Rejects Sell-out Opinion Leaders
-- Complaining About Change
-- Delaying Implementation
-- Not a Large Number of Organizational Awards
-- Low Turnover (same people have been around for awhile)
-- Stagnant IT History
-- Poor Inter-departmental Communication
-- Unfavorable Perceptions of IT
-- Opinion Leaders Will Adopt Good Ideas if Sold Well
-- A Few Organizational Awards
-- Some IT Success, Some Failure
-- Limited Initial Resistance
-- Decent Perceptions of IT
-- Opinion Leaders are Innovative
-- Opinion Leaders Want to Make an Impact
-- Many Organizational Awards
-- Other IT Integrated into Business Processes
-- Good Inter-departmental Communication
-- Organization is Ready to Begin Implementation
-- Favorable Perceptions of IT
Reward System 
Management
Learning Management
Learning Management
Poor (Rigid) Organizational Context
Baseline Organizational Context
Positive (Innovative) Organizational Context
Change Process 
Management
Initially Low Level of Adoption Change Process Management
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Table 37: Disaggregated Management Interventions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most important point to make, as far as management intervention strategy is 
concerned, is that the manager must be actively engaged in the adoption-integration 
process for anything substantive to happen.  Without carefully thought-out and 
constructed management intervention, the IT implementation system is bound to repeat 
the terrible historical performance of GIS systems in the Air Force.  If the system 
manager uses this research as one of many tools to guide his system management plan, 
then this research has made a positive contribution to the GeoBase implementation effort. 
Managerial Issues 
It is interesting to note that most of the integration curves, even under highly 
positive initial conditions, did not really take off until a few years had passed at the 
Management Intervention Management Actions
-- Highly Individualistic (based on individual motivation)
-- Time-off Awards
-- Monetary Awards (AF Idea Program)
-- Public Recognition
-- Great Performance Evaluation
-- Managerial Attention
-- Emphasize Enhanced Job Security
-- Emphasize Future Career Opportunities
-- Analyzing and Planning Change
   -- Implementation Plan Based on Strategy
-- Communicating the Change
   -- Building Self-Efficacy
   -- Explaining Change Plan and Why Change is Necessary
-- Changing from Status Quo to Desired State
   -- Remove Obstacles
   -- Successful Pilot Project
-- Institutionalizing New Approaches
   -- Integrate IT into Business Processes 
   -- Foster Further Innovation
-- Team Learning
   -- Teams Composed of Adopters
   -- Learning Sets and Learning Contracts (Cunningham)
   -- Circular Structures (making mental models explicit) (Kim)
-- Structured Training Experiences
-- Vicarious Learning Programs
-- Personnel Rotation Programs
Reward System Management                
(Tailor to Individuals)
Change Process Management                
(Don't Skip Steps)
Learning Management                      
(Education, Opposed to Training, is Focus)
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beginning of the simulation run.  The problem with this realistic initial lag for managers 
is that they usually have a limited amount of time to make an impact in an organization 
(typically three years at the most for military personnel), so they may not see the fruits of 
their labors.  Poor early performance makes it difficult for the manager to weather the 
early storms in hopes for a bright future.  It is all the more relevant to stress the 
importance of not jumping to conclusions about system performance too early in the 
process.  If the early performance is low, the manager may still have effective policies in 
place for great long-term performance.  If the early performance is high, this may not 
mean that the best management policy is in place for sustained performance in the long-
term.  It takes more courage and is more difficult to manage a system for better long-term 
performance, especially in the face of dubious short-term performance. 
Managerial performance evaluations are usually linked to system performance, 
which, in this research, could be measured by the level of integration in the system.  
However, the truly short-term performance measure would typically be the level of 
operating capability.  Most managers intuitively understand this concept, so it is easier to 
manage, quantify, and discuss on a performance evaluation.  An underlying cause for the 
historical technology overemphasis problems could be partially attributable to the 
performance appraisal system currently in place.   
Monetary figures and technology performance are more easily discussed and 
quantified in a performance evaluation than are people issues (adoption and integration).  
For this reason, the current performance appraisal system works against long-term 
sustainment because it does not reward the manager according to a successful long-term 
strategy.   
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One way to combat this problem is to keep a manager in place for a longer period 
of time and change the appraisal system to support the long-term sustainment strategy.  
Unfortunately, the government is not about to change the appraisal and transfer system, 
so a solution to this problem may come from outside the government – contractor 
personnel with longer time horizons (to allow the dynamics of the system to play out) and 
an adjusted performance appraisal system that rewards based on strategic policy 
implementation, as opposed to an unbalanced focus on the short-term technology issues. 
Top-level Leader Issues 
If a manager desires long-term performance, he may have to convince his boss 
that his approach, while maybe not achieving the best short-term results, will bring better 
long-term performance.  Top-level leaders have to understand the nature of IT 
implementation systems to have the required patience to allow successful integration to 
occur.  Based on the reference mode and simulation output for this model, IT integration 
will not initially respond for a number of years.  Hence, in line with this and other 
research in change management, top leaders must reserve judgment on system 
performance until enough time has passed to allow the system to mature to the point 
where it can perform well.  System managers and top-level leaders should also 
understand that in a forced adoption context, potential adopters (even innovative potential 
adopters) often become cynical about the innovation and resist further implementation.  
This research outlines the importance of managers gaining buy-in from potential 
adopters, making them adopters, and reaping the fruit of that action in the form of better 
integration performance.  One hundred heads working to integrate the IT innovation is 
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better than one or two.  By the same token, one hundred heads with a personal stake in 
the outcome of the IT innovation also makes for a powerfully positive integration 
strategy since personnel will actively support the system. 
Top-level leaders also have to make the decision on what level of patience they 
are willing to endure while the implementation dynamics play out.  From these research 
results, poor contextual organizations take a longer period of time for substantial 
integration to occur, whereas the baseline and positive contexts provide a shorter timeline 
for integration.  The concept of a performance pay-back period should be ascertained at 
the beginning of the investment period – will the IT innovation bring the desired 
performance within the longest time horizon the leader is willing to wait?  If not, either 
the complexity of the IT innovation should be decreased (stripped-down version of the 
planned IT product) to spur faster integration or the leader should not invest in the IT 
innovation in the first place.  The main determiner of long-term sustainment, regardless 
of the context in which the IT implementation is occurring, is whether or not the IT 
innovation is meeting the needs of the organization.  If the up-front planning for the 
architecture, technology, functionality, etc. (outside the control of the organizational IT 
manager) is not performed properly, resulting in an obsolete product that does not meet 
organizational needs, the long-term prospects for sustainment are not good. 
Value of Client Interaction 
The system dynamics approach allows the modeler to work with a client in the 
modeling process.  Based on feedback from the modeler-client meetings, the clients 
valued the discussion that resulted from the system dynamics approach because it forced 
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both the modeler and clients to think differently about the system.  Viewing the system 
from a system dynamics perspective allowed those involved in the process to envision the 
feedback loops and other aggregated portions of the system in new ways.  In the 
aggregate, the system is not overly complex, so managers can see how their interventions 
affect system function.  Simulation may also uncover other behavior that was not 
expected at the forefront of the modeling process. 
Research Limitations 
Certain issues were screened from this model to allow a parsimonious answer to 
the research problem to develop, with as little befuddled complexity as possible.  There 
are a multitude of influences that exist in any organizational system, so the focus must be 
constrained to those variables of greatest importance and aggregate or screen other points 
of complexity.  Hence, there are some limitations that are inherently part of this research 
effort.  The following list outlines a few of these: 
- This model does not address some issues associated with manager personality 
(such as level of charisma, predisposition towards job or people-centered 
management techniques, level of education, experience and knowledge with 
GIS innovations, etc.) 
- This model does not address some issues associated with personnel (collective 
knowledge level of GIS, remote sensing, and imagery, impacts of job security, 
such as A-76 studies, aggregate age of personnel, etc.) 
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- This model is not quantitatively precise (typical of system dynamics models), 
but focuses more on behavior patterns and causal relationships that generate 
performance differences over time 
This model’s system boundary is constrained to those organizational elements that 
the system manager can more easily control using management interventions focused on 
operating capability and adoption-integration.  Hence, the contextual variables, such as 
top-level support, organizational culture, and database quality (all focused on whether the 
IT innovation is meeting organizational needs or not), are unchangeable by the system 
manager.  Expanding the system boundary would allow these contextual variables to also 
fall under the system manager’s control, but this system boundary expansion is 
unrealistic because changing the operating context would usually require intervention 
from a manager at a higher level in the organization. 
Thoughts on Follow-on Research 
There are many areas for follow-on research associated with this modeling effort.  
Using the system dynamics approach for a management-related problem is a first for a 
student at AFIT, so there should be ample problems in this field amenable to student 
research using a system dynamics approach.  Using the system dynamics approach is 
very applicable in many different situations, but the researcher must assure the research 
problem is a good system dynamics problem.  This research is very general and could 
guide other system dynamics approach research focused on IT implementation or 
organizational change initiatives.   
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For more research on GeoBase specifically, follow-on research could either 
shrink or expand the system boundary used here to allow the researcher to focus on 
different questions.  With a different system boundary, different elements of the system 
could be studied either more specifically or more generally.  Expansion of the system 
boundary may encompass more than one squadron or organization and focus more on the 
wing or larger organizational level.  Shrinking the system boundary may allow the 
researcher to explore questions on how the management interventions are done more 
specifically or to disaggregate many of the aggregated concepts in this model. 
The model used for this research is also robust enough to allow a variety of 
different contextual levels to change over time or to use a time-phased implementation 
approach, where the manager can allocate different percentages of time to various 
management interventions at various points in time.  An organizational system dynamics 
learning intervention could help personnel better understand the dynamics of their 
organization and how they can affect it.  Outlining an analysis methodology where 
system dynamics is used as a learning tool would be interesting. 
The opportunity also exists for research on an organizational business process 
reengineering (BPR) study, using GeoBase as a technology enabler.  BPR has an 
associated analysis methodology that could be used to help organizations better direct 
their efforts in the technology integration process. 
Value of Dynamic Approach to Understanding an IT Implementation System 
This research has presented a fresh, new, dynamic way to view and understand IT 
implementation and sustainment without compromising the proven principles found in 
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the research literature.  IT implementation and sustainment are dynamic concepts that 
have not been adequately addressed in the research literature, so this research makes a 
significant contribution to this growing and expanding field.   A dynamic view of this 
process is very important and helps managers understand what to expect and how to 
manage a system for either short-term or long-term good.  The conclusions presented in 
this research were only made possible by the use of a dynamic methodology grounded in 
principles from the literature and historical behavior. 
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Appendix A: History of GIS 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are the technological impetus for 
GeoBase since they provide the necessary software for working with and displaying 
spatial data.  Without GIS technical capabilities, GeoBase would not be a viable program.  
To understand how the development of GIS has unfolded over time and how this history 
affects its and GeoBase’s future potential, this section of the appendix will elucidate the 
historical roots of GIS and how its growth is being managed. 
Clarke provides a relatively brief history of cartography and discusses the main 
events leading to the current state of GIS.  Cartography dates back centuries with an 
initial focus on general-purpose maps.  General-purpose maps tended to focus on 
topography, the lay of the land, and transportation features such as roads and rivers.  
Within the last century, thematic maps have come into use.  Thematic maps contain 
information about specific subjects or themes, such as surface geology, land use, soils, 
etc.  Although both of these maps are compatible with a GIS, thematic maps led 
cartography toward GIS (Clarke, 2001). 
The field of planning was the first to extract data from one map and place it on 
another.  As an example, in 1912 the German city of Dusseldorf was mapped at differing 
time periods to show the progressive expansion of the geographic extent of the city (time-
series maps).  Other maps focusing on traffic circulation and land use were also 
developed in the United States and England in the 1920s (Clarke, 2001). 
In the 1950s and 1960s map overlay techniques were created to assist planners in 
land analysis and siting considerations.  In 1950, the publication of the Town and Country 
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Planning Textbook included a chapter entitled “Surveys for Planning” where various 
themes, such as land elevation, surface geology, hydrology/soil drainage, etc., were 
combined onto one map.  Later in 1969, Ian McHarg published a book entitled Design 
with Nature where he discussed the use of blacked-out transparencies overlaid on one 
another to assist in finding suitable locations in New York’s Staten Island where siting 
control problems could be avoided.  These mapping techniques were beneficial, but very 
time intensive for the production of maps (Clarke, 2001). 
As early as 1959, models were being created to apply the use of computers to 
cartography.  Throughout the 1960s programmers were using languages such as 
FORTRAN to draw maps and print them out.  As modular computer programming 
languages improved during the 1960s, the process of writing integrated software became 
easier.  Researchers developed a few early mapping packages, such as SURFACE II, 
IMGRID, and CAM, in the 1960s that were based on modular languages (Clarke, 2001). 
At about this same time, the first systematic map databases began to appear.  The 
first of these was the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Data Bank showing coastlines, 
rivers, and national boundaries.  CAM software was used to project this information onto 
maps at different scales (Clarke, 2001). 
The breakthrough for today’s GIS was the U.S. Census Bureau’s dual 
independent map encoding (DIME) project.  The DIME and its associated files, called 
geographic base files (GBF), not only were able to display map information, but also 
combine map attribute information with computer maps and perform searches for 
geographic patterns and distributions (Clarke, 2001). 
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Researchers at Harvard University created the arc/node (vector) data structure in 
1975, which drove the later development of the GIS packages we have today.  The 
premise for this structure was that all geographic shapes (points, lines, and polygons) 
could be described using only points and lines.  Polygons could be specified using a start 
node (which was also the end node) and the shape was determined by the interconnected 
arcs and nodes (lines and points) that eventually ran back to the origin of the polygon 
(Clarke, 2001). 
GIS package development continued through the 1970s and early 1980s based on 
mainframe computers and FORTRAN.  As computers branched-out from mainframes to 
PCs and workstation platforms (UNIX), some of the GIS packages using the arc/node 
system (Arc/Info) were also able to make the same transition to the much more widely 
dispersed desktop computers.  Other software packages such as IDRISI and GRASS 
started after this transition.  GIS packages that did not make the transition eventually 
died-out (Clarke, 2001). 
As computers became more powerful through the 1980s and early 1990s, GIS was 
able to take advantage of the capabilities of the more powerful systems.  The first 
generation of GIS graphical user interface (GUI) software made GIS much easier to use, 
based on the addition of menus, on-line manuals, and context-sensitive help.  The 
creation of the Internet and GIS infrastructure (journals, conferences, etc.) also allowed 
GIS to rapidly expand (Clarke, 2001). 
The 1990s saw remarkable growth in the GIS field as new computer products and 
other technologies, such as the more precise Geographic Positioning System (GPS) and 
high resolution satellite maps, emerged.  GIS has expanded into new fields such as 
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geology, archeology, epidemiology, and criminal justice.  Currently, it is a multibillion-
dollar business with large continuing growth prospects (Clarke, 2001). 
There are four main reasons for the success of GIS.  First, the industry was 
founded on vast amounts of inexpensive government data from the U.S. Geological 
Survey and the U.S. Census Bureau.  Second, the GIS community created the 
infrastructure for self-support, user groups, network conference groups, etc.  Third, the 
addition of GUIs and software features, such as help screens and automatic installation 
routines, have allowed the worldwide dispersion of software to users in an array of fields.  
Fourth, GIS has integrated itself successfully with emergent technologies, such as GPS 
and satellite remote sensing.  The overall growth of the GIS field could not have emerged 
without the advent of desktop computers and their amazing increases in power and 
capability (Clarke, 2001; Cullis, 2000).   
GIS is a multibillion-dollar industry.  Groups monitoring the industry estimate the 
total value of the hardware, software, and services conducted by the private, 
governmental, educational, and other sectors that handle spatial data to be billions of 
dollars a year.  For the last half of the 1990s, the GIS industry saw double-digit annual 
growth.  The transition from mainframe computers to desktop computers drove the price 
of computers down so more people had easier access to GIS applications.  Now, most 
major academic institutions teach at least one class in GIS.  Most local, state, and federal 
agencies use GIS, as well as businesses, planners, architects, geologists, etc.  The 
exponential growth in the number of users, as well as the growth in system sophistication 
by way of increased computer power, speed, and storage, is the main ingredients for the 
big business aspect of GIS (Clarke, 2001). 
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GIS now has a plethora of journals, books, professional societies, and conferences 
to add to the growth of the field.  Some of the journals include the International Journal 
of Geographic Information Systems, Geographical Systems, Transactions on GIS, 
Business Geographics, and GIS Law, among many others.  Some related professional 
societies include the American Congress of Surveying and Mapping, the American 
Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, and the Association of American 
Geographers, among others.  Some of the conferences in this field include the URISA 
annual conference, which has a GIS application focus, the ACSM/ASPRS technical 
meetings, which have both a research and applications orientation, and the GITA 
conference, which is mainly for municipalities and industrial GIS users (Clarke, 2001). 
These organizations and journals drive GIS forward with success stories, standards, 
technical support, ongoing professional training, data sharing collaborations, interest 
groups, credentialing committees, and a host of other services, membership offers, and 
products. 
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Appendix B: Additional Testing 
Extreme Conditions, Sensitivity Analysis, and Behavior Anomaly Tests 
The purpose of the extreme conditions test, as stated by Sterman (2000), is as 
follows: 
Does each equation make sense, even when its inputs take on extreme values? 
 
Does the model respond plausibly when subjected to extreme policies, shocks, 
and parameters? 
 
The purpose of sensitivity analysis testing, as stated by Sterman (2000), is as 
follows: 
Numerical sensitivity: Do the numerical values change significantly? 
 
Behavioral sensitivity: Do the modes of behavior generated by the model 
change significantly? 
 
Policy Sensitivity: Do the policy implications change significantly? 
 
…when assumptions about parameters, boundary, and aggregation are 
varied over the plausible range of uncertainty? 
 
The purpose of the behavior anomaly testing, as stated by Sterman (2000), is as 
follows: 
Do anomalous behaviors result when assumptions of the model are changed  
or deleted? 
 
These tests are all interrelated, so the model will be tested concurrently with these 
questions in mind.  The main goal for these tests is to determine if the model responds as 
expected under abnormal conditions and if the model responds (or does not respond) 
when variables are changed from their baseline values.  Tests for effects from extreme 
policies will be performed in the next section. 
 
279 
During these tests, the integration variable will be the sole focus, since this is the 
focus of the research.  Comparative traces of baseline, minimum, and maximum values 
on each associated graph will be performed.   
STELLA software allows the modeler to simulate the same variable multiple 
times under differing conditions for each simulation run to allow comparison.  Testing 
will consist of multiple simulation runs (and, as a result, multiple traces) of the same 
variable, Integration, graphed under different model conditions.  Hence, each of the 
variable names across the top of each figure will be Integration, but each simulation run 
and trace will represent different behavior based on the extreme points for the variable 
being studied.  In these cases, the variable scale will be the same throughout each figure 
(since Integration is the lone output). 
Operating Capability. 
Funding. 
Funding: Scale (0 to 1) 
 
Baseline condition (funding at a reasonable level): Funding = 0.2 
 
MIN: No funding for program: Funding = 0 
 
MAX: Unobstructed funding for program: Funding = 1 
 
Figure 85 shows the baseline and extreme conditions for the funding variable to 
show the range of values that integration will take as it varies over its range.  Trace 1 is 
the baseline condition (funding = 0.2) with all other variables in their baseline conditions 
as well.  The output for integration (Trace 1) is the same as the integration output in 
Figure 57 (Trace 4).  Trace 2 shows integration stays close to zero when funding is non-
existent (funding  = 0).  Trace 2’s largest value is 0.04, essentially meaning there is no 
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integration when there is no funding.  Trace 3 shows integration rises relatively quickly, 
but its long-term level after ten years is not significantly different than the baseline.  
Trace 3 rises quickly and levels-off at approximately four years (at four years, integration 
= 3.74).  After ten years, trace 3 comes to a value of 3.98.  The reason for these behavior 
patterns is based on how quickly the system builds-up operating capability.  In the 
baseline condition, operating capability gradually rises over ten years, whereas in the 
maximum funding environment, operating capability rises to its maximum value very 
quickly.  This sharp rise drives the other system components (adoption and integration) 
much more quickly.  Based on the extreme conditions testing for funding, these behavior 
patterns are realistic and the model does not do anything unexpected in these scenarios.  
The model is sensitive to the funding variable and there is no associated anomalous 
behavior.  
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Figure 85: Extreme Conditions Test for the Funding Variable 
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Operating Capability Goal (OC Goal). 
Operating Capability Goal (OC Goal): Scale (0 to 1) 
 
Baseline condition (manager wants top operating capability): OC Goal = 1 
 
MIN: No operating capability goal (representing manager having no interest in 
having any GeoBase operating capability): OC Goal = 0 
 
MAX: Manager wants GeoBase operating capability at peak capability:  
OC Goal = 1  
 
Figure 86 presents the extreme conditions testing for OC Goal.  Trace 1 is the 
baseline.  Trace 2 gradually rises to a value of 0.73 after ten years.  With a constantly low 
value of OC, the manager focuses all of his time on the adoption and integration process, 
which still provides some growth potential for integration.  Though there is still growth in 
integration, as shown in Trace 2, it does not compare to the growth when the manager 
puts effort into increasing operating capability.  It is interesting that during the first five 
years of the system, Trace 2 slightly outperforms Trace 1.  At five years though, the S-
shaped growth takes off for Trace 1 while Trace 2 just keeps gradually increasing at a 
much smaller pace.  This is explained by the fact that the manager’s effort is completely 
focused on adoption and integration throughout the simulation period, so slightly greater 
early gains in integration are expected.  The model is sensitive to the OC goal variable 
and there is no associated anomalous behavior after the adjustment.    
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Figure 86: Initial OC Goal Extreme Conditions Test 
Operating Capability (OC). 
Operating Capability (OC): No Scale – will come to static steady state value 
based on OC Goal (baseline of OC goal = 1) – constrained by not being able to be 
less than zero. 
 
Baseline condition (assuming there is small initial level of OC): OC = 0.05 
 
MIN: There is no initial operating capability whatsoever: OC = 0 
 
MAX: Manager has maximum initial operating capability: OC = OC goal = 1 
 
Figure 87 presents the results of the extreme conditions testing for the OC stock.  
Trace 1 is the baseline trace.  Trace 2 is the minimum condition trace (OC = 0 initially).  
It is very similar to Trace 1, but slightly lags it.  They both come to the same value of 
3.81 after ten years.  Trace 3 is the maximum condition trace for OC.  Having OC 
maximally in place at the beginning allows the manager to focus his complete effort on 
adoption and integration, which allows very rapid integration to occur with the strong 
impetus of complete OC to back up his efforts.  Trace 3 rises quickly and levels-off at 
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about 3 years (at 3 years, Integration = 3.86).  After ten years, Trace 3 Integration equals 
4.01.  The model is sensitive to the OC variable and there is no associated anomalous 
behavior.   
 
1:00 PM   Sat, Dec 14, 2002
0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00
Time
1:
1:
1:
0.00
3.00
6.00
1: Integration 2: Integration 3: Integration
1 1
1
1
2 2
2
2
3
3 3 3
OC EC testing (OC)  
Figure 87: OC Extreme Conditions Test 
 
Adoption. 
Potential Adopters. 
Potential Adopters: Scale (0 to 1) 
 
Baseline condition (hypothetically, this means in an organization of 100 potential 
adopters, there are all but 2 individuals that have the potential to adopt GeoBase): 
Potential Adopters = 0.98 
 
MIN: No potential adopters scenario #1 (meaning all potential adopters are 
already adopters, so adopters = 1): Potential Adopters = 0 and Adopters = 1 
 
No potential adopters scenario #2 (meaning there is no pool of potential adopters 
to transfer to adopters, so adopters = 0): Potential Adopters = 0 and Adopters = 0 
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MAX: No initial adopters (there is no one in the organization that has any initial 
interest in GeoBase): Potential Adopters = 1 and Adopters = 0 
 
Figure 88 presents the results of the potential adopters and adopters extreme 
conditions testing.  Trace 1 is the baseline condition.  Trace 2 is the minimum condition 
for potential adopters, but the maximum condition for adopters (potential adopters = 0, 
adopters = 1).  With all potential adopters in the organization being pushed over to the 
adopters stock initially, there is a strong impetus for integration to take-off early in the 
simulation period.  Trace 2 does display early-S-shaped behavior gains and levels-off the 
exponential growth portion at about 2.5 years.  After ten years, Trace 2’s value is 3.89 
(which does not differ much from the baseline condition in the long-term).  Trace 3 
represents the no potential adopter scenario #2.  This is where there are no potential 
adopters and no adopters (potential adopters = 0, adopters = 0).  In this scenario, one 
would expect integration to be close to zero, which in fact it is throughout the simulation 
period.  Trace 4 is the maximum condition for potential adopters and the minimum 
condition for adopters (potential adopters = 1, adopters = 0).  If there is no one in the 
organization that has any interest in GeoBase from the beginning, then there will be no 
one to get the adoption and integration processes started.  In this scenario, one would 
expect that integration would stay close to zero, which it does throughout the simulation 
period.  It is extremely important to have at least one person in the organization (probably 
the GeoBase champion) that can get things started.  These extreme conditions tests 
represent expected behavior under such conditions.  The model is sensitive to the 
potential adopters/adopters variables and there is no associated anomalous behavior.   
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Figure 88: Potential Adopter/Adopter Extreme Conditions Test 
 
Adopters. 
Adopters: Scale (0 to 1) 
 
Baseline condition (hypothetically, this means in an organization of 100 potential 
adopters, there are 2 individuals that have adopted): Adopters = 0.02 
 
Reference Potential Adopters section for extreme conditions. 
Baseline Quality of Communication Channels (Baseline QoCC). 
Baseline Quality of Communication Channels (Baseline QoCC): Scale (0 to 1) 
 
Baseline condition (individuals in the organization are adequately connected by 
interpersonal communication channels, but there is much room for improvement): 
Baseline QoCC = 0.5 
 
MIN: Communication channels are very poor – both interpersonal and inter-
organizational communication is non-existent: Baseline QoCC = 0 
 
MAX: Excellent communication channel linkages exist – natural interpersonal 
and inter-organizational communication is superb: Baseline QoCC = 1  
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Figure 89 presents the extreme conditions test for the Baseline Quality of 
Communication Channels (QoCC) variable.  Trace 1 shows the baseline condition.  Trace 
2 shows the minimum condition.  Integration takes a long period of time to develop, but 
eventually rises to a level of 1.31 after ten years.  The reason there is some gain in 
integration is due to the management interventions for change process management and 
learning management.  The baseline for these interventions is 0.25 each, so individuals 
will still move from the potential adopters stock to the adopters stock, albeit at a much 
slower rate than if there were some level of communication channel quality.  Trace 3 
presents the results of the maximum condition for Baseline QoCC.  There is a fairly 
substantial rise in speed of integration, but the long-term results after ten years are the 
same as the baseline condition (Integration = 3.81).  The model behaves as expected 
when this variable changes over its extreme range.  The model is sensitive to the QoCC 
variable and there is no associated anomalous behavior. 
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Figure 89: Baseline Quality of Communication Channels (QoCC) Extreme 
Conditions Test 
 
Relative Advantage. 
Relative Advantage: Scale (0 to 10) 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes GeoBase is highly beneficial for personnel to 
adopt and implement.  Personnel perceive that adopting and using GeoBase will 
give advantages in job performance and potential rewards based on that 
performance.  Personnel perceive using GeoBase to be a much better way to 
accomplish relevant portions of their jobs): Relative Advantage = 9 
 
MIN: Poor perceived relative advantage (GeoBase provides no personal impetus 
for adoption): Relative Advantage = 0 
 
MAX: Outstanding perceived relative advantage (GeoBase maximizes personal 
impetus for use): Relative Advantage = 10 
 
Figure 90 presents the simulation results for relative advantage at its extreme 
conditions.  Trace 1 shows the baseline condition (relative advantage = 9).  Trace 2 
shows the minimum condition for relative advantage (relative advantage = 0).  It is 
appreciably smaller than the baseline condition, which is understandable.  In this extreme 
conditions test, the other factors are all set to their baseline values, so the reason anything 
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builds up in integration is a result of the other two adoption factors (ease of use and 
compatibility) allowing individuals to still move from the potential adopters to the 
adopters stock, which drives integration (albeit at a much slower pace).  Trace 2’s value 
after ten years is 1.37.  Trace 3 presents the maximum condition (relative advantage = 
10).  It is closely related to the baseline condition, but is slightly better in terms of speed 
of integration.  This closeness is expected since 1 unit only separates the maximum and 
baseline conditions for relative advantage.  Trace 3 comes to a value of 3.81 after ten 
years, just as the baseline condition.  These results were expected.  The model is sensitive 
to the relative advantage variable and there is no associated anomalous behavior. 
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Figure 90: Relative Advantage Extreme Conditions Test 
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Ease of Use. 
Ease of Use: Scale (0 to 10) 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes GeoBase is fairly difficult to learn and will 
take some effort to learn effectively): Ease of Use = 3 
 
MIN: Perception of GeoBase as very difficult to use and learn: Ease of Use = 0 
 
MAX: Perception of GeoBase as very easy to use: Ease of Use = 10 
 
Figure 91 presents the simulation results for ease of use extreme conditions.  
Trace 1 is the baseline condition (ease of use = 3).  Trace 2 is the minimum condition 
(ease of use = 0).  Trace 2 lags the baseline as expected, but is not significantly different.  
Trace 3 is the maximum condition (ease of use = 10).  Trace 3 has slightly better short-
term integration performance, but has the same long-term result after ten years.  All three 
traces intersect at 10 years at the integration value 3.81.  The model is not extremely 
sensitive to this variable alone, but it is sensitive to the combination in which ease of use 
resides.  There is no associated anomalous behavior. 
3:29 PM   Sat, Dec 14, 2002
0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00
Time
1:
1:
1:
0.00
3.00
6.00
1: Integration 2: Integration 3: Integration
1 1
1
1
2 2
2
2
3 3
3
3
Ease of Use EC Testing (Eas…  
Figure 91: Ease of Use Extreme Conditions Test 
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Compatibility. 
Compatibility: Scale (0 to 10) 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes GeoBase is in line with the existing values, 
needs, and past experiences of potential adopters): Compatibility = 5 
 
MIN: Perception of GeoBase as totally not in line with existing values, needs, and 
past experiences of potential adopters: Compatibility = 0 
 
MAX: Perception of GeoBase as totally in line with existing values, needs, and 
past experiences of potential adopters: Compatibility = 10 
 
Figure 92 presents the extreme conditions test for compatibility.  Trace 1 is the 
baseline condition.  Trace 2 is the minimum compatibility condition, which slightly lags 
the baseline condition.  Trace 3 is the maximum compatibility condition, which slightly 
improves integration performance.  All three traces intersect at the ten-year value of 3.81.  
The model is not extremely sensitive to this variable alone, but it is sensitive to the 
combination in which compatibility resides.  There is no associated anomalous behavior. 
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Figure 92: Compatibility Extreme Conditions Test 
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Technology Adoption Factors. 
Technology Adoption Factors: Scale (0 to 1) 
 
Note: The weighting factors for relative advantage, ease of use, and compatibility 
were derived from the literature review as outlined in Chapter 4, so they will not 
be changed during extreme conditions testing. 
 
For extreme conditions testing purposes, the technology adoption factors (relative 
advantage, ease of use, and compatibility) will be combined at their extreme 
points.  Since these three factors have 2 sampling points each, the complete 
combination set will consist of eight combinations as shown in Table 38. 
 
Table 38: Combinations of Technology Adoption Factors at Extreme Points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of simulation runs was too numerous to number and track on a 
graphical output.  The model was sensitive to the combination of the three technology 
adoption factors at their extreme points (0,0,0) and (10,10,10). 
Integration. 
Integration Stock. 
Integration: No Scale – constrained by not being able to be less than zero 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes there is a very small level of GeoBase/GIS 
integration initially – Integration structure requires an initial value greater than 0 
to function properly): Integration = 0.01 
Simulation Relative Advantage Ease of Use Compatibility
1 (Baseline) 9 3 5
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 10
4 0 10 0
5 0 10 10
6 10 0 0
7 10 0 10
8 10 10 0
9 10 10 10
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High Value: Organization has a great history with GIS-related applications and 
has integrated GIS applications into the organizational business processes that 
have a great impact on efficiency and effectiveness: Integration = 1 
 
Figure 93 presents the extreme conditions test for Integration.  Trace 1 is the 
baseline condition (as well as the minimum condition).  Trace 2 is a high initial value 
condition.  It is interesting to note that the integration curve in Trace 2 actually depletes 
before it starts climbing.  This dip means the artificially high initial value for integration 
was not supported by the system until it started to climb again after the dip.  The 
compensating loops in the system were able to dominate the integration stock until the 
reinforcing loops were able to build up enough power to overcome the compensating 
loops.  In the real world, if a system has a high initial value for a parameter, it probably 
has enough support behind it to sustain that value.  Since only one parameter was 
changed in the system and left the rest at their baseline values, the system took awhile to 
come to point where it could sustain that level of performance (approximately 3.5 years).  
The high value scenario captured in Trace 2 still outperformed the baseline condition, but 
came to the same steady state point after ten years (Integration = 3.81). 
A real-life scenario where this could play out would be the personnel in a well-
established organization being fired and new personnel with limited experience coming 
in to replace them.  It would take a while for the new personnel to attain the same level of 
performance as the old personnel.  There would probably be a drop in performance in the 
short-term until the new personnel could develop the necessary competence to sustain the 
previous level of performance.  Indirectly, this model, through simulation, is showing 
analogous behavior as described in the scenario above.  This behavior is not anomalous, 
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but it was not expected before testing.  This behavior pattern does provide some 
additional insight into the system.  The model is fairly sensitive to the integration level 
initially. 
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Figure 93: Integration Extreme Conditions Test 
 
Reengineering Effectiveness. 
Reengineering Effectiveness: Scale (0 to 10) 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes the organization has an adequate level of 
reengineering experience and understanding to be able to effectively reengineer 
organizational business processes): Reengineering Effectiveness = 3 
 
MIN: Organization has no experience with business process reengineering and 
does not know how to begin the process: Reengineering Effectiveness = 0 
 
MAX: Organization is totally versed in business process reengineering and 
always looks for opportunities to improve business processes to the highest 
degree possible: Reengineering Effectiveness = 10 
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Figure 94 presents the results of extreme conditions testing for reengineering 
effectiveness.  Trace 1 shows the baseline condition.  Trace 2 shows the minimum 
condition (reengineering effectiveness = 0).  Trace 3 shows the maximum condition 
(reengineering effectiveness = 10).  This is obviously an important variable in the system 
because integration will tend to approach this value.  Trace 2 rises to 0.51 after ten years.  
The only reason simulation 2 allowed anything to build-up in integration is largely the 
result of ambient positive organizational inertia building up the integration stock.  Trace 3 
rises to 10.85 after ten years.  This is a very good result, but in the real world, this level of 
organizational integration effectiveness would not be expected in an organization.  These 
results were expected.  The model is sensitive to the reengineering effectiveness variable 
and there is no associated anomalous behavior.  
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Figure 94: Reengineering Effectiveness Extreme Conditions Test 
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Baseline Continuity. 
Baseline Continuity: Scale (0 to 1) 
  
Baseline condition (Model assumes the organization has a typical level of 
continuity occurring – leaving personnel sometimes write continuity files for 
incoming replacements and there are plans on the shelves, but they are rarely read 
and usually collect dust): Baseline Continuity = 0.25 
 
MIN: Organization does absolutely no continuity work and there are no written 
files for how to do anything – when individuals leave, all of the knowledge stored 
in their heads is lost to the organization, resulting in a lot of fragmentation, as 
described by Kim in Chapter 2: Baseline Continuity = 0 
 
MAX: Organization has a wonderful continuity program established – personnel 
always write continuity files, incoming personnel always review, in full, all 
recorded information about their responsibilities, and plans are continually written 
and updated as information changes: Baseline Continuity = 1 
 
Figure 95 presents the extreme conditions test for baseline continuity.  Trace 1 is 
the baseline condition (baseline continuity = 0.25).  Trace 2 is the minimum condition 
(baseline continuity = 0).  Trace 3 is the maximum condition (baseline continuity = 1).  
Each of the traces are very similar and do not differ very much from one another.  The 
reason for this occurrence is do to the issue of minimal baseline inertia.  When inertia in 
the system builds up to greater values, there is much more of an impact on integration.  
However, in the baseline condition, only ambient inertia is building up, so the effect from 
continuity is small.  The results would change significantly if there were more positive 
inertia in the system.  There is no associated anomalous behavior. 
 
 
 
296 
5:42 PM   Sat, Dec 14, 2002
0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00
Time
1:
1:
1:
0.00
3.00
6.00
1: Integration 2: Integration 3: Integration
1 1
1
1
2 2
2
2
3 3
3
3
Baseline Continuity EC Testing (…  
Figure 95: Baseline Continuity Extreme Conditions Test 
 
Organizational Inertia. 
Note: Only the constant parameters in this section will be analyzed for extreme 
conditions testing.  
 
Continued Use Inertia. 
Continued Use Inertia: No Scale – will steadily rise as inflow is active – 
constrained by not being able to be less than zero. 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes there has not been any positive GeoBase-
related inertia building up in the system): Continued Use Inertia = 0 
 
High Value: High level of initial positive GeoBase-related inertia exists in the 
system: Continued Use Inertia = 1 
 
Figure 96 presents the continued use inertia extreme conditions test.  Trace 1 
shows the baseline condition (initial continued use inertia = 0).  Trace 2 shows a high 
value condition (initial continued use inertia = 1).  Trace 2 outperforms the baseline 
condition and gives a short-term boost to integration over approximately the first six 
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years.  Trace 2, after ten years, comes to a value of 3.92, whereas the baseline condition 
comes to a value of 3.81.  The main difference is the higher short-term growth as a result 
of high initial continued use inertia.  The model is fairly sensitive to the continued use 
inertia variable and there is no associated anomalous behavior. 
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Figure 96: Continued Use Inertia Extreme Conditions Test 
 
Discontinued Use Inertia. 
Discontinued Use Inertia: No Scale – will steadily rise as inflow is active – 
constrained by not being able to be less than zero. 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes there has not been any negative GeoBase-
related inertia building up in the system): Discontinued Use Inertia = 0 
 
Mid-high Value: Mid-high value of initial negative GeoBase-related inertia exists 
in the system initially: Discontinued Use Inertia = 0.5 
 
High Value: High level of initial negative GeoBase-related inertia exists in the 
system initially: Discontinued Use Inertia = 1 
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Figure 97 presents the extreme conditions tests for discontinued use inertia.  Trace 
1 is the baseline condition (discontinued use inertia = 0).  Trace 2 is the mid-high value 
for discontinued use inertia (discontinued use inertia = 0.5).  Trace 3 is the high value for 
discontinued use inertia (discontinued use inertia = 1).  Typically inertia builds up in the 
system gradually over time, but a high initial value serves to act as a powerful 
compensating loop in the system.  As such, the strengthening of the system reinforcing 
loops in the baseline condition is insufficient to overcome the compensating loops from 
the discontinued use inertia.  In the extreme case of high discontinued use inertia, the 
integration stock never is able to adequately build up over time.  This is the expected 
result.  The model is very sensitive to the discontinued use inertia variable and there is no 
associated anomalous behavior. 
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Top Level Support. 
Top Level Support: Scale (-1 to 1) 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes top level organizational leaders are neither 
overly supportive or obstructive to GeoBase): Top Level Support = 0 
 
MIN: Top level organizational leaders are highly obstructive and critical of 
GeoBase and act as extreme detriments to the innovation: Top Level Support = -1 
 
MAX: Top level organizational leaders are highly supportive of GeoBase and act 
as extreme champions of the innovation: Top Level Support = 1 
 
Figure 98 presents the extreme conditions test for top-level support.  Trace 1 
shows the baseline condition.  Trace 2 shows the minimum condition (top level support = 
-1).  In the minimum condition, top-level support makes discontinued use inertia very 
powerful in the system and the compensating loops begin to dominate as discontinued 
use inertia builds up to high levels.  Since there are a number of stocks in series, there are 
inherent delays in the system that allow integration to build up to a point and then 
dramatically decline as the discontinued use compensating loops dominate the system.  
At its peak, integration in Trace 2 is 2.6 after 7.3 years; after ten years it is 0.89.  Trace 3 
shows the maximum condition, which is not significantly different from the baseline 
condition.  After ten years, the value for integration is 3.99 as opposed to 3.81 for the 
baseline condition.  Based on the structure of the model, this is the expected behavior 
pattern.  In a context of top-level support, the system will behave well, but not 
significantly differently from the baseline.  In a context of top management discontent, 
the system shows marked declining effects.  In reality, in this context, other factors in the 
system would also be lower, which would not allow the integration in the system to build 
up. 
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Figure 98: Top Level Support Extreme Conditions Test 
 
Database Quality. 
Database Quality: Scale (-1 to 1) 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes database quality is neither good nor bad):  
Database quality = 0 
 
MIN: Database is absolutely unreliable – none of the information is correct and 
the database management teams never update any of the information as changes 
occur: Database Quality = -1 
 
MAX: Database is absolutely outstanding – database management team keeps it 
perfectly updated when any changes occur and it never has any problems: 
Database Quality = 1 
 
Figure 99 presents the database quality extreme conditions test.  Trace 1 shows 
the baseline condition.  Similar things are happening in Figure 18 as in Figure 17.  Trace 
2 shows the minimum condition (database quality = -1).  Trace 2 peaks at 2.48 after 7.3 
years; after ten years it is 0.69.  Trace 3 is similar to the baseline, but comes to a value of 
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4.04 after ten years.  Database quality is an important influence in the system, especially 
when it contributes to discontinued use inertia.  Database quality has slightly more 
influence in the system than top-level support.  The model behaves as expected in each 
case of minimum and maximum values for database quality.   
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Figure 99: Database Quality Extreme Conditions Test 
 
Culture Fit. 
Culture Fit: Scale (-1 to 1) 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes the organizational culture is neither rigid nor 
innovative as far as GeoBase is concerned): Culture Fit = 0 
 
MIN: Organization is totally rigid and unsupportive of GeoBase: Culture Fit = -1 
 
MAX: Organization is totally innovative and accepting of GeoBase:  
Culture Fit = 1 
 
Figure 100 presents the results from the extreme conditions test for culture fit.  
Trace 1 shows the baseline condition.  Trace 2 shows the minimum condition (culture fit 
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= -1). Trace 3 shows the maximum condition (culture fit = 1).   Trace 2, showing the 
minimum condition, peaks at 1.83 at 7.1 years; after ten years it is 0.17.  Trace 3 reaches 
4.36 after ten years.  Of the three organizational inertia factors, culture fit is the most 
important.  The mechanism for the behavior patterns shown in Figure 100 is the same as 
for the other inertia factors (shown in Figures 4-47 and 4-48).  The behavior shown in 
Figure 100 is expected. 
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Figure 100: Culture Fit Extreme Conditions Test 
 
Organizational Inertia Factors. 
Organizational Inertia Factors: Scale (0 to 1) 
 
Note: The scale factors were derived from the literature review outlined in 
Chapter 4, so they will not be changed during extreme conditions testing. 
 
For extreme conditions testing purposes, the organizational inertia factors (top 
level support, database quality, and culture fit) will be combined at their extreme 
points.  Since these three factors have 2 sampling points each, the complete 
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combination set will consist of nine combinations (including baseline) as shown 
in Table 39. 
 
Table 39: Combinations of the Organizational Inertia Factors at Extreme Points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of simulation runs was too numerous to number and track on a 
graphical output.  The model was sensitive to the combination of the three organizational 
inertia factors at their extreme points (-1,-1,-1) and (1,1,1). 
Extreme Policy Test 
Management Interventions. 
Note: The weighting factors for learning management factor, reward system 
management factor, change process management factor, and continuity 
management factor were derived from the literature review as outlined in Chapter 
4, so they will not be changed during extreme conditions testing.  The actual 
variables for learning management, reward system management, change process 
management, and continuity management are functions of the percentages and 
management effort allocator, so cannot be directly tested.  Instead, testing the 
extreme conditions for each of the management intervention percentages will 
achieve the desired testing objective. 
 
 
 
Simulation Top Level Support Database Quality Culture Fit
1 0 0 0
2 -1 -1 -1
3 -1 -1 1
4 -1 1 -1
5 -1 1 1
6 1 -1 -1
7 1 -1 1
8 1 1 -1
9 1 1 1
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Management Capacity. 
Management Capacity: Scale (0 to 1) 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes the manager is using all of his time as the 
GeoBase manager and consistently exerts maximum effort on improving GeoBase 
operating capability and managing the GeoBase integration process): 
Management Capacity = 1 
 
MIN: Manager only spends a percentage of his time increasing the operating 
capability of GeoBase and gives no heed to managing the GeoBase integration 
process beyond operating capability: Management Capacity = 0 
 
MAX: see baseline condition 
 
Figure 101 presents the results of the management capacity extreme conditions 
test.  Trace 1 shows the baseline and maximum condition (management capacity = 1).  
Trace 2 shows the minimum condition (management capacity = 0).  Trace 2 shows 
Integration stays at zero throughout the simulation, as is to be expected when there is no 
management effort whatsoever.  
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Figure 101: Management Capacity Extreme Conditions Test 
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Learning Management Percentage. 
Learning Management Percentage: Scale (0 to 1) – with constraint that all 
management intervention percentages must sum to 1 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes manager equally partitions his time between 
each of the four management interventions, outside of increasing operating 
capability): Learning Management Percentage = 0.25 
 
MIN: Manager focuses no time on learning management and focuses the rest of 
his time on a combination of the other three management interventions: 
Learning Management Percentage = 0 
Reward System Management Percentage = 0.333 
Change Process Management Percentage = 0.333 
Continuity Management Percentage = 0.333 
 
MAX: Manager focuses all of his time on learning management and no time on 
any of the other three interventions: Learning Management Percentage = 1 
 
Figure 102 presents the results of the extreme conditions test for learning 
management percentage.  Trace 1 shows the baseline condition (all management 
intervention percentages equally weighted at 0.25).  Trace 2 shows the minimum 
condition for learning management percentage (learning management percentage = 0 
with the other three management interventions equally weighted at 0.333 apiece).  Trace 
3 shows the maximum condition for learning management percentage (learning 
management percentage = 1 and the others equal zero).  It is interesting to note that when 
the manager is completely fixated on learning management, integration stays close to 
zero throughout the simulation period.  The reason for this result is due to the fact that the 
manager never applies effort to move potential adopters to adopters.  The adopter stock 
never increases, so integration never increases.  For any potential adopter to move from 
the potential adopter stock to the adopter stock, the manager must focus some effort on 
either change process management or reward system management.  Comparing Traces 1 
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and 2, there are also some interesting observations.  When learning management is non-
existent, in favor of other management interventions, there is slightly better performance 
in the short-term, but the longer-term performance is lower.  The ten-year integration 
value for Trace 2 is 3.47 (as opposed to the baseline value of 3.81).  This result shows 
that including some level of learning management is beneficial in the system, but a 
cosmopolitan management intervention approach is better.  
 
10:53 AM   Mon, Dec 16, 2002
0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00
Time
1:
1:
1:
0.00
3.00
6.00
1: Integration 2: Integration 3: Integration
1 1
1
1
2 2
2
2
3 3 3 3
Learning mgt EC Test (Learning…  
Figure 102: Learning Management Percentage Extreme Conditions Test 
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Reward System Management Percentage. 
Reward System Management Percentage: Scale (0 to 1) – with constraint that 
all management intervention percentages must sum to 1 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes manager equally partitions his time between 
each of the four management interventions, outside of increasing operating 
capability): Reward System Management Percentage = 0.25 
 
MIN: Manager focuses no time on reward system management and focuses the 
rest of his time on a combination of the other three management interventions: 
Reward System Management Percentage = 0 
Learning Management Percentage = 0.333 
Change Process Management Percentage = 0.333 
Continuity Management Percentage = 0.333 
 
MAX: Manager focuses all of his time on reward system management and no 
time on any of the other three interventions:  
Reward System Management Percentage = 1 
 
Figure 103 presents the results of the reward system management percentage 
extreme conditions test.  Trace 1 shows the baseline condition (all management 
intervention percentages equally weighted at 0.25).  Trace 2 shows the minimum 
condition for reward system management percentage (reward system management 
percentage = 0 with the other three management interventions equally weighted at 0.333 
apiece).  Trace 3 shows the maximum condition for reward system management 
percentage (reward system management percentage = 1 and the others equal zero).  It is 
interesting to note that without any management focus on reward system management 
(Trace 2), integration significantly lags the baseline but eventually rises to approximately 
the same long-term value.  Trace 3 shows that a complete focus on reward system 
management speeds integration in the short term, but the long-term performance is 
slightly lower (3.74 after ten years as opposed to 3.81 after ten years for the baseline).  
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These results show that the manager should focus some percentage of his effort on 
reward system management.  
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Change Process Management Percentage. 
Change Process Management Percentage: Scale (0 to 1) – with constraint that 
all management intervention percentages must sum to 1 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes manager equally partitions his time between 
each of the four management interventions, outside of increasing operating 
capability): Change Process Management Percentage = 0.25 
 
MIN: Manager focuses no time on change process management and focuses the 
rest of his time on a combination of the other three management interventions: 
Change Process Management Percentage = 0 
Learning Management Percentage = 0.333 
Reward System Management Percentage = 0.333 
Continuity Management Percentage = 0.333 
 
MAX: Manager focuses all of his time on change process management and no 
time on any of the other three interventions:  
Change Process Management Percentage = 1 
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Figure 104 presents the results of the change process management percentage 
extreme conditions test.  Trace 1 shows the baseline condition (all management 
intervention percentages equally weighted at 0.25).  Trace 2 shows the minimum 
condition for change process management percentage (change process management 
percentage = 0 with the other three management interventions equally weighted at 0.333 
apiece).  Trace 3 shows the maximum condition for change process management 
percentage (change process management percentage = 1 and the others equal zero).  
When the manager focuses no effort on change process management, integration 
significantly lags the baseline integration performance in both the short-term and long-
term.  The ten-year integration value for Trace 2 is 3.55.  When the manager focuses 
complete attention on change process management (Trace 3) to the exclusion of the other 
factors, there is better short-term performance, but less long-term performance. The ten-
year integration value for Trace 3 is 3.48 (compared to the baseline ten-year value of 
3.81).  These results show that managers should focus some of their effort on change 
process management.      
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Figure 104: Change Process Management Percentage Extreme Conditions Test 
 
Continuity Management Percentage. 
Continuity Management Percentage: Scale (0 to 1) – with constraint that all 
management intervention percentages must sum to 1 
 
Baseline condition (Model assumes manager equally partitions his time between 
each of the four management interventions, outside of increasing operating 
capability): Continuity Management Percentage = 0.25 
 
MIN: Manager focuses no time on continuity management and focuses the rest of 
his time on a combination of the other three management interventions: 
Continuity Management Percentage = 0 
Reward System Management Percentage = 0.333 
Change Process Management Percentage = 0.333 
Learning Management Percentage = 0.333 
 
MAX: Manager focuses all of his time on continuity management and no time on 
any of the other three interventions: Continuity Management Percentage = 1 
 
Figure 105 presents the results of the continuity management percentage extreme 
conditions test.  Trace 1 shows the baseline condition (all management intervention 
percentages equally weighted at 0.25).  Trace 2 shows the minimum condition for 
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continuity management percentage (continuity management percentage = 0 with the other 
three management interventions equally weighted at 0.333 apiece).  Trace 3 shows the 
maximum condition for continuity management percentage (continuity management 
percentage = 1 and the others equal zero).  It is interesting to note that under the baseline 
condition, the manager actually harms both short and long-term integration performance 
by focusing any effort on continuity management.  Trace 2 shows that integration rises 
sooner and comes to a higher ten-year value of 4.05 (as opposed to 3.81 for the baseline).  
When the manager focuses all attention on continuity management (to the detriment of 
the other management interventions), integration stays close to zero.  This occurs for the 
same reason complete focus on learning management does not allow integration to build-
up over time.  There has to be some level of reward or change process management in the 
system or none of the potential adopters will flow to the adopter side.  Without adopters, 
integration goes nowhere.  The reason the system actually performs better without any 
management focus on continuity is due to the weak baseline values for continued use 
inertia.  Investing managerial time in continuity management will only out-produce the 
other management interventions if there is a significant level of continued use inertia 
building up.  Otherwise, the manager would be wise to accept the baseline continuity 
contribution and focus his efforts elsewhere. 
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Figure 105: Continuity Management Percentage Extreme Conditions Test 
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